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Abstract 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a major cause of hospital-acquired 
infection, which is associated with increased cost and length of hospital stays and 
substantial morbidity and mortality. The rapid progression of whole-genome sequencing 
(WGS) technologies over the past decade has provided highly detailed and discriminatory 
insights into the epidemiology of MRSA. However, WGS is still not implemented in the 
routine surveillance of MRSA at a local, regional or national level. This thesis applies WGS 
to a number of questions and populations to describe its benefits. 
 
Standard infection control investigation commonly uses the antimicrobial susceptibility 
patterns (ASPs, patterns of susceptibility and resistance to commonly used antibiotics) of 
MRSA as a surrogate for bacterial relatedness. As they are readily available, ASPs are often 
combined with patient movement to evaluate putative MRSA outbreaks in hospitals. The 
accuracy of this method was evaluated by comparing linked cases based on MRSA ASPs 
versus linked cases based on whole-genome relatedness, using data from a year-long 
prospective observational cohort study of 1,465 MRSA-positive individuals. The 
sensitivity and specificity of ASP in the presence of a direct ward contact was 44% and 
85%, respectively; in the presence of a shared residential post code, the sensitivity and 
specificity of ASP is 59% and 76%, respectively. This demonstrates that compared to WGS 
plus epidemiology, ASP and epidemiology does not reliably identify or refute transmission 
events. 
 
A lineage referred to as epidemic (E)-MRSA15 is largely considered to be associated with 
hospital settings, but an epidemiological and genomic investigation of a MRSA outbreak 
in a General Practice (GP) identified 15 people who were E-MRSA15 positive, the majority 
of which shared a link to a leg ulcer/podiatry clinic in the GP surgery. The outbreak had 
not been detected previously, and was only identified post-hoc from MRSA sequence data, 
highlighting the importance of MRSA sequencing to detect otherwise cryptic community 
outbreaks.  
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The utility of WGS for the investigation of regional MRSA epidemiology was explored for 
two potentially high-risk MRSA lineages (USA300 and ST2371) that are otherwise 
unmonitored by current surveillance. Screening the genomes of MRSA isolated from 1,465 
people identified over a 12-month period demonstrated that 4.2% of cases were positive 
for MRSA USA300, with multiple introductions and household transmissions identified. 
Five people were positive for ST2371, all of whom had a direct or indirect link to a 
substantial outbreak in an intensive care unit at Addenbrooke’s Hospital in 2011, thus 
confirming the value of WGS in regional epidemiological investigations.  
 
The feasibility and utility of incorporating WGS into routine national MRSA surveillance 
was evaluated through a combined epidemiological and genomic survey of MRSA 
bacteraemia undertaken in England over a one-year period. This captured 903 reported 
cases of MRSA bacteraemia, with 425 isolates available for sequencing. Almost two thirds 
of isolates were assigned to multi-locus sequence type clonal complex (CC) 22. The 
addition of MRSA genomes from published outbreak investigations showed that the study 
genomes could provide context for outbreak isolates and supported cluster identification. 
Potentially high-risk lineages were also detected. These findings support the integration of 
epidemiological and genomic surveillance for MRSA bacteraemia as a first step towards a 
comprehensive national surveillance programme.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Staphylococcus aureus: Microbiology  
1.1.1. Microbiological Characteristics and Identification 
Staphylococcus aureus is a facultative anaerobic Gram-positive coccus, which is typically 
distinguished microbiologically from other staphylococci by its gold coloured colonies on 
blood agar and production of the enzyme, coagulase.  It ferments mannitol, produces 
DNAse and catalase, and tends to appear beta-haemolytic on blood agar. It is a hardy non-
sporulating bacterium which tolerates high salinity, temperatures up to approximately 
60oC, and resists drying.1 
 
1.1.2. Colonisation and Disease 
A human commensal, the most common site of colonisation of S. aureus in adults is the 
anterior nares.2,3 Approximately 20% of individuals are persistent nasal carriers, 30% 
intermittent carriers and 50% non-carriers.3 Environmental, host and bacterial factors have 
been shown to impact the colonisation status of an individual.  Rates of colonisation are 
high in those undertaking dialysis, those with diabetes, those undergoing surgery and those 
with immunodeficiencies.4  
 
S. aureus is one of the most common causes of bacterial infection and can cause disease 
both locally through infection of the a body site, or at a distance through toxin production.5 
If S. aureus is isolated from a site manifesting disease (showing clinical signs of infection) 
or a sterile site of the body, such as blood or joint fluid, then the microbiological diagnosis 
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of infection is made.  Asymptomatic carriage is a strong contributor to the risk of disease 
because infection with S. aureus tends to be endogenous in nature.2,6 Persistent nasal 
carriage is also associated with a higher risk of infection.7 It is a common cause of skin and 
soft tissue infection (SSTI) but can cause a wide range of infection from uncomplicated 
SSTI such as furuncles and carbuncles to serious invasive diseases such as infective 
endocarditis and osteomyelitis. An increased risk of infection is seen in those who are male, 
young or elderly.5  
 
1.1.3. Methicillin Resistance  
In day-to-day clinical practice, S. aureus is commonly referred to as methicillin-susceptible 
(MSSA), or methicillin-resistant (MRSA), as this impacts upon treatment regimens. 
Methicillin is no longer used clinically, and in the United Kingdom (UK), the β-Lactam 
antibiotic flucloxacillin is a typical first-line treatment for S. aureus infections. MSSA is 
susceptible to the majority of β-Lactam antibiotics. MRSA, however, is resistant to most 
β-Lactam antibiotics, including penicillins, cephalosporins and carbapenems. This includes 
the commonly used semi-synthetic penicillin, flucloxacillin. Resistance is due to the 
presence of a mobile genetic element (MGE) known as the staphylococcal cassette 
chromosome mec (SCCmec) within the staphylococcal chromosome.8,9 The presence of 
SCCmec is therefore sometimes considered the defining feature of MRSA.10  
 
MRSA was first isolated in the UK in 1961.11 Based on epidemiological evidence, it had 
long been thought that the introduction of methicillin into widespread clinical practice in 
1960 was the main evolutionary driver for MRSA emergence. However, a study by Harkins 
and colleagues in 2017 showed using Bayesian phylogenetic reconstruction that an 
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ancestral type I SCCmec element was acquired by a methicillin-susceptible strain of S. 
aureus in the mid-1940s.12 They hypothesised, therefore, that the widespread use of first 
generation β-Lactam antibiotics such as penicillin was the main driver for widespread 
dissemination of a pre-existing lineage of MRSA.  
 
Currently, there are 11 types of SCCmec element recognised in S. aureus, each consisting 
of a unique combination of mec gene complex and the cassette chromosome recombinase 
(ccr) gene complex.10,13 The mec gene complex carries one of two genes which, to date, 
have been recognised to encode methicillin resistance. In the vast majority of MRSA 
lineages, the mec gene complex contains mecA, a gene which encodes an altered penicillin 
binding protein (PBP) 2a.14,15 The bacteriostatic action of β-Lactam antibiotics is mediated 
by competition for the active site of the transpeptidase domain of PBPs. This blocks access 
to the substrate and prevents the cross-linking of the peptidoglycan strands that is required 
for efficient bacterial cell wall synthesis.16 Therefore, because MRSA has an altered PBP, 
it has a lowered affinity to β-Lactam antibiotics and cell wall synthesis can continue despite 
the antibiotic presence.15 
 
There are, however, some exceptions to the descriptions above. A minority of MRSA 
isolates do not carry the mecA gene but instead the mec complex contains a mecC gene. 
Reported in 2011, this mecA homologue encodes a modified PBP2a to mediate methicillin 
resistance.17 A recent report by Becker et al., 2018, describes the first case of a mecB gene 
being identified in an MRSA from a nasal screening sample in Muenster, Germany. Prior 
to this, the mecB gene had only been identified in Macrococcus caseolyticus, not within 
staphylococcal species.18  In addition, whilst it is still terminology in common use, MRSA 
is no longer considered resistant to all β-Lactam antibiotics. In the last decade a number of 
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altered β-Lactam antibiotic agents that maintain some activity against MRSA have been 
developed, such as Ceftaroline and Ceftobiprole.19,20 
 
1.2. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
1.2.1. Clinical Features of MRSA Infection 
MRSA causes the same broad spectrum of disease as that seen in MSSA infections (Section 
1.1.2). These broad clinical manifestations mean that clinical suspicion for MRSA infection 
is often based on the identification of risk factors.  The people at greatest risk for MRSA 
infection are those with a history of prolonged hospital admission, surgery (within a year), 
renal dialysis, indwelling device/catheter or residence within a long-term care facility 
(LTCF).21 Whilst MRSA is not necessarily more virulent then susceptible strains, MRSA 
infections have been shown to be associated with an increased length of stay in hospital, 
increased mortality and higher costs.22 There are a number of factors hypothesised to 
contribute to this, such as increased time to optimal antibiotic therapy being commenced 
and presence of co-morbidities and complications in the hospital populations where 
infection rates are highest.23,24 
 
1.2.3. History of MRSA in England 
Currently, successful lineages of MRSA are widely disseminated globally, especially 
within hospitals. Stefani et al., 2012, reviewed a number of global studies and describe how 
MRSA rates greater than 50% were seen in North and South America, Asia and Malta. The 
lowest prevalence rates are seen in Scandinavia and the Netherlands.25 Throughout history, 
S. aureus lineages have been observed to emerge, expand, and then decline,26 and MRSA 
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appears to behave no differently.27 Around the time of its discovery in the early 1960s, 
MRSA was uncommon in England.28 There was a marked increase in MRSA infections in 
the 1980s with the spread of an MRSA lineage known as epidemic (E) EMRSA-1.29 
Reacher et al., 2000, described how methicillin-resistance increased from 1.7% to 3.8% of 
all S. aureus from 1990 to 1993, to 32% in 1997 and reached 34% in 1998.30 The increasing 
infection rates generated a high level of public concern and media attention.  Rates of 
MRSA bacteraemia reached an all-time high by 2003 with around 7,700 cases per year,31 
followed by a gradual decrease to current levels. Since 2014, levels have remained 
relatively constant at around ~800 cases of MRSA bacteraemia per year.32   
 
Whilst the rise in MRSA infection in the 1990s – 2000s has been attributed to the expansion 
of EMRSA-16 and EMRSA-15 lineages,33,34 it is more difficult to disentangle the cause of 
the decline of MRSA in England. Historic decreases, such as those seen after early 
outbreaks in Switzerland and Denmark in the 1970s, were attributed to improved infection 
control and antibiotic stewardship.35,36 MRSA bacteraemia in England declined at a 
substantial rate alongside control initiatives such as active surveillance, isolation, 
decolonisation regimens, improved care of intravenous devices and environmental 
decontamination being introduced. Due to such a rapid introduction of these initiatives, it 
has not been possible to robustly determine the contribution of each intervention to the 
decline in rates. Indeed, it has been proposed that one of the endemic lineages, EMRSA-
16, was in fact already in decline prior to these initiatives being introduced.37 Conflicting 
with the hypothesis that the decline of MRSA bacteraemia is attributed to strengthened 
infection control initiatives is that the rate of MSSA bacteraemia, which should respond in 
a similar way to such interventions, has continued to increase, rather than decrease, since 
rates began to be monitored in 2011.32 Because of this uncertainty, it is commonly regarded 
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that it is most likely that a multifaceted strengthening of infection control measures 
alongside potential changes in the population structure of MRSA have together caused the 
observed reduction in MRSA bacteraemia.37-39  
 
1.2.4. Current Epidemiology of MRSA Bacteraemia in England 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the substantial variation in the distribution of MRSA across 
Europe, with a North-South gradient visible. Comparison between the two maps shows the 
substantial decrease in MRSA in England in the last decade. The most recent report shows 
that England reported about 5-10% of invasive S. aureus isolates as methicillin-resistant in 
2016.  
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Figure 1.1. Proportion of invasive Staphylococcus aureus resistant to methicillin, 
MRSA, by EU/EEA countries, 2009 and 2016. Reproduced from: Surveillance of 
antimicrobial resistance in Europe, ECDC, 2009 and 2016. 
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Within England, absolute numbers of MRSA bacteraemia cases collected through 
mandatory reporting form the primary method of surveillance (Section 1.5.3). Over the last 
five years, rates of MRSA bacteraemia have remained at around 1.5 per 100,000 population 
per year. Surveillance indicates that there is geographical variation in the rates of MRSA 
bacteraemia across England with a North-South trend (Figure 1.2). NHS England North 
(Greater Manchester) report the highest rates at 2.1 cases per 100,000 in 2016/2017, with 
NHS England South (Wessex) reporting the fewest cases at 0.7 cases per 100,000 in the 
same year.32    
 
Figure 1.2. Geographic distribution of MRSA rates per 100,000 population. 2016/2017 
MRSA rates are used in combination with 2015/2016 population rates as later data was not 
available. Reproduced from: Public Health England. Annual Epidemiological 
Commentary. 2016-2017.32 
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Surveillance data are also collected on whether the bacteraemia began in, or was ascribed 
to, the community or hospital. These data suggest that despite relatively consistent rates of 
MRSA bacteraemia overall on a national level, there are changes in the finer level 
epidemiology. Most recently, it has become apparent that a greater proportion of cases are 
being acquired outside of hospital Trusts, such as in community facilities managed by 
clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) (Table 1.1). There are a number of potential 
explanations for this, including changes in the circulating lineages, increasing amounts and 
complexity of care being delivered outside of hospitals and the focus of MRSA control 
initiatives in the hospital setting. Indeed, it has been proposed that the changes may be due 
to patients being discharged earlier and therefore symptoms of infection acquired in 
hospital developing only when patients are back in the community.32  
 
Table 1.1. MRSA counts and rates by Post Infection Review assignment, England, 
from 2013/2014 until 2016/2017. Reproduced from: PHE, Annual Epidemiological 
Commentary, 2016/2017.   
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1.3. Identification of MRSA 
1.3.1. Laboratory Identification of MRSA 
Typically, laboratory identification of an antibiotic resistant bacterium would require 
culture and identification of the organism followed by antibiotic susceptibility testing. 
Whilst this is still applicable for clinical samples, the aim to identify patients with MRSA 
promptly upon admission to hospital, and the volume of samples obtained through 
universal screening, means that there has been substantial demand for identification 
methods which minimise processing time from screening swab to report. In England, the 
standard protocol issued by Public Health England details the culture of a screening swab 
directly onto chromogenic selective MRSA medium with or without prior broth 
enrichment. Incubation requires 18-48 hours, with cultures being read daily.40  
 
1.3.2. Typing of MRSA  
Typing confers the ability to distinguish between strains of MRSA. In order to distinguish 
between MRSA isolates involved in an outbreak, a high level of discriminatory ability is 
required when compared to typing isolates to determine their evolutionary relationships or 
phylogeography.  There are a number of phenotypic and genotypic methods which have 
been used to type MRSA. Phenotypic methods include phage typing, serotyping and 
antibiotic susceptibility profiles. Molecular typing methods include Multi-locus Sequence 
Typing (MLST), pulsed field gel electrophoresis, Multiple-Loci Variable Number Tandem 
Repeat Analysis, staphylococcal protein A (spa) typing, and whole-genome sequencing 
(WGS). Currently, antibiotic susceptibility profiles (ASP) tend to be the most 
commonplace surrogate typing method used to compare isolates in clinical laboratories, 
whilst molecular methods such as MLST, SCCmec and spa typing are routinely used by 
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referral laboratories such as the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory at Public Health 
England, Colindale.41 
 
1.3.3. Multi-locus Sequence Typing 
First developed by Maiden et al. to type Neisseria meningitidis,42 MLST is a well-
established typing method which utilises the variation within seven, highly-conserved 
housekeeping genes to determine bacterial relatedness. The essential metabolic functions 
of these genes means that changes to nucleotide sequences are slow and therefore provide 
insight into bacterial evolution over large timeframes.43 Once the nucleotide sequence of 
each locus has been determined, the data are entered into an online centralised database 
(https://pubmlst.org/) and an allelic profile allocated. Seven numbers are allocated, one for 
each locus, forming an allelic profile, and a corresponding ‘sequence type’ (ST) is 
allocated. STs are then grouped into clonal complexes (CC) based on relatedness.44 The 
population structure of MRSA is highly clonal, with low levels of homologous 
recombination, and therefore MLST relatively accurately reflects the population 
structure.45 It is also reproducible between laboratories, and easy to collate and compare 
via online databases. The requirement to sequence seven genes acts as a barrier to 
widespread use since this is time-consuming, expensive and requires specialist 
equipment.25  
 
1.3.4. spa typing 
spa typing is a single-locus genotyping method that is routinely used for typing MRSA. It 
involves determining the variation in nucleotide sequence and number and type of repeats 
within the highly variable X-region of the staphylococcal Protein A gene.46 After 
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determining the sequence using PCR, the nucleotide sequence is entered into an online 
centralised database in order to determine the spa type (e.g. 
https://www.spaserver.ridom.de).47 Resolution is comparable to multi-locus methods such 
as MLST, but being a single-locus method, spa typing does not indicate genetic relatedness. 
It is, however, cheaper than MLST and it is possible to apply a clustering algorithm, known 
as Based Upon Repeat Pattern (BURP), to group related spa types together into clusters.48  
 
1.3.5. SCCmec typing 
PCR typing of the SCCmec type can provide useful supplementary data to MLST and/or 
spa typing of MRSA (e.g. ST8-t008-MRSA-IV).  The SCCmec type is often used to provide 
additional information on the isolate, based on the less stable MGEs within the genome. 
Typically, the larger SCCmec types (I, II and III) are more abundant within lineages 
regarded as hospital associated, whereas the smaller SCCmec types IV and V are often 
found within those more commonly regarded as community clones, although this is less 
informative now that community clones are increasingly common in hospitals, and vice 
versa.49 50 
 
1.3.6. Antibiotic Susceptibility Profiles 
Antibiotic susceptibility profiles or antibiograms are routinely used by infection control 
practitioners to identify potentially related isolates. Once a clinical sample enters the 
laboratory, culture is set up and if a potential pathogen is isolated, identification and 
antibiotic susceptibility testing is carried out. To identify the organism, observation of 
colonial morphology, microscopy and biochemical tests are undertaken. Traditionally, 
antibiotic susceptibility has been determined using disk diffusion testing. Having isolated 
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a pure culture of the bacterium, a solution with a specific turbidity (typically 0.5 
McFarland) of the organism is spread across an agar plate (often Müller-Hinton agar with 
or without supplementation). Paper disks containing pre-defined concentrations of 
antibiotic agents are placed on the inoculated agar, and the plates incubated in certain 
conditions for defined time periods, normally between 16 and 20 hours.51 Measurement of 
the size of the zone of inhibition (no growth) around the disk are compared to predefined 
zone sizes to determine whether the bacterium is susceptible or resistant to each antibiotic.52 
The most rapid phenotypic susceptibility testing is known as direct susceptibility testing 
(DST), where an unstandardized volume of inoculum is plated directly from the clinical 
sample to susceptibility testing, in some cases reducing time to provisional results from 
about 36 hours to 12 hours. However, for formal antibiotic susceptibility with a 
standardised volume of inoculum, the need to culture the organism during processing 
means that at least 36 hours of processing is required in the laboratory. 
 
1.4. Community-associated MRSA 
1.4.1. Emergence of CA-MRSA 
In the 1990s, reports of MRSA infections in individuals lacking ‘typical’ MRSA risk 
factors (section 1.2.1) began to emerge. Using epidemiological criteria, the absence of prior 
healthcare contact meant that these infections were defined as community-associated 
MRSA (CA-MRSA). Although first described in Australia,53 the United States (US) has 
experienced the most extensive spread of CA-MRSA.50,54 Early investigations showed that 
rather than representing ‘overspill’ of hospital-associated strains into the community, these 
community strains were genomically distinguishable from the hospital strains.55 Indeed, 
the early strains which were defined as CA-MRSA tended to carry the smaller SCCmec 
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types IV and V, and Panton-Valentin Leucocidin (PVL), a virulence factor associated with 
SSTI and necrotising pneumonia.  CA-MRSA strains also carried fewer antibiotic 
resistance genes than hospital associated lineages.55 The combination of epidemiology and 
genomics within the definition of CA-MRSA has proven challenging, with CA- lineages 
spreading within hospitals, and no stable genomic marker or antibiotic susceptibility pattern 
representing community association.  
 
1.4.2. USA300 MRSA 
The CA-MRSA pulsotype USA300 has proven particularly troublesome in the US. It was 
first reported in 1999 and this was followed by widespread dissemination and an epidemic 
of MRSA infection in otherwise healthy people.56,57 A community associated clone, by 
2004, this lineage was responsible for up to 97% of skin and soft tissue infection (SSTI) 
presenting to US emergency departments (ED).50 USA300 also causes invasive disease, 
such as pneumonia and osteomyelitis, and over time USA300 has become endemic in US 
hospitals where it causes hospital-associated infections including bacteraemia.58,59 USA300 
is readily transmitted within households, which act as long-term reservoirs associated with 
repeated episodes of infection and onward transmission.60,61 Antimicrobial resistance to 
macrolides and fluoroquinolones is common.50 An epidemic of CA-MRSA infection 
caused by a clone that is closely related to USA300 but which arose independently 
(USA300 Latin-American variant, USA300-LV) has also been identified in South 
America.62  
 
International travel is an important contributor to the inter-continental spread of infectious 
diseases,63 and the spread of USA300 and USA300-LV have been documented 
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globally.56,64 However, in the UK, the vast majority of MRSA infections continue to be 
caused by the dominant hospital-associated lineage EMRSA-15 (ST22).65 USA300 is 
considered to be of low prevalence in continental Europe, presenting primarily as sporadic 
cases and discrete, small outbreaks.66-72 Similarly, sporadic cases and a single hospital 
outbreak caused by USA300 have been described in the UK,73-76 but the prevalence of 
USA300 carriage and infection is unknown.  
 
1.5. MRSA Prevention and Control 
1.5.1. Infection Surveillance 
Surveillance is defined as ‘the systematic and continuous collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data, closely integrated with the timely and coherent dissemination of 
results to those who have the right to know so that action can be taken.’77 More simply, this 
can be considered as ‘information for action.’ Infectious disease surveillance systems are 
typically divided into active and passive surveillance methods. Active surveillance refers 
to the active solicitation of data, whereas passive surveillance refers to those systems that 
utilise routinely collected information to monitor infection, with the responsibility lying 
with the laboratory or health provider.78 Methods used in both groups have advantages and 
limitations, depending on the infection, population and aim of surveillance. Importantly, 
active surveillance is more labour-intensive and expensive than passive surveillance. 
Passive is more sustainable over longer time periods, but is dependent on the quality of 
data recorded for an alternative purpose, and therefore vulnerable to under-reporting.  
 
Syndromic surveillance refers to the monitoring of rates of infection based on the 
occurrence of a group of signs and symptoms (syndrome), which may be caused by that 
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infection. In the UK, the general practitioner is the first point of contact for most patients 
and consequently, the majority of infections will be managed by these teams in the 
community. The short duration of most illnesses and the time frame associated with 
submission and processing of samples in the laboratory mean that until point-of-contact 
testing is commonplace, general practitioners rely on ‘syndromic diagnosis’ alongside a 
judgement of risk of patient deterioration, in order to determine their management 
strategy.79 Monitoring infection rates can be undertaken by extracting data on symptoms, 
signs, clinical diagnosis and treatments from clinical coding systems. Syndromic 
surveillance therefore monitors rates of infections where no organism has been identified, 
providing data trends where otherwise no information would be available. In addition, in 
the case of an outbreak of a novel pathogen, such as the emergence of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV), syndromic surveillance is a useful proxy 
to monitor spread.80  
 
Sentinel surveillance is also a frequently used mechanism for infectious disease 
surveillance. Here, selected facilities with the appropriate staff and facilities for diagnostics 
are used to provide higher quality data than that obtained through passive surveillance.81 
Sentinels are selected according to the population they serve and access to testing. In the 
UK, sentinel surveillance forms an important part of the national influenza surveillance 
programme. Here, during a pre-defined time period corresponding with seasonal influenza 
activity, a selection of general practitioners submit both syndromic data (consultations for 
influenza-like illness) and also nose and throat swabs from patients presenting with this 
syndrome.82 Such a sentinel system can report trends, which can be generalised to a greater 
population and therefore acts as a useful alternative to passive surveillance. Whichever 
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method of surveillance is implemented, it is important that data are collected 
systematically.83 
 
1.5.2. National Surveillance of Infectious Disease in England 
There are a number of surveillance mechanisms for infectious diseases in England. These 
consist of mandatory, enhanced and voluntary systems,84 and are a combination of passive, 
active, sentinel and syndromic systems. Public Health England is a government 
organisation which is responsible for the co-ordination of national infectious disease 
surveillance. Over the past 20 years, there have been various systems implemented to 
systematically capture laboratory data for surveillance purposes. The first national 
electronic system was known as COSURV/LabBase2. This system involved the electronic 
transfer of data from local laboratory information management systems (LIMS) to the 
regional PHE centre. Here, it would be processed before electronic transfer from the 
regional centre to LabBase2,84 where analysis could be undertaken centrally prior to 
feedback to the regional/local level. An additional system, AMSURV, was introduced in 
2009 to electronically capture antibiotic susceptibility profile data to enhance national 
AMR surveillance. In 2014, both systems were replaced by the Second Generation 
Surveillance System (SGSS). This currently receives voluntary submissions of laboratory 
data from 98% of English microbiology laboratories via electronic transfer.85  
 
1.5.3. National Surveillance of MRSA Bacteraemia in England 
The sharp rise in MRSA infections in the 1990s was seen in laboratory surveillance data 
that were submitted voluntarily to the national database, LabBase2. In response to the 
increase, the UK Government (Department of Health) introduced a number of control 
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measures, including mandatory surveillance of MRSA bacteraemia from 2001.32  Indeed, 
for over fifteen years, English hospital Trusts have been required to submit data to Public 
Health England (PHE), as part of a national surveillance system to monitor rates of MRSA 
bacteraemia.38 Initially, these data consisted of aggregated counts of MRSA bacteraemia 
cases, but in 2005 enhanced epidemiological data were requested to provide more 
information about individual cases. When studied retrospectively, this mandatory 
surveillance data now provides reliable information on the trends of MRSA bacteraemia in 
England, with strong epidemiological data on each case. It also has an ascertainment rate 
that is 20% higher than the comparable voluntary surveillance system.86 
 
1.5.4. Post Infection Review of MRSA Bacteraemia Cases 
Since April 2013, the NHS in England has adopted a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to 
preventable MRSA bacteraemia.87 To this end, at the time of writing, PHE co-ordinate a 
‘Post Infection Review’ (PIR) process for each case. The aim of this is to identify the 
organisation where the learning from occurrences would be best placed, be it the acute 
Trust, CCG, or a third party in the case of complex, unassignable cases.88 This is a multi-
disciplinary and cross-organisation process which is equally applied to providers in the 
community and hospitals.  A tool-kit is provided by PHE, which is shown in Figure 1.3. 
After summarising the patient journey through healthcare services, infection control, 
devices, and antimicrobial therapy, an action plan for learning outcomes is produced and 
the case apportioned to one of the organisations. As of April 2018, PIRs will no longer be 
required for every case of MRSA bacteraemia, but instead, only those assigned to 
organisations with the highest rates of infection. These organisations will be determined by 
PHE each year based on past performance.89 
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Figure 1.3. Summary of post infection review toolkit. Adapted from: NHS England. 
Guidance on the reporting and monitoring arrangements and post infection review process 
for MRSA bloodstream infections from April 2014 (version 2).88 
 
1.5.5. Local Prevention and Control of MRSA  
Microbiology services in England are tiered from national to regional to local level. Since 
the ‘Independent review of NHS Pathology Services in England’ reports were published in 
2006 and 2008, there has been widespread consolidation of microbiology laboratory 
services.90 This means that  laboratories may process samples for a wide geographical area, 
including hospitals, community healthcare facilities and general practices. However, 
surveillance and infection control within these distinct areas are often quite different. 
 
A. Case	details	and	timeline	of	healthcare	contactB. Screening	procedures	appliedC. Medical	devices in situD. Appropriateness	of	antimicrobial	therapiesE. Skin integrityF. Risk factors for transmissionG. Hand hygieneH. Other factorsI. Organisational	issuesJ. Governance issues
Summary	of	learning	outcomesK. Statement	of	good	practice
K. Assignment	of	case	to	organisation
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1.5.5.1. Infection Control of MRSA in Hospitals 
Infection control in hospital aims to minimise the risk of acquiring an infection when in 
contact with the healthcare environment.91 For MRSA, methods focus on limiting direct 
transmission. Hand hygiene is a general infection prevention method which is vitally 
important in limiting MRSA spread, as MRSA has been shown to be transmitted on the 
hands of healthcare workers.92 Specific infection control interventions vary dependent on 
local guidelines, but preventative measures include screening for MRSA carriage and for 
those identified as carrying MRSA, decolonisation, isolation and contact precautions  are 
implemented.  
 
At the institutional level, hospitals adopt a number of mechanisms for determining the 
presence and overall prevalence of pathogens within their in-patient populations. The 
rationale behind identifying MRSA positive individuals through screening is that isolation 
and contact precautions can be applied for these cases. Such interventions have been shown 
to interrupt the transmission of MRSA in hospital settings and reduce the risk that the 
individual will develop MRSA infection.93-98 From 2008 until 2014, universal MRSA 
screening of hospital in-patients (including both elective and emergency admissions) was 
undertaken. This consisted of multi-site screening of the patient (typically three sites of the 
nose, throat, axilla, groin) either at the start of their admission or at a pre-admission clinic. 
More recently, Robotham and colleagues, 2016, undertook an effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness analysis of MRSA screening in the UK NHS and showed that universal 
screening was unlikely to be cost-effective at concurrent NHS willingness-to-pay 
thresholds.99 Therefore, the recommendation of universal screening was revised by the 
Department of Health MRSA Screening Implementation Group, and limited to targeted 
screening of high-risk populations only.100  This consists of those previously infected with 
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or colonised by MRSA, and patients admitted to high-risk units.  Currently, those areas 
deemed high-risk are summarised in Table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2. High-risk areas where MRSA screening is recommended by the 
Department of Health MRSA Screening Implementation Group.100 
Defined High-risk Area Areas Subject to Local Risk 
Assessment 
Vascular Specialised services (e.g. transplant) 
Renal/Dialysis Units with history of high endemicity 
Neurosurgery Units with patients at risk of poor 
outcome 
Cardiothoracic surgery  
Haematology/Oncology/BMT  
Trauma and orthopaedics  
Intensive or high care units  
 
 
Isolation and contact precautions typically consist of an individual room, gloves and gowns 
for staff entering the room and for patient contact, and being positioned after other patients 
on operation or procedure lists to reduce the risk of onwards transmission. The regimen for 
decolonisation therapy varies depending on the institution, but the CUH regimen is outlined 
in Figure 1.4. Substantial cost is incurred through implementing such regimens. The most 
recent, comprehensive cost analysis was undertaken by Roth et al., 2018, and showed 
through a prospective cost analysis in a Swiss hospital that contact precautions alone cost 
approximately US$158.90 per patient per day.101 In addition, Cairns et al., 2014, 
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determined that screening based on clinical risk assessment may lead to similar rates of 
detection with greater cost effectiveness than universal screening.102 In practice, isolation 
and contact precautions are continued until MRSA colonisation has been shown to be no 
longer present.100 Depending on the hospital, patients in England tend to be considered 
MRSA negative if three consecutive screens are negative.95,103  
 
 
Figure 1.4. CUH regimen for MRSA decolonisation 
 
In each hospital, the infection control team will receive daily updates of the cases of MRSA, 
often through an automated IT system. The infection control team (ICT) will then review 
the patients, advise on decolonisation therapy and determine appropriate infection control 
measures to minimise the risk of transmission. If there is more than one case of MRSA with 
epidemiological links, the ICT may investigate further regarding a potential outbreak 
(Section 1.5.5.3). 
 
1.5.5.2. Prevention and Control of MRSA in the Community 
In contrast to hospitals, there is greater variation in the structure of infection control 
services in the community. The responsibilities of organisations providing healthcare in the 
community, however, are well-defined. Like hospitals, general practices and similar 
Mupirocin	2%	nasal	ointmentApplied	to	both	nostrils	three	times	per	day	for	five	days
Octenisan wash	concentrateApplied	neat	to	moistened	skin,	left	for	one	minute	and	then	washed	offShampoo hair with Octenisan day 1	and	4
Rescreen 48hours	after	treatment	has	ended	and	then	at	weekly	intervals	for	3	weeks.	
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healthcare facilities are required to meet infection control standards outlined in the Health 
and Social Care Act 2008: Code of Practice on the prevention and control of infections and 
related guidance.104,105 The Care Quality Commission then assesses a provider against 10 
pre-defined criteria to determine compliance to the code of practice (Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3. Table summarising the ‘Code of Practice’ for providers of healthcare on 
the prevention of infections under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. A registered 
provider is judged on how it complies with each regulation related to infection prevention 
outlined below. Reproduced from: The Health and Social Care Act 2008 Code of Practice 
on the prevention and control of infections. 
 
 
What is of great contrast in the community versus hospital setting is the reduced infection 
control manpower and expertise. Whereas each hospital will employ specialist infection 
control doctors and nurses, in the community setting an ‘infection control lead’ will hold 
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responsibility for the compliances detailed in Table 1.3. This individual is likely to be a 
general practitioner, practice nurse or practice manager who has undertaken specific 
infection control training, rather than an infection specialist.  
 
There are, however, overarching teams which offer support to individual practices. Using 
the Cambridgeshire region as an example, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough CCG 
employs two infection control nurses to provide support and specialist advice to facilities 
commissioned by the CCG in the region (e.g. general practices and nursing homes).106 In 
addition, those infections deemed to pose a risk to public health are managed with the PHE 
East of England Health Protection Team, which consists of health protection practitioners 
and consultants in communicable disease control. Some NHS hospital microbiology teams 
also provide infection control advice to practitioners in the community, although the extent 
of this may vary dependent on the contract of service between the laboratory and 
practitioners. In Cambridgeshire, however, general practices are served by the PHE 
laboratory at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. At the time of 
writing, there are currently eight PHE laboratories across England. PHE laboratories aim 
to deliver “microbiology support for the investigation, management and control of infection 
and outbreaks of communicable disease.”107 Each PHE laboratory serves a defined 
geographical region and employs a regional public health microbiologist to oversee the 
delivery of public health microbiology in the region. Where NHS laboratories are 
contracted to provide community services (this is not the case in the Cambridgeshire area), 
the PHE laboratory will act as a ‘back-up’ if particular public health functions cannot be 
delivered.107  
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MRSA is not considered a ‘notifiable’ organism of concern to public health, and cases or 
outbreaks in the community do not automatically require input from public health teams. 
Therefore, in Cambridgeshire, the author’s experience has shown that cases tend to be 
managed by community practitioners with advice from the CCG infection control nurses, 
and advice from hospital/PHE microbiologists if sought.  
 
Typically, general practitioners have only been required to screen individual patients for 
MRSA in exceptional circumstances, such as a patient having surgery in a hospital within 
a different region.103 If an individual is positive on screening but asymptomatic and not due 
to attend hospital, then decolonisation is not required. If MRSA is suspected clinically and 
sampled, or detected unexpectedly on an infected clinical sample, then decolonisation is 
advocated. If no specific policy is present, general practitioners may be advised to follow 
local hospital protocols regarding decolonisation therapy (e.g. Figure 1.4).103  
 
Increasing amounts of complex care and procedures are being moved from hospitals to the 
community, as outlined in the “NHS Five Year Forward View,” 2014.108 Given this, 
relevant infection control measures which are implemented in secondary care may need to 
be transferred to primary care if a patient is MRSA positive. For example, in secondary 
care, patients with MRSA are placed at the end of procedure lists to reduce the chance of 
cross-contamination. In primary care, this is more difficult to administer, for example, as 
appointments may be allocated based on both patient and provider availability. In addition, 
not all healthcare in the community is delivered in a clinic setting, for example some 
professionals routinely undertake healthcare tasks in patient’s homes.  Consensus opinion 
would suggest that infection control practices would be beneficial in preventing the spread 
of infection in the community setting, but there are few studies in this area and so evidence 
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is lacking. It has, however, been shown that some practices which have become highly 
embedded within hospital practice (e.g. hand hygiene) are not always implemented in 
general practice.109-111 Despite this, the professional guidelines for healthcare professionals 
and regulations for registered providers of healthcare, as outlined above, do stress the 
importance of infection control to prevent infection transmission. 
 
1.5.5.3. Identification and Definition of an MRSA Outbreak 
Both in the community and within hospitals, an outbreak is typically defined as ‘a localised 
increase in the incidence of disease.’77 In practice, the term cluster and outbreak are used 
interchangeably; indeed, it can be argued that the term used may be selected based on how 
‘serious’ terminology needs to sound, with an outbreak sounding more substantial than a 
cluster. Detecting outbreaks can be labour intensive. Historically, outbreaks have tended to 
be discovered if they involve an unusual (e.g. antibiotic resistant) organism, an unusual site 
of infection, or cause a large increase in infections.  More systematic analysis of 
surveillance data can lead to more objective detection of outbreaks. Both methods have 
substantial limitations, ranging from a reliance on human judgement (“gut feeling”), to the 
inflexibility of fixed rules which may miss true outbreaks.  
 
In a typical diagnostic laboratory, the pattern of MRSA susceptibility to different antibiotic 
agents provides the only readily available additional information regarding strain type.  
Therefore, the ASP is often used when considering whether isolates that are associated in 
time or space are related. If the ASPs and basic epidemiology align, this may indicate 
transmission or an outbreak. Samples may then be sent to the PHE Staphylococcal 
Reference Laboratory for further typing to investigate the relatedness of the isolate at a 
higher resolution. The logistics of sending samples to another site for investigation incurs 
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a further time delay of a number of days. Consequently, the initial evaluation of the need 
for infection control intervention will need to be made using ASP data only. In 1999, 
Grundmann et al. attempted to determine the potential of laboratory services in determining 
the cross-transmission of S. aureus. They found that the majority of isolates were from two 
genotypes, as determined by PCR fingerprints. Despite this, most of the patients were 
shown to be epidemiologically unrelated. ASPs have also been shown to act as ‘triggers’ 
for further investigation using genomics in possible outbreaks which have then been 
halted.112,113 With the increased use of WGS in research, a number of studies have 
undertaken small investigations into ASPs versus WGS for detecting MRSA transmission. 
Harris et al., 2013, investigated an outbreak using WGS and identified that two isolates 
were incorrectly excluded due to variation in ASP from the outbreak strain.114 Similarly, 
Azarian et al., 2015, showed through study of MRSA dynamics on a neonatal intensive 
care unit that despite minimal variation in ASP, 10 of the 17 USA300 isolated were 
unrelated.115 Gordon et al., 2018, concluded in their study that ASPs could lead to isolates 
being falsely excluded from outbreak investigations.116 
 
Despite being a cornerstone of infection control practice in both triggering and guiding 
outbreak investigations, at the time of writing there remains no systematic analysis of the 
reliability of ASPs and epidemiology in detecting MRSA transmission.  
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1.6. Whole-Genome Sequencing 
1.6.1. History of WGS 
1.6.1.1. First Generation ‘Sanger Sequencing’ 
The era of whole-genome sequencing began in the 1970s when the first complete DNA 
genome, that of phiX174 bacteriophage, was sequenced by Fred Sanger and his team.117 
Known as Sanger sequencing, in this process nucleotides are incorporated into 450-500bp 
fragments complementary to the template DNA strand.118 Each strand is terminated by the 
integration of a modified nucleotide, known as ddNTP, which also acts as a label for the 
base in situ to be read, typically via gel or capillary electrophoresis.119 The high level of 
accuracy achieved through Sanger sequencing is reflected by high time and cost 
commitments.  
 
1.6.1.2. Second Generation Sequencing 
It is with these limitations in mind that ‘second generation sequencing’ technologies were 
developed. Also known as ‘next generation sequencing’, a number of methods have been 
developed. The technologies used and discussed in this work have been developed by 
Illumina, (San Diego, USA), formerly Solexa, (Cambridge, UK), which is currently the 
dominant provider of second generation sequencing technologies.120 
 
Each time that a sequencing experiment is undertaken and sequencing data is generated, it 
is known as a ‘run’. Small genome sequences generated through sequencing are known as 
‘reads.’ These are assembled by piecing together based on overlaps in the short sequences 
(de novo assembly) or by comparing to a predetermined, related reference genome for 
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which the sequence is already known (mapping). Because the process is error-prone, each 
position is sequenced many times in many reads. The overlap in these reads is known as 
the ‘coverage’.  
 
Second generation sequencing methods prioritise the parallel processing of samples to 
reduce the reaction time and cost, which limited first generation technologies. Illumina 
sequencing works through ‘sequencing by synthesis’. First, native DNA is prepared by the 
creation of a library, the production of DNA fragments of 300-500 base pairs in length. 
Adaptors are attached to these DNA fragments to aid ligation to the flow cell and act as 
primers for PCR amplification. Fluorescently tagged nucleotides are used to determine 
which base is incorporated as the synthesis proceeds, and the sequence is determined. 
Paired-end sequencing is undertaken to provide positional information about the genome.  
In order to achieve increased sample throughput, multiplexing has become an important 
feature of the Illumina platform. Tags are added to the adaptors in the sequencing libraries. 
These tags are recorded and then are sequenced together and separated at the analysis stage.  
Despite this method being higher-throughput, only 100-150 base pairs are of sufficient 
quality and so Illumina technology is limited to generating short read data.  
 
1.6.1.2. Third Generation Sequencing 
The current limitations of second generation sequencing methods such as that provided by 
the Illumina platform are the time required per run and the length of high quality sequence 
that is achievable.  ‘Third generation sequencing’ methods have been designed with the 
aim of addressing these.  
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Of particular interest to public health is the MinION (Oxford Nanopore). This is a highly 
portable technology which can be used with minimal specialist equipment, and generates 
DNA sequences in real-time using nanopore technology. To summarise, DNA strands 
associate with a pore which generates an electrical signal, detected by a sensor. This 
technology is capable of generating much longer sequences than NGS technologies, but 
currently does not produce as high quality data. It has, however, been shown by Quick et 
al., 2015, that this technology could determine if Salmonella samples were part of a hospital 
outbreak within two hours.121 Since then, studies have shown the application to 
identification of transmission of carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae and a 
resistant lineage of Serratia marcescens.122,123 Once this technology and the subsequent 
analysis is optimised, the combination of long read, real-time data, compatability and 
portability will make this of particular interest in public health microbiology.  
 
1.6.2. WGS and MRSA 
1.6.2.1. Insights into Evolution and Population Structure of MRSA Using WGS 
In the last decade, a number of seminal studies have examined the spread and population 
structure of MRSA across the globe using whole-genome sequencing.  In 2010, Harris and 
colleagues were the first to demonstrate the use of WGS in studying the evolution and 
population structure of ST239 MRSA, a multiple antibiotic resistant lineage which at the 
time was responsible for over 90% of HA-MRSA in Asia. They sequenced 43 isolates from 
a global collection of ST239 between 1982 and 2003, and 20 isolates from a Thai hospital.  
The subsequent phylogenetic analyses demonstrated strong evidence for both 
intercontinental spread and hospital transmission of ST239.124 McAdam et al. then studied 
the evolution of the endemic UK lineage by sequencing 60 E-MRSA16 lineage and 27 
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contextual CC30 isolates. Analyses dated the emergence of E-MRSA16 to approximately 
35 years previously and suggested that this lineage had spread from large urban centres 
such as London and then through other regions.125 Also relevant to the UK, Holden et al., 
2013, sequenced 193 MRSA ST22 isolates from around the world to explore the evolution 
and emergence of EMRSA-15, the dominant clone in the UK. They determined that the 
current lineage of EMRSA-15 had emerged from an ancestor which had spread across the 
UK in the 1980s. The current lineage was determined to have emerged in the Midlands in 
the 1980s, and the acquisition of fluoroquinolone resistance may have been pivotal in this 
dissemination.126 
 
1.6.2.2. Local MRSA Outbreak Investigation Using WGS 
WGS offers such a high level of resolution that it is possible to distinguish between isolates 
with one base difference. Because of this, it has offered substantial advances in the 
investigation and management of potential infection outbreaks in hospitals and the 
community. In one of the earliest studies demonstrating this application, Köser et al., 2012, 
retrospectively sequenced isolates from an outbreak on a neonatal intensive care unit.  They 
studied isolates from seven case and control babies and phylogenetic analysis revealed that 
it was possible to clearly distinguish the cluster of outbreak strains from the control isolates. 
They also determined a previously unknown transmission event between two control 
patients.112  
 
Building on from this, Harris et al., 2013, used WGS in real time during a suspected 
outbreak of MRSA linked to a special care baby unit (SCBU).114 This investigation 
identified 26 related cases of MRSA infections and/or carriage, and showed that 
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transmission occurred within the SCBU, between mothers on a postnatal ward, and in the 
community up until the end of 2011. Epidemiological investigation was complicated by 
variation in the antibiotic susceptibility profile of the isolates. The outbreak strain was a 
novel multilocus sequence type, ST2371, related to the dominant hospital-associated 
lineage in the UK (ST22, EMRSA-15) but Panton-Valentine leucocidin (PVL)-positive. A 
case which occurred 64 days after the previous cases triggered healthcare worker screening 
and led to the detection of a worker carrying the outbreak lineage. Decolonisation therapy 
was administered and no further cases identified.  Standard infection control measures had 
failed to characterise isolates involved in the outbreak due to the variation in antibiogram, 
which misled the ICT regarding isolate relatedness.  This also demonstrates the ability of 
WGS to supersede reference laboratory typing as a method of confirmation of isolate 
relatedness, benefiting from discriminatory ability and reduced logistical testing 
constraints.   
 
Similar studies have now been undertaken around the world, demonstrating the practicality 
of using WGS to study MRSA outbreaks in hospitals when traditional infection control 
methods have suggested an outbreak may have occured.113,116,127,128 Whilst the value of 
improved detection and therefore early intervention of outbreaks is easily demonstrated, 
Török et al., 2014, also demonstrated that being able to exclude an outbreak using WGS is 
also beneficial as it allows a step down of control measures, avoiding unnecessary cost.129  
 
1.6.3. Surveillance of MRSA in England using WGS 
In the Chief Medical Officer report, 2011, the significant opportunity offered through novel 
technologies such as whole-genome sequencing and point of care testing to undertake 
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‘more rapid and more discriminating surveillance,’ was discussed.130 Whilst the 
surveillance strategies discussed previously (Section 1.5.2) are integrated within laboratory 
systems and operate continuously and sustainably within Public Health England, other 
organisations also undertake national surveillance programmes for MRSA. The British 
Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (BSAC) have been undertaking surveillance for 
antibiotic resistance for over 15 years. A selection of British laboratories are invited to 
submit 20 S. aureus isolates to BSAC for characterisation each year.131 Furthermore, the 
European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC)-funded European Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance Network (EARS-Net) is a Europe-wide surveillance programme to which 
selected sentinel laboratories submit the first five invasive MRSA isolates processed each 
month.132  
 
Isolates from these collections have been used in research projects to explore the population 
structure of MRSA across Britain and Europe. Reuter et al., 2016, showed that the WGS 
of 1013 MRSA isolates collected through the BSAC surveillance programme between 2001 
and 2010 could be used as a resource for investigation of outbreaks and the tracking of 
antibiotic resistance in England.76 Similarly, Aanensen and colleagues sequenced the 
genomes of 308 S. aureus isolates collected from EARS-Net surveillance across Europe 
(123 of which were MRSA), to demonstrate the importance of representative national and 
international data sets in genomic infection surveillance, and also to show how 
bioinformatic tools are required to manage the data which is generated.133  Both studies 
demonstrate the potential for isolate collections from surveillance programmes to act as 
genomic frameworks to monitor specific lineages and contextualise outbreaks. However, 
both were one-off studies undertaken and grant-funded through academic research and 
currently, there is no real-time genomic surveillance programme for MRSA in England.  
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1.6.4. Challenges to Implementation of WGS in Microbiology Services 
Whilst the potential benefits and proof-of-principle can be evidenced through academic 
research, the implementation of new technologies into clinical and public health practice is 
not a quick process. WGS is now routinely used within academic institutions. However, it 
remains distant from most English clinical microbiology laboratories, which continue to 
rely on ASPs, and in the minority of centres, single gene PCR, to type isolates in-house and 
then send the isolate away to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory for further 
characterisation. Only in April 2017 did the PHE Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory 
switch to routinely undertaking whole-genome sequencing to characterise referred isolates 
rather than spa typing and PCR determination of virulence genes. Therefore, despite the 
rapid development of WGS, there remain a number of challenges to overcome prior to 
implementation of WGS into routine practice.  
 
Work is on-going to improve WGS direct from clinical samples including directly from 
blood cultures.134 Whilst WGS has become increasingly rapid and third generation 
technologies such as Nanopore offer further progress in achieving identification and 
susceptibilities promptly, when a pure culture is required, there will always be a substantial 
time-lag between taking a sample and achieving WGS data. Once it is possible to sequence 
from a clinical sample directly, point-of-care WGS becomes possible, with the associated 
benefits of rapid testing. 
 
Routine WGS will generate vast amounts of data, which will require substantial 
infrastructure for transfer and quality control. Automated data handling and analysis tools 
will be required to ensure data is stored appropriately, and that non-bioinformaticians can 
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interpret and act upon WGS data. Vast amounts of this data will not be of use in day-to-
day clinical practice, and will need to be presented appropriately.  
 
Curated, centralised, open access databases will be required in order for locally generated 
data to be contextualised. This is essential for outbreak analyses. Tools to interrogate such 
databases are already under development.135,136  Standardised protocols for the collection 
and processing of genomic data will also be needed. Further to this, it is necessary that 
epidemiological and genomic data are integrated within a database which is accessible by 
relevant individuals (e.g. clinicians and public health professionals). Whilst this does raise 
concerns regarding ethics and confidentiality, similar web systems, albeit without genomic 
data, are in routine use. HPZone, a web accessible case management database which 
contains sensitive data, is used daily by PHE health protection practitioners 
(http://hpzoneinfo.in-fact.com/).  
 
Whilst academic institutions can fund the upfront and on-going costs for WGS through 
grant-based funding, PHE and NHS funded laboratories are public services and it would be 
untenable to invest in such expensive technology without established evidence of benefit.  
For slow-growing organisms such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis, the long process of 
culture means that current practice is considered sub-optimal. Determining antibiotic 
susceptibilities from WGS data is therefore considered strongly beneficial to both patient 
care and public health, and has progressed rapidly. Currently, genomic susceptibility testing 
is beginning to be trialled against routine clinical practice.137 For organisms such as S. 
aureus, despite increasing evidence of the equivalence of genomic determination of 
resistance,138-140 the relatively rapid turnaround times of culture and phenotypic methods 
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mean that the implementation of genomics into the routine laboratory is likely to take much 
longer. 
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1.7. Thesis Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this work is to use phenotypic, epidemiological and genomic data to 
investigate MRSA surveillance at the local, regional and national level by addressing the 
following objectives: 
 
1) To systematically evaluate the reliability of ASPs and epidemiology in detecting MRSA 
transmission. 
 
2) To investigate the prevalence of high-risk and unmonitored MRSA lineages in the 
Cambridgeshire region. 
 
3) To explore the feasibility of the integration of genomic and epidemiological surveillance 
at a national level.  
 
To this end, Chapter 3 determines the reliability of ASPs and epidemiology for detecting 
transmission of MRSA in Cambridgeshire. These methods are compared to whole-genome 
sequencing and epidemiology. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates two potentially high-risk lineages, USA300 and ST2371, which 
remained undetected through routine practice but were identified using whole-genome 
sequencing.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates how the typically nosocomial lineage of MRSA, E-MRSA15, was 
transmitted within the community and was not identified through routine practice despite 
causing severe infections.  
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Chapter 6 explores the feasibility of a combined epidemiological and genomic approach to 
surveillance of MRSA bacteraemia at a national level.  
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Chapter 2. Materials and Methods 
 
The methods described here are those that are common to several results chapters. Each 
results chapter also contains materials and methods where these are specific to the chapter 
study design and analysis.  
 
2.1. “Cambridgeshire Prospective MRSA Study” Outline 
A dataset generated previously by the research group in which the author was based has 
been central to this thesis (Appendix 2.1).145  In brief, a 12-month prospective observational 
cohort study was undertaken between April 2012 and April 2013. This study identified all 
individuals with any MRSA-positive samples processed within the Public Health England 
Clinical Microbiology laboratory at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust.  This laboratory was responsible for the processing of samples from healthcare 
facilities within the region and during this time received samples from 75 general practices 
and four hospitals – Addenbrooke’s hospital (a University teaching hospital), The Rosie 
Hospital (an obstetric and gynaecological hospital), Papworth Hospital (a cardiothoracic 
hospital), and Hinchingbrooke Hospital (a district general hospital).  
 
2.1.1. Sampling 
All samples received by the microbiology laboratory for processing as part of routine 
screens (screening samples) or direct clinical care (clinical samples) as requested by the 
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requesting clinician were included. All individuals with MRSA isolated at least once from 
any sample type were included in the study. 
 
At the time of the study, in-line with national guidance, universal multi-site screening for 
MRSA carriage of individuals admitted to hospital and weekly screening of patients in 
critical care units was undertaken.141,142 The CUH laboratory sampling protocol 
recommended that multi-site screens include sampling of the nose, throat and groin. There 
was no national policy for MRSA screens in the community and so submission of MRSA 
samples in non-hospital settings was dependent on individual practitioner clinical decision 
making.  
 
2.1.2. Epidemiological Data Collection 
For those patients admitted to hospital, clinical metadata and demographic information 
were collected from electronic or paper records. This included data on patient movement 
for hospital admissions in the preceding two years. For all patients, demographic and 
epidemiological data was collected including residential postcode. 
 
2.1.3. Ethical Approval 
The study protocol was approved by the National Research Ethics Service (ref: 
11/EE/0499), the National Information Governance Board Ethics and Confidentiality 
Committee (ref: ECC 8-05(h)/2011), and the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust Research and Development Department (ref: A092428). 
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2.1.4. Bacterial Culture and Identification 
MRSA samples were received in the CUH microbiology laboratory and processed by 
biomedical scientist staff as per protocol (PHE standards for microbiology 
investigations).40,143 In outline, MRSA was isolated from screening samples by direct 
plating onto Oxoid BrillianceTM MRSA chromogenic medium (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK). 
Clinical samples were plated onto Columbia Blood Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and S. 
aureus identified through using a latex agglutination kit (Pastorex Staph Plus, Bio Rad 
Laboratories, Hemel Hempstead, UK).  A single colony was selected for further processing. 
The identities of all presumptive S. aureus were confirmed using Matrix-Assisted Laser 
Desorption/Ionisation Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry (MALDI-ToF MS). 
 
2.1.5. Antibiotic Susceptibility 
Phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility was determined via two methods, disk diffusion 
and using the VITEK 2 instrument, card P620 (bioMerieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). 
Antimicrobial susceptibility was determined for the following antibiotic agents using disk 
diffusion: Flucloxacillin, ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, fucidic acid, gentamicin, 
tetracycline, vancomycin, mupirocin, rifampicin, neomycin, linezolid, chloramphenicol. 
Antimicrobial susceptibility results were interpreted using European Committee on 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) zone diameters.52 Antimicrobial 
susceptibility to the following agents was determined using VITEK 2: Benzylpenicillin, 
cefoxitin, oxacillin, ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, chloramphenicol, daptomycin, fusidic 
acid, gentamicin, linezolid, mupirocin, nitrofurantoin, rifampicin, teicoplanin, tetracycline, 
tigecycline, trimethoprim, vancomycin, clindamycin.144  
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2.2. WGS Methodology 
2.2.1. DNA Extraction and Sequencing 
Bacterial genomic DNA was extracted using the QIAxtractor kit (QIAgen, Hilden, 
Germany), and sequencing of DNA for 2,320 samples was performed by the core 
sequencing team at the Wellcome Sanger Institute (WSI). Libraries were prepared and 150-
bp paired end sequences determined on an Illumina HiSeq2000 (Illumina, San Diego, CA, 
USA), as previously described.114 As quality control, 16 samples were filtered out at this 
point due to low numbers of reads (n=2) or duplicate/missing information (n=14).145 
 
2.2.2. Sequence Data Assembly 
Fastq files of genome sequence data were de novo assembled using an established assembly 
and improvement pipeline at the WSI.145 This consisted of VelvetOptimiser v2.2.5 to 
determine the optimal kmer size and then Velvet v1.2 creating multiple assemblies.146 
SSPACE v2.0 and GapFiller v.1.11 scaffold the best N50 contigs and fill sequence gaps of 
more than one nucleotide respectively. As further quality control, 10 samples were filtered 
out as they were not MRSA.145 
 
2.2.3. Multi-locus Sequence Typing 
MLST sequence types were determined from the assemblies using MLST check 
(https://github.com/sanger-pathogens/mlst_check). The assembled genomes were 
compared against the MLST database for S. aureus (http://pubmlst.org/saureus/) to assign 
clonal complexes.  
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2.2.4. Mapping of Sequence Data 
Sequence data were mapped to closely related reference genomes (Table 2.1) using 
SMALT (http://www.sanger.ac.uk/science/tools/smalt-0) as previously described.114 In 
summary, reads were mapped if their identity matched the reference greater than 90%. 
Variation statistics at each base were calculated using samtools mpileup and bcftools view. 
Bases with uncertainty in the base call were removed. The bcftools variant quality score 
was required to be greater than 50 and mapping quality greater than 30. If not all reads gave 
the same base call, the allele frequency, as calculated by bcftools, was required to be either 
0 for bases called the same as the reference, or 1 for bases called as a single nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP). The majority base call was required to be present in at least 80% of 
reads mapping at the base, and the minimum mapping depth allowed was 4 reads, at least 
two of which had to map to each strand. If any of these filters were not met, the base was 
called as uncertain. Through quality control, 12 samples were filtered out (high number of 
heterogenous sites, n=8; abnormal position in the phylogeny, n=4).145 
 
 
Table 2.1. Reference genomes for each CC 
CC Strain ID Accession Number 
22 HO 5096 0412 HE681097 
30 MRSA252 BX571856 
5 N315 BA000018 
8 USA300 USA300 FPR3757 
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2.2.5. Phylogenetic Analysis 
Mobile genetic elements were removed from whole-genome alignments 
(https://github.com/sanger-pathogens/remove_blocks_from_aln) to identify the 
phylogenetically informative core genome for each isolate, and SNPs used to create a mid-
point rooted, maximum-likelihood phylogeny with 100 bootstrap replicates.147 Trees were 
visualised using Figtree (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/) and ITOL 
(http://itol.embl.de/). Pairwise genetic distances between isolates of the same CC were 
calculated based on the number of SNPs in the alignment of the core genome using an in-
house script.  
 
2.3. Other Methods 
2.3.1. Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were undertaken in RStudio (version 0.99.489). 
 
2.3.2.  Figure Production 
Figures were generated in RStudio (version 0.99.489), Microsoft Excel (version 14.6.1) 
and Adobe Illustrator CS5. 
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Chapter 3. Evaluation of Antibiotic Susceptibility Profiles as a Method 
of Detecting MRSA Transmission  
 
3.1. Introduction 
A primary goal of infection surveillance within a healthcare setting is to prevent pathogen 
transmission and detect outbreaks.83 An outbreak is often practically defined as ‘a localised 
increase in the incidence of disease.’77 Historically, there has been a reliance on rule-based 
approaches combined with practitioner intuition in detecting possible outbreaks of 
infection.148 However, over the past decade or so, a number of studies have explored the 
potential benefits of improved hospital infection surveillance through automated detection 
of links between patients using information technology (IT). This includes the potential 
benefits of reduced demands on practitioner time alongside more rapid rates of 
detection.149,150 
 
As antimicrobial susceptibility profiles are a readily available piece of information in a 
clinical laboratory, they are often combined with patient movement (time and place) to 
detect and evaluate putative MRSA outbreaks. Further investigation and ward visits are 
then undertaken to monitor cases and investigate potential transmissions accordingly. The 
clonal nature of MRSA limits the use of traditional typing methods in distinguishing 
between isolates.  However, the recent, rapid advancements in the understanding of 
bacterial molecular epidemiology via the development of WGS over the last 15 years has 
provided evidence of previously unrecognised, yet extensive, local, regional and global 
transmission pathways of MRSA.112,114,124,145 
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WGS provides the highest available resolution with which to discriminate between 
bacterial isolates and has proven particularly useful in detecting outbreaks at the local level, 
where a high degree of resolution is necessary to confirm or refute isolate 
involvement.112,114,116,127,129  A number of studies using WGS to investigate MRSA 
outbreaks have highlighted the variation in ASPs within isolates which are genomically 
linked, implying limitations to using ASPs to determine transmission in practice.114,116 
However, to date, the validity of ASPs and epidemiological (time and space) approaches 
in identifying MRSA transmission has not been systematically evaluated on a larger scale. 
 
In a large population-based study, WGS combined with high-quality epidemiological data 
uncovered a high level of hidden MRSA transmission in four Cambridgeshire hospitals and 
the surrounding community.145 This study also showed that shared GP practice and ward 
contacts (other than the ED) were present in <1% of genetically unrelated cases.  
 
This chapter builds on previous findings through an extended analysis of this dataset to 
evaluate the accuracy of conventional techniques employed in clinical practice (ASPs, 
combined with strong epidemiological links and in silico spa-typing) to detect genomically 
defined MRSA transmission events. This chapter aims to answer a question relevant to 
clinical practice in two separate but important settings. First, if there are two MRSA 
positive patients who have been in the same hospital ward at the same time and have the 
same or a single mismatch in ASP, what is the likelihood that these represent a putative 
transmission event? Second, if the same was to occur between a pair of individuals who 
share a post code, what is the likelihood that these two isolates represent a putative 
transmission? 
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3.2. Specific Materials and Methods 
3.2.1. Study design 
Isolates and associated patient metadata were sourced from the 12-month prospective 
observational cohort study (the Cambridgeshire prospective MRSA study, Appendix 2.1) 
between April 2012 and April 2013, as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). In 
brief, this identified individuals with MRSA-positive samples processed by the Clinical 
Microbiology and Public Health Laboratory at the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust (CUH). A total of 2,282 MRSA isolates from 1,465 individuals were 
sequenced and met quality control criteria. For this analysis, only the first MRSA sample 
isolated from 1,465 individuals during the study period was analysed. 
 
3.2.2. Epidemiological analysis 
Epidemiological data (in-patient hospital stays and residential post codes) were recorded 
for all cases. Epidemiological links were established between each pair of MRSA-positive 
individuals (case-pairs) through systematic comparisons, as described previously.145 In the 
first hospital analysis, direct ward contacts were defined as follows: a case-pair admitted to 
the same ward with overlapping dates of admission. Admissions to the emergency 
department were excluded, and only those admitted for one day or more were included in 
the hospital analysis (n=906). In the second community analysis, case-pairs with the same 
post code were considered epidemiologically linked. A total of 1367 patients had a 
registered post code and were therefore included in the community analysis. 
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3.2.3. Microbiologic evaluation and antibiotic susceptibility testing 
MRSA was isolated from screening and clinical samples as per the methods described in 
Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). Antimicrobial susceptibility was determined to 
commonly-used antibiotic agents (Appendix 3.1), using the VITEK 2 instrument 
(bioMerieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). Systematic comparison of each isolate ASP was 
undertaken to determine similarities within case-pairs using two thresholds: an exact match 
in ASP, or a mismatch of a single antibiotic (Appendix 3.2).  
 
3.2.4. WGS and MLST  
MRSA sequence data was determined and CCs assigned using methods described in 
Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). If the case-pair were from the same CC, pairwise 
genetic distances between isolates were calculated based on the number of SNPs in the core 
genome; if not, this was recorded as ‘different CC.’ 
 
3.2.5. In silico spa-typing 
Isolates were spa-typed using in-silico polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to extract the spa 
gene variable X region from assembled genomes using published primers.151 The spa-type 
was then determined using an online spa-typer tool (http://spatyper.fortinbras.us/). Whether 
the in silico spa-types matched was then established for each case-pair.  
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3.3. Results 
ASPs are commonly used in the early stages of infection control outbreak surveillance in 
routine clinical practice. The utility of ASPs was evaluated using a reference dataset of 
1,465 MRSA isolate genomes from 1,465 patients, collected over a one-year period. The 
additional utility of spa-type, a common typing method used in determining MRSA 
relatedness, was also explored through determining the spa-type from WGS data (n=1398) 
and comparing this with the reference genomic and epidemiological datasets.  
 
WGS was used within a population with strong epidemiological links as the gold standard 
for identifying putative transmissions. For the purpose of this work, a putative transmission 
was defined as a genetic distance of 50 SNPs or less and an epidemiological link (admission 
to the same hospital ward at the same time in the first analysis, or shared post code in the 
second analysis) between two patients (a ‘case-pair’).  Isolates were genomically diverse; 
MLST defined 58 STs that resided in 19 CCs but the collection was predominated by CC22 
(1035 isolates, 71%) (Figure 3.1). Phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
determined 132 unique ASPs for the 1,465 MRSA isolates, with two profiles accounting 
for 698 (48%) of isolates. (Figure 3.1). In silico spa-typing assigned 195 different spa-types 
to 1398 isolates (95%) for which this could be determined (Figure 3.1), with one spa-type 
(t032) predominating (n=631, 45%). Delineation of the number of ASPs for each CC and 
spa-type demonstrated a high degree of ASP diversity within isolates belonging to the same 
CC or spa-type. CC22 and CC30 contained 74 and 19 different ASPs, respectively (Table 
3.1), while t032 contained 53 different ASPs (Appendix 3.3).
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Figure 3.1. Diversity of clonal complexes, ASPs and spa-types within the collection. 
*For 42 pairs, spa comparison was not done.  
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Table 3.1. Phenotypic ASPs identified within genotypic CCs 
 
CC Number of Isolates 
Percentage 
of Isolates 
Number 
of Unique 
ASPs 
1 79 5.4 38 
5 79 5.4 25 
8 51 3.5 23 
12 2 0.1 1 
15 9 0.6 7 
22 1035 71.0 74 
30 80 5.5 19 
45 49 3.4 11 
59 41 2.8 12 
72 3 0.2 3 
80 15 1.0 6 
88 2 0.1 2 
130 2 0.1 1 
152 1 0.1 1 
361 5 0.3 4 
398 1 0.1 1 
425 1 0.1 1 
779 1 0.1 1 
1943 1 0.1 1 
 
3.3.1. Accuracy of ASP in Determining Hospital Ward MRSA transmission 
Using existing evidence based on the genomic and epidemiological dataset as the reference, 
this study determined the accuracy of using ASP and a direct ward contact in identifying 
putative MRSA transmissions as defined above. Comparison of epidemiologically related 
case-pairs sharing the same ASP was undertaken to define the sensitivity and specificity of 
this 
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method (Table 3.2). A total of 2514 case-pairs had direct ward contact. Of these, 403 case-
pairs had isolates with an identical ASP. The sensitivity and specificity of ASP in the 
presence of a direct ward contact was 44% and 85% with a positive predictive value (PPV) 
of 6.7%.  This equates to the investigation of 403 case-pairs in hospital to identify 27 
putative transmission events whilst missing a further 35 events.
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Table 3.2. Sensitivity, specificity and predictive values of ASP in determining genetic 
relatedness (<=50SNPs) between different categories of epidemiologically related 
isolate pairs in the study period.  
 
C
om
bi
na
tio
n
H
os
pi
ta
l E
pi
de
m
io
lo
gi
ca
l l
in
k 
(S
am
e 
W
ar
d,
 S
am
e 
Ti
m
e)
N
o.
 
C
om
pa
ri
so
ns
T
P
FP
T
N
FN
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 
(%
)
Sp
ec
ifi
ci
ty
 
(%
)
PP
V
 
(%
)
N
PV
 
(%
)
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
25
14
27
37
6
20
76
35
43
.5
84
.7
6.
7
98
.3
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
, s
pa
-m
at
ch
23
46
26
15
4
21
31
35
42
.6
93
.3
14
.4
98
.4
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 A
SP
1 
&
 A
SP
2
66
4
15
46
59
5
8
65
.2
92
.8
24
.6
98
.7
Si
ng
le
 A
SP
 m
is
m
at
ch
25
14
47
10
28
14
24
15
75
.8
58
.1
4.
4
99
.0
Co
m
m
un
ity
 E
pi
de
m
io
lo
gi
ca
l l
in
k 
(S
am
e 
Po
st 
co
de
) 
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
43
4
10
10
2
31
5
7
58
.8
75
.5
8.
9
97
.8
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
, s
pa
-m
at
ch
39
0
9
57
31
7
7
56
.3
84
.8
13
.6
97
.8
Id
en
tic
al
 A
SP
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 A
SP
1 
&
 A
SP
2
13
3
6
38
88
1
85
.7
69
.8
13
.6
98
.9
Si
ng
le
 A
SP
 m
is
m
at
ch
43
4
16
19
2
22
5
1
94
.1
54
.0
7.
7
99
.6
  Evaluation of ASPs to detect MRSA transmission 
 54 
3.3.2. Accuracy of ASP in Determining Hospital Ward Transmission when Allowing 
for a Single Mismatched Antibiotic 
Comparison of the similarity of MRSA ASP allowing for a single mismatched antibiotic 
(‘single ASP mismatch’) between epidemiologically related case-pairs was undertaken to 
define sensitivity and specificity (Table 3.2). Comparison to the gold standard 
demonstrated that 62 case-pairs were confirmed as genetically related, with the sensitivity 
and specificity of ASP with a single mismatch in the presence of a direct ward contact as 
76% and 58% with a PPV of 4%. This equates to the investigation of 1075 case-pairs in 
hospital to identify 47 transmission events and miss a further 15 events.  
 
3.3.3. Utility of Rare ASPs (Non ASP1, Non ASP2) in Determining Hospital Ward 
Transmission 
Nearly half of MRSA isolates (n=698, 48%) had one of two dominant ASPs (ASP1 and 
ASP2). Therefore, the data were re-analysed after excluding isolates with ASP1 and ASP2, 
to determine whether analysis of a match between isolates with rarer, identical ASPs only 
provided greater accuracy in detecting or excluding putative transmission. After exclusion 
of the most frequent ASPs, ASP1 and ASP2, the sensitivity and specificity of an identical 
ASP in the context of a direct ward contact was 65% and 93% (PPV 25%), which equates 
to investigation of 61 case-pairs to identify 15 putative transmission events whilst missing 
eight events.  
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3.3.4. Accuracy of ASP in Determining Transmission in the Community 
Coll et al. (2017), showed that shared post code acted as a strong epidemiological link for 
putative MRSA transmission. Therefore, the same methods were applied to those case-pairs 
with a shared residential post code to determine the accuracy of using ASP and a strong 
community epidemiological link (shared residential post code) in identifying putative 
MRSA transmission events in the community. A total of 434 case-pairs had shared 
residential post code. Of these, 112 case-pairs had isolates with an identical ASP. The 
sensitivity and specificity of ASP in the presence shared residential post code is 59% and 
76% with a PPV of 9%.  This equates to the investigation of 112 case-pairs to identify 10 
putative transmission events whilst missing a further seven events.  
 
3.3.5. Accuracy of ASP in Determining Community Transmission when Allowing for 
a Single Mismatched Antibiotic 
Comparison to the gold standard demonstrated that 17 case-pairs were confirmed as 
genetically related, with the sensitivity and specificity of ASP with a single mismatch in 
the presence of a post code match as 94% and 54% with a PPV of 7.7%. This equates to 
the investigation of 208 case-pairs to identify 16 transmission events and miss a further one 
event.  
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3.3.6. Utility of Rare ASPs (Non-ASP1, non ASP2) in Determining Community 
Transmission 
The sensitivity and specificity of a match between rare, non-ASP1, non-ASP2 in the context 
of a post code contact was 86% and 70% (PPV 14%), which equates to investigation of 44 
case-pairs to identify 6 putative transmission events, whilst missing one event.  
 
3.3.7. In silico spa-typing 
As laboratory spa-typing is a widely accepted and utilised typing method, this study 
explored the improvement in accuracy of in silico spa-typing plus ASP/epidemiology in 
detecting transmission. The use of in silico spa-type in determining genomic relatedness 
when case-pair isolates had the same ASP and a strong epidemiological link had a 
sensitivity and specificity is 43% and 93% respectively with a PPV of 14% for hospital 
cases, and 56% and 85%, respectively, with a PPV of 14%, for community cases. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
ASP and epidemiology are widely used in day-to-day infection control practice as 
indicators of potential MRSA transmission events.  Harris et al., 2013, studied an outbreak 
of MRSA in a special care baby unit. They reported how during the management of this 
outbreak, MRSA isolates had initially been ruled out of the infection control investigation 
on the basis of different ASPs but WGS showed them to be closely related.  Similarly, 
Gordon et al., 2017, studied 17 MRSA outbreaks and described how in five of these there 
were two or more ASPs identified within the groups of genomically related outbreak 
isolates.  Because of the routine use of ASP as a screening tool for MRSA transmission, 
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yet the uncertainty surrounding the validity of this use, this study aimed to investigate the 
accuracy of these methods in detecting putative MRSA transmission. The availability of 
whole-genome data as a gold standard for defining isolate relatedness provides an 
opportunity to determine the accuracy of the use of ASPs and epidemiology in a way which 
has not been possible beforehand.  
 
This chapter describes how the sensitivity and specificity of ASP plus an epidemiological 
link in identifying putative MRSA transmission is low. There is, however, variation in 
performance when different types of epidemiological links are considered. The first 
question that the study aimed to answer was, if there are two MRSA positive patients who 
have been on the same hospital ward at the same time and have the same ASP, what is the 
likelihood that these represent a putative transmission event? This study showed that the 
ASP under these conditions had less than 50% sensitivity and a PPV of 6.7%. However, 
when isolates with the two most dominant ASP were removed from the analysis, the 
sensitivity and specificity of ASP and epidemiology in identifying transmission within the 
hospital increased. Indeed, sensitivity and specificity of a strong hospital ward 
epidemiological link increased to 65% and 93%, respectively, and the PPV increased to 
25%. This aligns with past work which suggests that ASP is most useful as a surrogate to 
identifying outbreak isolates if it is unusual within the particular healthcare setting.114,116 
The performance of ASP and epidemiology when using rare ASPs only was strongest in 
the hospital setting, identifying the greatest proportion of putative transmissions in the case-
pairs investigated.  
 
Secondly, when considering patients who share a residential post code, what is the 
likelihood that these two MRSA isolates represent a putative transmission? Here, an ASP 
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match gave a sensitivity of nearly 60%, with a PPV of 9%. However, when excluding 
isolates with ASP1 & ASP2, the sensitivity, but not the specificity, increases, reaching a 
PPV of 14%.  
 
It is commonplace in clinical practice to allow for one antibiotic to vary when considering 
if ASP similarity indicates potential transmission in epidemiologically linked patients. 
When considering case-pairs linked by a strong hospital epidemiological link, this 
increased the sensitivity to over 75% but because more case-pairs are potentially linked, 
specificity is reduced. Importantly, in the hospital setting, over 1000 case-pairs would need 
to be investigated to identify less than 50 putative transmissions, making this strategy 
impractical. A similar trend was seen in the community setting, albeit on a smaller scale.  
 
For both the hospital and community setting, when compared to ASP/epidemiology alone, 
the addition of in silico spa-type offered a slight improvement to the PPV of determining 
putative MRSA transmission events, meaning this may be useful addition to a screening 
tool, especially in the hospital setting. However, the small increase in performance of the 
test may not outweigh the additional time and cost that undertaking in silico spa-typing of 
isolates would require.  
 
A number of limitations in this analysis are acknowledged. First, genomic relatedness has 
been defined based on a SNP cut-off of 50 SNPs or less. Whilst evidence based,145 the use 
of any cut-off value may over/under-detect some linkage between isolates. ASPs were 
determined using the VITEK 2 instrument, technology which may only be used to 
determine antibiotic susceptibilities for a subset of isolates processed in clinical 
laboratories, and provide an ASP on 19 antibiotics rather than the six/twelve antibiotics 
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which may be tested in clinical laboratories at present.  However, in the UK, the VITEK2 
is increasingly available. Furthermore, using only six antibiotics is likely to decrease 
discrimination and be even less reliable than any putative ASP links between case-pairs 
based on 19 antibiotics, therefore the sensitivity, specificity and PPVs above will be greater 
than that achieved in a setting not using VITEK 2. 
 
Despite these limitations, this study provides much needed insights into the accuracy of 
epidemiology combined with ASP, routinely used methods in practice, in defining putative 
MRSA transmission. Whilst these methods are readily available, this systematic analysis 
demonstrates that compared to the gold standard of WGS plus epidemiology, none of these 
methods reliably identify/refute transmission events. Improved IT systems in laboratories 
could increase detection of epidemiological links and ASP matches which may not be noted 
by practitioners alone, meaning that detection could be optimised. However, given the 
overall low sensitivity and specificity, in the UK setting, in order to reliably determine a 
greater proportion of MRSA transmission events, more discriminatory testing such as WGS 
is necessary. Until universal WGS is commonplace, further work in this area should aim to 
evaluate the role of targeted WGS to identify those transmissions which are missed through 
other identification approaches, the false negatives in this study. 
 
This study provides further evidence of the limitations of current practice, and the potential 
benefits of routine WGS to improve the study of disease transmission and to optimise the 
control of infection in hospitals.
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Chapter 4. Systematic Genomic Surveillance for Potentially High-risk 
MRSA Lineages in the East of England using WGS  
 
4.1. Surveillance for Potentially High-risk MRSA Lineages  
4.1.1. Introduction 
In the UK, whilst the vast majority of MRSA infections continue to be caused by the 
dominant hospital-associated lineage, ST22,65 some MRSA lineages are considered 
potentially high-risk. It is difficult to strictly define a high-risk lineage, however those 
which display resistance to a number of therapeutic agents, a predisposition to cause severe 
clinical disease (either widespread or in a particular population group) or high 
transmissibility would be of concern. In the East of England, two of the lineages that may 
be considered high-risk are USA300 and ST2371. USA300 is considered a high-risk 
lineage globally because of its rapid spread through the USA and its ability to cause disease 
in otherwise healthy individuals. The ST2371 MRSA lineage, in contrast, caused a large 
outbreak locally in both the hospital and the community in this region, in a particularly 
vulnerable population group (neonates). 
 
A central role of infectious disease surveillance systems is the detection and monitoring of 
the emergence of novel pathogens or lineages. Chapter 3 (Evaluation of ASPs to detect 
MRSA transmission) used a genomic gold standard to show how routine practice, using 
ASP and epidemiology to detect MRSA transmission events has poor sensitivity and 
specificity. Following on from this, Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance for high-risk MRSA 
lineages) reports the findings of systematic genomic surveillance for USA300 and ST2371 
within a major diagnostic microbiology laboratory serving the East of England to 
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demonstrate how whole-genome sequencing can be used to investigate the epidemiology 
of two, potentially high-risk MRSA lineages that otherwise remain largely unmonitored. 
 
4.2. Specific Methods 
Both studies used the isolates sourced from the Cambridgeshire MRSA prospective study, 
sampled and processed as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods).  
 
4.2.1. DNA Sequencing, Phylogenetic Analysis, Definition of Clones 
MLST sequence types were identified from the sequence data and the MLST database 
(http://saureus.mlst.net/), and assigned to clonal complexes as described in Chapter 2 
(Materials and Methods).  CC8 and ST2371 isolates were identified, and formed the basis 
for the remaining analyses. Using methods as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and 
Methods), CC8 isolates were mapped using SMALT to the S. aureus USA300 genome 
FPR3757 (Genbank accession number CP000255.1), and ST2371 isolates to the S. aureus 
E-MRSA reference genome EMRSA-15 (Genbank accession number NZ_CP007659). 
Mobile genetic elements, insertions and deletions were excluded and SNPs in this core 
genome were used to create maximum-likelihood phylogenies using RAxML, as described 
in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods).  Bacterial DNA sequences were deposited in the 
European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena, and accession numbers, 
are provided in Appendix 4.1.   
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4.2.2. Identification of Isolates 
Genome sequence data for 348 USA300 isolates reported previously by Uhlemann et al. 
were sourced from the ENA.60 The study CC8 isolates were contextualised against the 
Uhlemann et al. collection to characterise USA300 isolates phylogenetically based on their 
position within the combined phylogenetic tree.  Genome sequences from 45 ST2371 
isolates from a prior outbreak in Cambridge, 2011,114 were sourced from the ENA. These 
were combined with the study ST2371 isolates to determine relatedness.   
 
4.2.3. Accessory Genome 
The SCCmec subtype was determined using in-silico PCR and published primers.152 For 
both collections, presence or absence of PVL (lukF-PV and lukS-PV) was determined. The 
following methods were applied to the USA300 isolates only. The corresponding sequences 
for the arginine catabolic mobile element (ACME) and S. aureus pathogenicity island 5 
(SaPI5) were extracted from the mapping alignment. Mutations in the cap5 locus were 
retrieved from the assemblies by comparison to the cap5 locus of the positive reference 
strain, Newman, and USA300 reference strains, TCH1516 and FPR3757, as described 
previously.153 The presence or absence of acquired genes and SNPs conferring resistance 
against macrolides, lincosamides, ketolides and quinolones were determined as previously 
described,154 with a list of genes given in Table 4.1. For SNPs causing resistance in 
chromosomal genes the standard mapping and SNP calling approach was used as described 
in Chapter 2 (Materials & Methods). 
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Table 4.1. Antibiotic resistance genes 
 
Antibiotic Class Genes 
Quinolones grlA 
 
grlB 
 
gyrA 
 
gyrB 
Macrolides and Ketolides msrA 
 
msrD 
 
ermA 
 
ermB 
 
ermC 
 
erm33 
 
ermT 
 
mefA 
 
mefE 
 
ereA 
 
ereB 
Lincosamides linA 
 
linB 
  linC 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. USA300 Study  
4.3.1.1. Description of Cases Positive for USA300 
This study aimed to determine the prevalence of USA300 MRSA in the Cambridgeshire 
prospective MRSA study (Appendix 2.1). A total of 56 USA300 isolates from 24 cases 
were identified, giving a case prevalence among MRSA carriers of 1.6% (24/1489). The 
majority of USA300-positive cases were young (median 32 years, range 3 – 84 years, 
interquartile range 25 - 57 years), with a male predisposition (16/24, 67%). The majority 
of first positive samples were submitted from first-opinion services (ED (8/24, 33%) and 
GPs (5/24, 21%)). USA300 was identified from carriage screens alone in half of cases 
(12/24, 50%).  Ten cases had skin or soft tissue infection, with or without associated 
carriage, and two cases had invasive infection. Twenty-two cases resided across the East 
of England, one residence was unknown and one case normally resided in the US (Figure 
4.1). Dates of positive samples were distributed throughout the 12-month study period 
(Figure 4.2). Review of the microbiological records showed that only three of the 56 
USA300 isolates were submitted by the diagnostic laboratory for PVL testing, which were 
subsequently identified as USA300 by the reference laboratory and therefore detected by 
the national surveillance mechanisms.  
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Figure 4.1. Map of East of England, showing the geographical distribution of the 
residences of patients from which USA300 was isolated, using postcode area. Yellow: 
one case; orange: two cases; red: three cases. H: hospital location. 
 
Figure 4.2. Timeline of the date of submission of the each USA300 MRSA isolate per 
patient between April 2012 and April 2013, showing distribution of isolates over time.  
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4.3.1.2. Genomic Investigation 
A median of one isolate was sequenced per patient (range 1 to 15, a total of 56 isolates). In 
those cases with more than one MRSA isolate, carriage of non-USA300 was not detected.  
The median time between the first and last sequenced isolate was 21 days (range 0 to 332 
days), and the median pairwise SNP difference between isolates cultured from a given 
individual was 3 (range 0 to 64). The finding that MRSA USA300 positive cases were 
distributed in time and space is consistent with numerous independent introduction events. 
In addition, the phylogenetic tree revealed three groups of very closely related isolates 
(termed clusters A, B and C, Figure 4.4). Cluster A contained two isolates from two cases 
(patient (P) P11 and P12) that differed by six SNPs. Samples were submitted three months 
apart from a GP (ear swab) and a hospital (multi-site MRSA screen) and cases shared the 
same registered address, suggesting household transmission. Cluster B contained six 
isolates from two cases (P17 and P18), which differed by a median of 59 SNPs (range 57 
to 60), but from other isolates by a minimum of 81 SNPs. The two patients shared a surname 
but not address, suggesting spread between close contacts rather than household 
transmission. Cluster C contained 17 isolates from three cases (P22, P23 and P24) with a 
median difference of six SNPs (range 0 to 9) between isolates from different patients. P22 
and P24 had the same registered address and together had a total of 16 MRSA isolates 
sequenced, the most closely related of which were identical. The single isolate from P23 
was also highly related (the closest genetic distance to isolates from P22 and P24 was 1 and 
7 SNPs apart, respectively), but a direct or indirect epidemiological link between P22/P24 
and P23 could not be identified. The 56 USA300 genomes from this study were combined 
with 348 MRSA USA300 genomes reported previously and isolated from New York to 
provide genetic context to the UK isolates. A tree containing all 406 isolates showed that 
the UK study genomes were interspersed throughout the tree (Figure 4.5).  
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A: 
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Figure 4.3. A, Midpoint-rooted phylogenetic tree of study CC8 isolates, with USA300 
isolates highlighted. 56 isolates residing in the subclade within the grey box were 
phylogenetically identified as USA300 isolates. B, Detailed USA300 phylogenetic tree 
rooted on the isolate from P01, with a summary of metadata for each isolate. Person 
(P) numbers represent the study identifier of each individual from whom the sample was 
from, with grey boxes indicating pairs or clusters with presumptive epidemiological links.  
±Red, resistant; yellow, intermediate; blue, susceptible. *Ciprofloxacin: red, S80Y and 
S84L; blue, S80F only; white, none identified; grey, not done. SCCmecIVa, PVL, ACME, 
SAPI5: red, present; black, absent. ^4 mutations associated with the CAP5 locus identified.  
B: 
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of the first USA300 isolate from each study case (n = 24, 
circles) relative to previously published USA300 isolates from the United States (n = 
348) [6]. Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome of 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus with branch colours representing 
fluoroquinolone genotypes. Red branches: S80F/Y and S84A/L; yellow: S80F only; blue 
branches: nil; black branch: reference genome FPR3757. Letters alongside circles indicate 
epidemiologically linked pairs or clusters. 
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4.3.1.3. Variability in the USA300 Genome 
The presence of mobile genetic elements proposed previously to be associated with 
USA300 fitness and epidemic spread was investigated (Figure 4.3). Enterotoxins K and Q 
are thought to enhance pathogenesis through T-cell stimulation and are encoded by genes 
sek2 and seq2 within a pathogenicity island, SAPI5.155,156  SAPI5 was present in 25 of the 
56 isolates. The ACME locus is a genomic island associated with USA300 that is composed 
of at least 33 putative genes and two operons.157 The arc operon encodes genes involved in 
arginine catabolism, which are important for survival of USA300 in acidic environments. 
158 The ACME speG gene, which encodes a spermidine acetyltransferase, confers the 
ability to survive levels of the polyamines spermidine and spermine that are lethal for other 
strains of S. aureus.159 As described previously,60 ACME was variably present in the 
USA300 isolates. Eight isolates from three cases were missing this gene cassette. The 
dispersed position of ACME-negative isolates in the phylogeny suggested multiple losses 
of the pre-existing island. ACME-negative isolates did not carry the copper and mercury 
resistance element (COMER), presence of which would be characteristic of South 
American strains of USA300-LV.62 Boyle-Vavra et al. recently reported that USA300 
failed to produce capsular polysaccharide, which was associated with the presence of four 
conserved mutations associated with the cap5 locus when compared with strain 
Newman.153 It was confirmed that these four mutations were present in all 56 USA300 
isolates. These cap5 mutations, together with SCCmec IVa and PVL, therefore form a 
consistent marker of USA300 in this study collection, whereas ACME and SAPI5 are 
variably present. 
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4.3.1.4. Antibiotic Resistance 
The oral antibiotics used to treat MRSA SSTI in the UK and US in single or combination 
regimens are clindamycin, doxycycline and trimethoprim-sulphamethoxazole, rifampicin, 
trimethoprim and fusidic acid.160-162 All 56 isolates were phenotypically susceptible to 
trimethoprim, and clindamycin (constitutive), and only one isolate tested resistant to 
tetracycline. None of the 51/56 phenotypically erythromycin resistant isolates tested 
positive for inducible clindamycin resistance. More than half of isolates (36/56) were 
phenotypically resistant to ciprofloxacin, and contained known mutations in both grlA and 
gyrA (gyrA 84L and grlA 80Y (n=33), and grlA 80F alone (n=3).) Previous studies have 
reported that USA300 isolates from the US segregated into two clades based on 
fluoroquinolone resistance genotypes (with or without gyrA 84L/grlA 80Y/F mutations). 
60,61 When the study isolates were considered in the context of the US isolates (Figure 4.4), 
this was replicated for isolates from 22 cases; the two exceptions being isolates from P07 
and P13. Three isolates from P07 carried the 84L/80F mutations and tested phenotypically 
resistant but resided within the ‘susceptible’ clade. Three isolates from P13 resided at the 
top of the resistant clade and tested phenotypically resistant but with an 80F mutation 
within grlA (Figure 4.4).  
 
4.3.2. ST2371 Study 
This study aimed to determine the prevalence of the locally problematic MRSA clone, 
ST2371, in the Cambridgeshire prospective MRSA study (Section 2.1, Materials and 
Methods).  Ten isolates identified as ST2371 were cultured from samples submitted by 
general practitioners (n=7) and hospital wards (n=3) between June 2012 and February 
2013.  The ten isolates were cultured from five individuals (Cases A to E), giving a case 
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prevalence among MRSA carriers of 0.3% (5/1489). Cases were defined as those patients 
with an isolate identified as ST2371. All ten study isolates were positive for the PVL genes.  
 
4.3.2.1 Phylogenetic Relatedness 
The relatedness between ten ST2371 isolates from five individuals sampled in 2012-2013 
and 45 isolates from 26 cases of MRSA from an outbreak linked to a local SCBU in 2011 
was then investigated. To this end, the ten study isolates were phylogenetically compared 
to the 45 isolates from the original 2011 outbreak. This comparison demonstrated that the 
isolates were highly related with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 24 SNPs between 
isolates from the study and 2011 outbreak (Figure 4.5). The close phylogenetic relatedness 
of the study isolates to the 2011 outbreak isolates triggered an epidemiological 
investigation to determine whether epidemiological links could be drawn between the study 
cases and cases from the previous outbreak.  
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Figure 4.5. Midpoint-rooted phylogenetic tree based on SNPs in the core genome of 
MRSA. Isolates were mapped against the EMRSA-15 reference genome. Red dots denote 
isolates from 25 patients and family members investigated during an outbreak on a SCBU 
in 2011. Blue dots denote 20 individual colonies picked from a nasal swab culture taken 
from a healthcare worker during the same outbreak. Black dots represent ten isolates from 
five people who had microbiological samples taken between 2012 and 2013. The numbers 
shown are the original study number used during the SCBU investigation (prefixed by a P), 
and the letter A-E for each of the 2012-2013 cases. In the event that more than one sample 
was taken from the same patient in 2012-2013, these are shown as underscore followed by 
the sample number (e.g. the second sample from case B is shown as B_2). 
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4.3.2.2. Descriptive Epidemiology 
Investigation showed that all cases had soft tissue infection. Of the five cases, two were 
female, with age ranging from 1 – 57 years (median: 19 years). None of the cases resided 
within the same 6-digit post code area and none of the cases were registered to the same 
GP practice. None of the patients had a history of overlapping hospital admission in the 
preceding year (Figure 4.7). However, on further investigation, all of the cases had a direct 
or indirect link to the original outbreak in 2011. The isolation of ST2371 from two of the 
cases suggest persistence of ST2371 in the community. Cases A and B were part of the 
original SCBU outbreak (P22 and P14 on the postnatal ward and SCBU, respectively). 
After being defined as a case in the 2011 outbreak, Case A remained MRSA positive into 
the early part of 2012, with positive samples in January and March 2012.  No further 
samples were submitted until the sample which was again identified as ST2371 as part of 
the Cambridgeshire MRSA prospective study, in February 2013. After originally testing 
positive in the 2011 outbreak, samples from Patient B were not available until October 
2012, when ST2371 was again confirmed.  
 
Evidence of familial transmission in the original outbreak is further supported by the spread 
of this strain between P20, P26, case C and case D. Case C was born at the CUH and was 
not screened for MRSA before discharge from hospital, but both parents became involved 
in the SCBU outbreak (P20/P26). Based on a matching surname, case D was a member of 
the same extended family as P20, P26 and case C.  
 
Case E was born at the CUH and discharged when five days old, which was two days before 
the birth of the presumed index case of the original SCBU outbreak. The first ST2371 
isolate from case E was isolated in 2013 when they were almost two years old, over a year 
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after the original outbreak was considered over. It is not possible to determine whether 
acquisition occurred when born at the CUH or from subsequent contact with unidentified 
carriers in the community. 
 
Figure 4.6. Chart displaying timing of visits to hospital A and GP visits for each case 
during April 2012-2013. Numbers following A (hospital A) or GP (GP surgery) indicated 
an anonymised code for each ward or GP surgery. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
The USA300 study represents the first prospective genomic surveillance study for USA300 
in the UK. The current methods for surveillance of invasive staphylococcal infections in 
the UK are inadequate to monitor potentially high-risk lineages such as USA300. 
Phylogenetic analysis has indicated a process of repeated introduction throughout the 
Americas prior to the epidemic.62 These data suggest a similar pattern, and provide weight 
for the need to undertake prospective systematic surveillance to define the trajectory of 
USA300 in the UK. In contrast to when USA300 rapidly disseminated in the USA over 10 
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years ago, it is now feasible to implement comprehensive, systematic genomic surveillance 
strategies to guide interventions. Had this been possible during the initial stages of the USA 
epidemic, an aggressive search and destroy policy or alternative strategy to limit spread 
may have been implemented. 
 
Systematic prospective surveillance is now required to determine whether this rate changes 
over time in the UK. Existing studies are sparse and limited by sampling methodology,64 
but it appears that USA300 may be increasing in England. Molecular testing in a national 
reference laboratory study identified 40 likely USA300 isolates (CC8 SCCmecIVa, spa 
t008, agr group 1, PVL positive) from across England and Wales over a two-year period 
(2004-05).163 The identification of 60% of this total in one rather than two years and from 
a single region of England indicates a gap in current surveillance knowledge. 
 
Similarly, the ST2371 study demonstrates how, despite causing clinical disease in patients 
already identified as at risk, a biologically successful lineage can persist within a region 
and remain undetected by existing surveillance systems. Clinical management of the 2011 
ST2371 outbreak included decolonisation recommendations, but this failed to control the 
persistence of this clone of MRSA in the community.  Decolonisation was likely ineffective 
in cases A and B. Explanations for this include not implementing or completing the course 
of decolonisation, failed decolonisation, or limiting decolonisation to individual family 
members followed by repeated household acquisition. Two individuals involved in both 
the original outbreak and surveillance study experienced disease for at least 15 months after 
their initial outbreak samples.  
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Despite causing a clinical outbreak within a vulnerable population in the SCBU at CUH, 
this lineage has not been monitored since. By demonstrating that the lineage continued to 
cause disease, and even persisted in patients who were linked to the original outbreak, this 
shows that there is both a clinical and public health need to review how such lineages are 
monitored and managed in the longer term.  Both studies provide evidence of how using 
systematic WGS can provide actionable epidemic intelligence of potentially high-risk 
clones.  
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Chapter 5. Whole-Genome Sequencing to Investigate Cryptic 
Community Transmission of ST22 MRSA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
At the time of writing, only 40% of bacteraemia cases reported to PHE are attributed to a 
hospital, which suggests that transmission outside of hospitals is a substantial contributor 
to overall MRSA bacteraemia rates.164 Definitive evidence for community transmission as 
a driver of MRSA infection in the UK is limited, but is supported by a recent 
epidemiological and bacterial genomic survey that captured transmission events over a 
16,000km2 area of the East of England.145 This argued against the conventional wisdom 
that ST22 is largely healthcare associated in the UK,65,165 and provided evidence for a 
substantial burden of MRSA transmission outside of hospital settings (i.e. in the 
community). 
 
In addition to identifying high-risk lineages, as shown in Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance 
for high-risk MRSA lineages), infection surveillance also aims to detect lineages which 
occur in larger than expected numbers or within unusual or unexpected locations. In the 
Cambridgeshire prospective MRSA study (Appendix 2.1), isolates less than 50 SNPs apart 
were grouped into clusters. This approach granted the opportunity to investigate cases in 
the ‘opposite direction’ to a traditional infection control investigation, identifying linked 
cases via the relatedness of the bacteria prior to exploring epidemiological links. In routine 
MRSA investigations it is more typical to identify those patients who are epidemiologically 
linked and then to source samples from each case for typing to determine bacterial 
relatedness.  
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This chapter builds on this and uses the high-resolution provided by WGS to characterize 
the community-based transmission of the typically nosocomial lineage, EMRSA-15, in a 
GP surgery. 
 
5.2. Specific Materials & Methods 
5.2.1. Study Design 
A cluster of 13 MRSA-positive individuals registered to a single GP surgery in 
Cambridgeshire was first detected during the Cambridgeshire prospective MRSA study, as 
described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods) In brief, 1,465 individuals were identified 
with MRSA isolated at least once from either screening swabs and/or clinical specimens, 
and WGS of 2,282 MRSA isolates from these cases. Combined analysis of WGS data 
revealed a single large cluster of closely-related MRSA (defined based on a pairwise SNP 
distance <50) that contained 22 isolates from these 13 individuals. This formed the starting 
point for a public health investigation and the study described here.  
 
5.2.2. Public Health Investigation 
The detection of the MRSA cluster resulted in an investigation conducted in May 2015 
with the local PHE health protection team. The GP surgery had more than 10,000 registered 
patients and provided specialist services including diabetic and podiatry clinics. The 13 
people involved in the MRSA cluster (defined as cases) were sent an information sheet and 
details of opt-out consent prior to individual GP record review (Appendix 5.1). If consent 
was not withheld and records were available, data were collected on demographics, co-
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morbidities and date of first MRSA detection using a data collection proforma (Appendix 
5.2). In the six months prior to each patient’s first recorded positive MRSA result, 
healthcare attendance (primary care, hospital outpatient, or in-patient) and microbiological 
samples that were MRSA-negative were recorded.  
 
Incidence rates of MRSA-positive individuals were calculated per 10,000 registered 
patients at the study surgery. The CUH laboratory information system was used to 
determine incidence of MRSA positivity based on samples submitted to CUH from four 
comparable practices within the same region (defined as practices with more than 10,000 
registered patients in the same GP Classification Group).166 All data were collected and 
analysed within the context of the public health investigation.  
 
Staff at the GP surgery were invited to undergo MRSA screening (triple site screening 
consisting of nose, throat and groin swabs) following attendance at an information session 
and after providing written consent (Appendix 5.3). Environmental MRSA screening was 
performed at 40 sampling points in the building (Appendix 5.4). Samples were taken from 
high-contact equipment and surfaces in the following areas: two randomly selected medical 
clinic consultation rooms, two nursing clinic rooms (where the ulcer clinic, which was the 
strongest epidemiological link between patients, was held), and shared patient waiting 
areas. At each sampling point, an area of approximately 10cm-by-10cm (or entire surface 
of handles) was swabbed and cultured for MRSA using direct plating onto chromogenic 
agar.167 
 
Extended case-finding was performed to identify further cases that might be linked to the 
cluster over a longer time period, and for whom MRSA isolates had been stored and could 
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be retrieved for sequencing. This involved three different approaches. (i) A retrospective 
search was performed of the CUH information system for MRSA-positive samples 
submitted by the GP surgery between January 2006 until June 2015. These data were then 
cross-referenced with the bacterial archive database to determine if isolates had been stored 
at -80°C. (ii) Laboratory surveillance was conducted in the laboratory between November 
2015 and February 2016 to detect MRSA-positive individuals from the GP surgery. (iii) 
Recent PIRs at the GP surgery were reviewed. Isolates were requested from the receiving 
hospital for WGS and patient records reviewed as described above.  
 
5.2.3. WGS, Typing and Data Analysis  
DNA was extracted, libraries prepared, and 150-bp paired end sequences determined on an 
Illumina HiSeq2000 (original study isolates) or MiSeq (isolates identified through 
additional case finding). Methods were as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). 
Details of reads, depth of coverage/N50 are provided in Appendix 5.4. Sequence data were 
submitted to the European Nucleotide Archive (www.ebi.ac.uk/ena), accession numbers 
are also listed in Appendix 5.5. STs and CCs were assigned using sequence data as 
described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). Isolates were mapped using SMALT to 
the E-MRSA15 reference genome (strain HO 5096 0412, accession HE681097) and the 
phylogenetically informative core genome was identified for each isolate. SNPs were used 
to create a mid-point rooted, maximum-likelihood phylogeny using RAxML with 100 
bootstraps, and trees were visualised as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). 
In-silico PCR of the variable X-region of the spa gene was undertaken using the genome 
data and published primers.151 spa-type was then determined using spaTyper 
(http://spatyper.fortinbras.us). 
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5.3. Results  
During the year-long prospective MRSA study of carriage and clinical MRSA isolates in 
the Cambridgeshire between April 2012 and April 2013, a number of potential outbreaks 
based on genomic relatedness and epidemiological links were identified (Appendix 2.1). 
The largest potential outbreak consisted of thirteen MRSA-positive individuals (22 
isolates) registered with the same GP surgery in Cambridgeshire and therefore was of 
particular interest. All thirteen isolates were ST22 and part of the EMRSA-15 clade (Figure 
5.1). An investigation was initiated to rule out on-going transmission, and to elucidate if 
this represented community-based transmission or ‘spill-over’ from a more likely source 
such as hospital or LTCF.  
 
Extended case finding identified additional MRSA-positive individuals attending the same 
GP with samples available for sequencing (Figure 5.2). First, retrospective review of 
electronic laboratory records identified four individuals with a total of seven isolates 
retrievable for sequencing, one of whom (Patient(P)04) had already been identified in the 
initial 13 cases. Second, prospective surveillance of MRSA-positive samples sent from the 
GP surgery over three months between November 2015-February 2016 and surveillance of 
new positive MRSA samples by the infection control team identified three retrievable 
isolates from three individuals. Third, two PIRs had been undertaken in 2014/2015 
(P12/P13). Both patients had died with MRSA bacteraemia in another regional hospital. A 
single isolate from each blood culture was obtained for each patient from the admitting 
hospital. A summary of the 22 patients (34 isolates) from the original study and additional 
case-finding is provided in Table 5.1. The median number of MRSA isolates per patient 
was 1 (range 1-4). Four patients had only screening samples submitted. Of those clinical 
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samples submitted, 61% were reported as superficial swabs of lower limbs/foot, while three 
were from blood cultures and one from pus (all from different patients.)
 
Figure 5.1. Maximum likelihood tree generated from SNP sites in the core genome for 
1,715 CC22 isolates from the 2012-2013 study. The clade highlighted in grey is the 
largest cluster (with a maximum SNP cut-off of 50) within the collection, and represents 
patients registered to the study GP surgery.  
 
0.0030~ 100 SNPs
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Figure 5.2. Flow diagram summarising the identification of study patients. One patient 
was captured by both the community cluster and extended retrospective laboratory record 
review.  
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Table 5.1. Patient and sample information.  
Study ID 
Isolation 
year 
Sample 
type/site Method of identification 
MLST 
type 
Within 
phylogenetic 
cluster? 
Included in  
public health 
investigation? 
P01_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P02_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P02_2 2013 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P03_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P03_2 2012 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P04_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P04_2 2015 Clinical, ankle This study, lab record review 22 Yes Yes 
P04_3 2014 Screen This study, lab record review 22 Yes Yes 
P04_4 2014 Screen This study, lab record review 22 Yes Yes 
P05_1 2012 Clinical, unspecified Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P06_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P06_2 2012 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P07_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P07_2 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P07_3 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P08_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P09_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P10_1 2012 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P11_1 2013 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P11_2 2013 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes Yes 
P12_1 2014 Clinical, blood This study, PIR 22 Yes Yes 
P13_1 2015 Clinical, blood This study, PIR 22 Yes Yes 
P14_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes No 
P14_2 2012 Clinical, unspecified Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes No 
P15_1 2012 Clinical, back Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes No 
P15_2 2012 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes No 
P15_3 2013 Screen Coll et al., 2016 22 Yes No 
P16_1 2014 Clinical, genital  This study, lab record review 6 No No 
P17_1 2014 Clinical, finger  This study, lab record review 45 No No 
P18_1 2014 Screen This study, lab record review 22 No No 
P19_1 2015 Screen This study, lab record review 45 No No 
P20_1 2015 Screen This study, prospective surveillance 45 No No 
P21_1 2016 Clinical, blood This study, prospective surveillance 1539 No No 
P22_1 2016 Clinical, abscess This study, prospective surveillance 22 No No 
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5.3.1. Genomic Analysis 
STs were derived from WGS data for the 12 MRSA isolates identified through additional 
case finding. The predominant ST was ST22 (7 isolates, 3 individuals), the remainder being 
ST45 (3 isolates, 3 individuals), ST6 (1 isolate) and ST1539 (a single-locus variant of 
ST221, 1 isolate). The non-ST22 cases were excluded from further analysis. After 
combining the 22 ST22 isolates from the original study and 7 from additional case-finding 
to form a total of 29 ST22 isolates, a maximum-likelihood tree was constructed based on 
SNPs in the core genome compared to the EMRSA-15 reference genome. This 
demonstrated clustering of 27 of the 29 ST22 isolates from 15 individuals (Figure 5.4), now 
referred to as cases. Of these, 13 had been identified in the original cluster and the 
additional two isolates were from two cases (P12 and P13) identified during PIRs of fatal 
bloodstream infections. The median pairwise SNP distance between the 27 cluster isolates 
from these 15 cases was 21 (range 0 to 58, interquartile range 10 to 37). The median 
pairwise SNP distance for cluster isolates from the same person (in the 8 cases with more 
than one isolate) was five (range 0 to 60, interquartile range 1.5 to 15.5). One patient (P04) 
had cluster isolates that extended over a period of 34 months (a basal isolate in 2012, and 
three isolates in 2014/15 with pairwise distances of 60, 59 and 57 SNPs from the 2012 
isolate). spa-typing showed that the cluster was formed of two main spa types (t032, t294) 
with three additional variants (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3. spa-type of 29 MRSA ST22 isolates from 15 cases linked to a GP surgery. 
Each isolate is labelled as patient (P) study number_isolate number_year of isolation.  
Midpoint rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome. Coloured 
bars indicate spa type: red, t294; blue, t032; yellow, t379; orange, t1302; purple t492; grey, 
not typable/not done. 
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Figure 5.4. Phylogenetic analyses of 29 MRSA ST22 isolates from 15 cases linked to a 
GP surgery. Midpoint rooted maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome. 
Each isolate is labelled as patient (P) study number_isolate number_year of isolation.  
Circles indicate multiple isolates from the same patient, with each color being unique to a 
patient. Cases without circles signify those with a single isolate.  
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within 5.6km of each other and two individuals (P10/P11) lived on the same street.  No 
cases lived in the same household or LTCF. 
 
Review of sample requesting information showed a predominance of lower limb swabs 
(cases with samples including lower limb, 9; screen alone, 1; bacteraemia alone, 2). GP 
medical records revealed that the date of first recorded MRSA positive sample for cases 
ranged from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 5.5A). Healthcare contact by each case in the six months 
prior to first MRSA detection was extensive for all but two patients (Figure 5.5B). Six of 
the 13 cases had attended hospital in this period, of whom three cases (P08/P11/P12) had 
attended only one hospital, two cases (P05/P13) had attended two different hospitals, and 
one (P10) had attended three different hospitals. Crucially, no overall link could be made 
between cases and attendance at a hospital (Figure 5.5A). Six individuals had one or more 
samples that were negative for MRSA in the six-months prior to their MRSA first detection 
date, and had no record of hospital attendance in the intervening time. Eleven of the 13 
cases had attended the GP leg ulcer clinic. P5 and P11 had not, but P11 lived in the same 
road as P10.  
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Figure 5.5A.  Timeline showing dates of first positive MRSA sample for cases. Date of 
first known positive MRSA sample (denoted by black star) for the 13 cases investigated in 
public health investigation, and the preceding 6-month window (grey boxes) during which 
contacts with healthcare for each case were established. Red open circles denote date of 
genomically confirmed cluster lineage MRSA samples for each individual.  
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Figure 5.5B. Timeline summarising healthcare contact for 13 cases in the six months 
prior to first MRSA positive sample. The timeline for each case does not necessarily 
overlap and ranges between 2006-2015 as shown in Figure 5.5A.  Recorded contact with 
healthcare represented by: Open circle, hospital; Red square, ulcer clinic; Open square, any 
other GP visit. Black crosses indicate date of negative MRSA sample.   
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A total of 57 GP surgery staff (approximately 90% of current clinical/non-clinical 
employees) received multi-site MRSA screens, all of which were negative. This included 
four nurses who had worked at the ulcer clinic since the first positive MRSA samples in 
2008. Forty environmental samples were taken from communal waiting areas and clinic 
rooms, all of which were also MRSA-negative.  
 
Given that this cluster was only identified by genome sequencing, the question of whether 
the incidence rate of MRSA-positive samples in the practice had been higher than that 
expected was explored. This was achieved by comparing the incidence rate of MRSA-
positive samples submitted to the CUH diagnostic microbiology laboratory between 2006-
2013 between the study GP surgery and four other practices of a similar size and patient 
demographic within Cambridgeshire. This showed a fluctuating rate over time for all four 
practices, with no identifiable outbreak signal for the general practice under investigation 
(Figure 5.6).  
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Figure 5.6. Comparative incidence rate of MRSA for the study GP surgery and four 
comparable general practices. Bold line represents practice studied. Practices not labelled 
to maintain organisational anonymity. 
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5.4. Discussion 
This chapter describes how routine infection control failed to detect or prevent a community 
cluster involving fifteen people who carried or were infected with ST22 MRSA. This was 
despite two fatal cases of bacteraemia that were investigated using standard public health 
procedures,107 but were not linked to each other or the cluster until WGS was undertaken. 
Overall, epidemiological evidence was consistent with onwards transmission of MRSA in 
the community, although the precise circumstances under which this occurred could not be 
defined. Most patients were high users of primary care services including a GP leg ulcer 
clinic, although transmission through other unidentified contacts cannot be ruled out.  
 
One case (P04) had a history of testing MRSA positive since December 2008, and WGS 
on available isolates confirmed carriage of the same MRSA lineage over a period of 34 
months. The diversity within the isolates from P04 encompasses that of isolates from all 
other cases, potentially suggesting that persistent carriage in this case had contributed to 
spread of this lineage. Due to limited sampling, it was not possible to rule out re-infection, 
but the most recent common ancestor of these isolates would have dated to around 2006 
(based on a SNP rate of ~3.5 SNPs/genome/year in ST22),126 consistent with carriage since 
that date. The important contribution of long-term MRSA carriers to transmission in 
hospitals has been shown previously,116,141, and this study shows that it is likely to be 
relevant in other settings. Decolonisation of persistent carriers with chronic wounds such 
as leg ulcers is notoriously difficult, and rigorous infection control is required during 
treatment such as dressing changes when bacterial shedding can occur. MRSA was not 
isolated from staff or the environment at the GP practice during a point-prevalence survey, 
but this was performed a considerable period of time after the cluster had become 
established and was undertaken largely to identify modifiable factors.  
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MRSA ST22 is the most common MRSA lineage associated with healthcare-associated 
infection in the UK,65 and based on the higher overall prevalence of MRSA in hospitals 
versus the community in the last few decades it has been assumed that the predominant 
directionality of spread is from hospitals into the community. Previous studies conducted 
in the UK have isolated ST22 from the community,168,169 but bacterial typing lacked 
sufficient resolution to infer transmission. To support this, in silico spa-typing of the cluster 
isolates in this study was undertaken, and based on the presence of a number of in silico 
spa-types it is unlikely that this cluster would have been identified. Chapter 4 (Regional 
surveillance for high-risk MRSA lineages) describes how WGS was used to confirm that 
transmission of a PVL-positive, single locus variant of ST22 occurred from a special care 
baby unit into the community where it subsequently persisted.114,170 By contrast, the 
findings of this study suggest that most cases (9 of 13) associated with the MRSA cluster 
had either not attended a hospital or had at least one intervening sample that was MRSA-
negative in the six months prior to first MRSA detection. The majority of cases had links 
to clinic attendance in the community (in particular for ulcer care), providing genomic 
evidence for transmission of this typically-nosocomial lineage within community rather 
than hospital settings.  
 
A greater focus is needed to detect MRSA transmission in the community if overall MRSA 
bacteraemia rates are to be further reduced. The role of infection prevention and control in 
the community will become increasingly relevant as National Health Service initiatives are 
rolled out that increase delivery of care outside of hospitals,81 and will require a review of 
the current predominantly hospital-centric structure of infection services.168 In order to 
determine if passive surveillance with a defined ‘trigger’ threshold would have detected 
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this cluster, rates of MRSA over time for the study practice and other similar practices were 
compared. The protracted period over which transmission occurred in the cluster described 
here meant rates of MRSA over time for the GP surgery were comparable with other similar 
practices. Consequently, the real-time analysis of routine data from this practice is unlikely 
to have triggered an outbreak investigation. However, the addition of WGS allowed robust 
assessment of the relatedness of MRSA isolates and the cases involved in the outbreak.  
 
This study has a number of limitations. It cannot be excluded that the outbreak may have 
been detected through other typing methods not undertaken here, such as pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis. Sampling was not undertaken for asymptomatic MRSA carriers in the 
wider community, which is likely to have under-represented the extent of the cluster. Only 
a small proportion of the MRSA isolated from samples submitted by the GP surgery were 
available for sequencing, reducing the number of cases that could be included from the 
retrospective look-back. The study was not sufficiently powered to conduct a case-case 
design (cases with MRSA assigned to the cluster versus unrelated MRSA cases) to 
determine specific risk factors for MRSA acquisition, as comparison between practices was 
limited due to the variation in services provided. Finally, not all staff who may have been 
involved in the care of patients within the cluster were screened for MRSA due to staff 
turnover.   
  
In conclusion, the detection of transmission and outbreaks associated with MRSA ST22 
carriage and infection in the community is incomplete. In particular, this study 
demonstrates the need to consider GP surgeries as well as hospitals and LTCFs as potential 
transmission hotspots. Whilst WGS of all MRSA isolates from GP surgeries may not be 
cost-effective, this work demonstrates how universal WGS of bacteraemia isolates can 
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detect relatedness and potential transmission events in settings which are not typically 
regarded as foci of transmission. Systematic WGS could provide more accurate attribution 
of source, provide a mechanism for more efficient targeting of infection control, and lead 
to further reductions in the number of people who become colonised by, and go on to 
develop MRSA bacteraemia. 
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Chapter 6. Genomic Surveillance of MRSA Associated with 
Bacteraemia in England 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Since the national MRSA bacteraemia surveillance programme conducted by PHE was 
introduced in 2001, it has not included routine submission of isolates for characterisation. 
Isolates submitted to the PHE Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory are highly selected and 
are submitted in order to type isolates as part of suspected outbreak investigations in 
healthcare and community settings, and/or to detect specific genes in isolates from patients 
with suspected toxin-mediated disease. Strain characterisation is undertaken through spa 
typing, MLST, SCCmec-subtyping, toxin gene profiling, and as required, WGS. It is 
possible that a large amount of information regarding the population structure of disease-
causing MRSA in England may have been missed as a result of using this ad hoc isolate 
collection for surveillance.   
 
National bacteraemia surveillance was originally introduced in England to compare MRSA 
rates between hospitals and then enhanced to aid direction of clinical interventions.38 
Combined with comprehensive sampling regimens, WGS technologies now provide the 
opportunity to study the natural history of successful MRSA clones at great resolution, and 
identify clonal expansions to monitor in case of widespread dissemination.171 This chapter 
describes a proof-of-principle study to determine the feasibility and potential benefits of 
combining prospective epidemiological and genomic surveillance of MRSA bacteraemia 
on a national scale within a public health organisation.   
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6.2. Specific Methods 
6.2.1. Study Design, Setting and Participants 
A prospective, observational cohort study of all cases of MRSA bacteraemia in England 
from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 was conducted. Linked, anonymised 
epidemiological and microbiological data were submitted electronically to the mandatory 
enhanced surveillance scheme (MESS) by infection control teams in acute National Health 
Service Trusts, in accordance with national policy. Mandatory data variables included 
patient demographics, details of hospital admission, date of bacteraemia, and location of 
acquisition (community or hospital). 
 
6.2.2. Isolate Collection and Laboratory Testing 
During the study period, all NHS diagnostic microbiology laboratories in England were 
invited to submit MRSA bloodstream isolates to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory, 
PHE Colindale, for characterisation. Isolates were cultured on nutrient agar and underwent 
spa typing,172 and PCR to confirm species identification and determination of the mecA/C 
and PVL status.173 Isolates were stored at -80°C using MicrobankÔcryovials (Pro-Lab 
Diagnostics, Cheshire, UK) pending further analyses. 
 
A total of 559 MRSA bloodstream isolates were received. Following quality control 
procedures 134 isolates were excluded, and 425 isolates were included in the analysis. The 
reasons of exclusion were as follows: duplicate isolates (n=50); not MRSA (n=15); 
inadequate isolate growth (n=2); isolates collected outside of the study dates (n=16); 
isolates submitted in error (n=3); non-bloodstream isolates (n=2); isolates from Wales 
(n=28); and isolates from Northern Ireland (n=18).  
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6.2.3 DNA Extraction and Whole-genome Sequencing 
Isolates were retrieved from storage, sub-cultured onto nutrient agar slopes, and transferred 
to the Department of Medicine at the University of Cambridge. Each sample was cultured 
onto Columbia Blood Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and identified using a commercial 
latex agglutination kit (Pastorex Staph Plus, Bio Rad Laboratories, Hemel Hempstead, 
UK). Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed using the VITEK2 instrument 
(bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). DNA was extracted, libraries prepared, and 150-bp 
paired-end sequences determined on an Illumina HiSeq2000 as described in Chapter 2 
(Materials and Methods). 
 
6.2.4 Integration of Datasets 
PHE Staphylococcal reference laboratory test results were initially linked with 
demographic, clinical and geographic information from the MESS, and then anonymised 
prior to linkage to DNA sequence data by staff at the University of Cambridge.  
 
6.2.5 Genomic Analysis 
Genomes were assembled using an assembly and improvement pipeline as described in 
Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). MLST STs and CCs were assigned from the sequence 
data as described in Chapter 2 (Materials and Methods). Sequence data were mapped using 
SMALT to the reference genome for each CC with more than 20 isolates in the CC group 
(CC5, N315, GenBank accession number BA000018; CC8, FPR3757, GenBank accession 
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number CP000255; CC22, EMRSA15, GenBank accession number HE681097). The core 
genome alignment excluding mobile genetic elements, indels and repetitive regions was 
generated for each clonal complex and was used in phylogenetic estimates using RAxML 
with 100 bootstraps.174 Phylogenetic trees were visualised as described in Chapter 2 
(Materials and Methods).  
 
Isolates were spa typed using in-silico PCR to extract the spa gene X region from 
assembled genomes using previously described primers.151 The spa-type was determined 
using an online spa-typer tool (http://spatyper.fortinbras.us/). The types generated through 
in silico spa-type and laboratory determined spa-typing methods were compared to 
determine concordance. 
 
Bacterial DNA sequences were deposited in the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), 
https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena, under study number ERP005128. Accession numbers, details 
of reads, depth of coverage and N50 are provided in Appendix 6.1.  For subsequent analyses 
MRSA sequence data was sourced from the ENA from previously published studies. These 
included: i) The year-long Cambridgeshire prospective MRSA cohort study,  including 
MRSA carriage and clinical isolates from Cambridgeshire in 2012-2013;145 ii) MRSA 
bloodstream isolates collected by the British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 
(BSAC) Bacteraemia Surveillance Programme between 2001 and 2010;76 iii) USA-300 
isolates collected in New York, United States of America between 2009 and 2011;60 iv) 
MRSA isolates from outbreak investigations at Cambridgeshire hospitals.112,114,129 
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6.3. Results 
A total of 903 MRSA bacteraemia cases were reported to MESS at the time of extract 
(Figure 6.1). Gender was recorded for 98% of cases, and 584 (65%) of cases were male. 
Age was recorded for all but two cases, with a median age of 72 years (range 0 to 103 years; 
interquartile range (IQR) 56 to 84 years). A total of 111 laboratories participated in the 
study. Forty-seven per cent (425/903) of reported MRSA bacteraemia cases occurring in 
England during the study period had isolates that were sequenced and analysed (Figure 
6.1). All of the 425 sequenced isolates were mecA positive by laboratory-PCR. PCR testing 
identified 8.7% (n=37) of the isolates as PVL-positive. Based on sequence data, 65% 
(n=276) were assigned to clonal complex 22 (CC22). Other CCs were represented at lower 
frequencies: CC5 n=42; CC30 n=33; CC8 n=22; CC1 n=19; CC59 n=9; CC45 n=7; 
other/unknown CCs n=17. The number of isolates and variation in the CCs isolated from 
each region is shown in Figure 6.2. No associations were found between particular CCs 
and community versus hospital onset (Appendix 6.2).  
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Figure 6.1. Flowchart of sample processing and analysis. 
 
903 Cases of MRSA Bloodstream Infection Reported
Mandatory Enhanced Surveillance System
Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory, Colindale
559 MRSA isolates Received
134 Isolates Excluded*
425 Cases with Collated Genomic and Epidemiological Data
University of Cambridge/
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute
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Figure 6.2. Map of England with breakdown of the proportions of each CC within the 
sequenced PHE bacteraemia isolates from submitting regions. The number of isolates 
received from each of the labelled regions is indicated in brackets. 13 isolates did not have 
a region assigned. 
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6.3.1. Comparison of Bacteraemia Surveillance and Universal MRSA Sampling 
The most common clone in our collection, CC22 (n=276), was compared with CC22 
genomes generated by a prospective study that sequenced MRSA isolates from every 
positive case (carriage and clinical samples) identified at a single diagnostic microbiology 
laboratory that processed samples from three hospitals and 75 GP surgeries in 
Cambridgeshire between April 2012 and April 2013 (Appendix 2.1).  This Cambridgeshire 
collection was used to represent the diversity of carriage and clinical isolates within a 
defined geographical area, as a national collection of carriage and clinical isolates was not 
available. A phylogeny was constructed for the genomes from the national bacteraemia 
collection within this Cambridgeshire collection (Figure 6.3), in order to determine whether 
those isolates causing bacteraemia were clonally related, or distributed throughout the 
phylogenetic tree.  
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of PHE bacteraemia CC22 isolates (n=276, red branches) to 
the first isolate from each patient from the previously published universal sample 
collection from Cambridgeshire (n=1035, blue branches).145 Mid-point rooted 
maximum likelihood tree based on single nucleotide polymorphisms in the core genome 
alignment generated after mapping against the reference genome EMRSA-15. The inner 
ring denotes the collection, and the outer represents referral network of submitting 
laboratory. The arc indicates a large clonal expansion in the Cambridgeshire region, which 
is underrepresented in the bacteraemia only surveillance.  
 
As shown in Figure 6.3, isolates from our national MRSA bacteraemia collection were 
dispersed throughout the Cambridgeshire phylogeny, ruling out any association between a 
particular lineage and bacteraemia. Comparing the national bacteraemia collection to WGS 
of universal sampling in Cambridgeshire also demonstrates that some lineages are under-
represented when undertaking bacteraemia based (rather than clinical/carriage based) 
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surveillance. For example, a large clonal expansion (indicated with an arc on the figure) 
was seen in the Cambridgeshire phylogeny, with only eight of the Cambridgeshire isolates 
within the national MRSA bacteraemia collection having been received from the East of 
England region.  
 
To explore the effect of different sampling strategies on identified MRSA lineage diversity 
a comparison of CCs within three different MRSA collections was undertaken: this national 
MRSA bacteraemia collection (2012-2013), isolates from the Cambridgeshire study (2012-
2013),145 and MRSA bacteraemia isolates from the BSAC bacteraemia Surveillance 
Programme from 2000-2010 (Figure 6.4).76 Despite the different sampling strategies and 
time frames, it was found that CC22 was the dominant lineage in all collections. Both of 
the bacteraemia-based collections showed a lower diversity of lineages than seen in the 
one-year Cambridgeshire study. Furthermore, the BSAC collection, which collected 
bacteraemia from up to 40 laboratories in the UK between 2001 and 2010, showed the most 
limited diversity. This may have resulted from a decline in certain lineages e.g. EMRSA-
16 (CC30) during the 10-year collection period. 
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Figure 6.4. Diversity of lineages (CCs) within four collections: Carriage and clinical 
samples from a year-long Cambridgeshire study of MRSA;145 the national PHE 
bacteraemia collection and a national BSAC bacteraemia collection.76 Colours represent 
clonal complexes 
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Reuter et al. previously demonstrated that it is possible to use sequence data from the BSAC 
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feasible using a smaller sample of bacteraemia collected during over the shorter time period 
of one year. It was found that previous outbreaks in a neonatal intensive care unit,112 and a 
paediatric intensive care unit,114 were easily identifiable as discrete clusters, as shown in 
Figure 6.5. Furthermore, MRSA isolates from a suspected outbreak on a hepatology 
ward,129 were scattered throughout the phylogeny, refuting the outbreak. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Mid-point rooted, maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree based on SNPs 
in the core genome providing contextualisation of previously published outbreaks at 
Cambridge University Hospitals: Isolates from an outbreak on a neonatal intensive care 
unit (n=7, green),112 isolates from an outbreak on a special care baby unit which extended 
into epidemiologically linked cases in the community (n=15, purple)114 and isolates from a 
suspected but disproven outbreak on a hepatology ward (n=42, blue).129 
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6.3.4. Monitoring and Detection of Emerging or High-risk Lineages 
One key aim of a national MRSA surveillance is the identification and monitoring of 
emerging and/or high-risk MRSA lineages.  One such lineage is the USA300 lineage, 
which was first identified in 1999, and has subsequently caused an epidemic of SSTI in the 
US.56,57 The widespread dissemination of USA300 in otherwise healthy people, and its 
spread into hospitals has made this a high-risk strain. However, despite multiple 
introductions into a number of countries, genomic surveillance has shown that to date, 
minimal transmission of USA300 has occurred in Europe.66-69,175 The national MRSA 
bacteraemia collection was examined and it was found that six of the 22 CC8 isolates were 
phylogenetically defined as USA300 and were widely dispersed throughout the collection, 
indicating multiple introductions of USA300 into England (Figure 6.6). Given the 
observation that USA300 is commonly associated with SSTI (which are rarely sampled), 
and the limitations of bacteraemia-based sampling, it is likely that, as shown by the work 
presented in Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance for high-risk MRSA lineages), the 
prevalence of USA300 in the UK may be higher than detected here,.  
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Figure 6.6. Comparison of the PHE bacteraemia USA300 isolates (n=6, red) to 
previously published USA300 isolates from a universal sample collection in 
Cambridgeshire (n=24, orange) 145 and from the US (n=348, blue) 60. Mid-point rooted 
maximum likelihood tree based on SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after 
mapping against the reference genome FPR3757 (black).  
 
Another potential benefit of having access to national surveillance data is the ability to 
identify and explore changes in molecular epidemiology on a local scale. By way of an 
example, it was found that an expansion of CC5 in the South West region of England 
(Figure 6.7), was genetically distinct from a CC5 expansion in Wales identified in the 
BSAC collection,76 despite their close geographic proximity.  
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Figure 6.7. Comparison of PHE bacteraemia CC5 isolates (n=42, red branches) to 
those from the previously published national bacteraemia BSAC collection (BSAC, 
n=28, blue branches)76. Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on single 
nucleotide polymorphisms in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against 
the CC5 reference genome N315. Coloured bar represents referral network of submitting 
laboratory. Expansions within the South West of England and Welsh regions highlighted.  
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remain compatible. The concordance between these two methods in the national MRSA 
bacteraemia collection was examined. Of the 425 isolates a 98.4% concordance rate was 
found (Appendix 6.2), comparable to previous studies.176,177 Of the seven isolates with 
discordant results, there were deletions/rearrangements within the spa gene of the short-
read assemblies that resulted in loss of sequence complementary to the forward primer, and 
thus failure to amplify (in silico) the gene region targeted by in silico spa-typing.  
 
6.4. Discussion 
Mandatory enhanced surveillance for MRSA bacteraemia in England has provided in-depth 
information on the national decline of MRSA bacteraemia, and the changes in patient-level 
epidemiology that have accompanied it. However, without characterisation of 
systematically collected isolates, bacterial molecular epidemiology cannot be studied. This 
study aimed to investigate whether it was feasible to undertake combined epidemiological 
and genomic surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infections in England in order to address 
this issue.  
 
Some challenges were encountered including obtaining bloodstream isolates from all 
participating hospitals (as submission was voluntary), and integrating two datasets 
collected through different methods (epidemiological data collected through an online 
database submission and isolates sent via post/courier). Despite this, the feasibility of this 
approach was demonstrated. The known population structure and diversity of MRSA in 
England was constructed, even with an incomplete collection of bloodstream isolates 
collected over a one-year period. A greater diversity of clones was found than that seen in 
a ten-year national collection of MRSA bloodstream isolates (BSAC collection) with a 
limited sampling strategy, but less diversity than that seen in a one-year regional collection 
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of carriage and clinical isolates (Cambridgeshire study). A reasonable first step in MRSA 
surveillance is to assess existing genomic diversity,171 and our study demonstrates that this 
can be achieved and could feasibly be extended over time to generate a comprehensive 
national genomic database to monitor changes in clonal diversity. 
 
Prior to April 2017, any MRSA bacteraemia isolates submitted to PHE were routinely 
characterised by spa-typing,172 and PCR to confirm species identification alongside 
determination of mecA/C and PVL status.173 As typing methods evolve and WGS becomes 
increasingly routine, backward compatibility with previous methods ensures the continued 
utility of typed historical collections. Laboratory spa-typing and in silico spa-typing from 
short read WGS data have been shown to be largely comparable in a limited number of 
studies,176,177 despite the high density of repeats within the spa gene region. The study 
showed over 98% concordance between laboratory and genomic spa-typing methods 
which, reassuringly, confirms compatibility with historical data. 
 
A further potential benefit of prospective sequencing of MRSA bloodstream isolates and a 
centralised national database is the ability to provide genomic context to confirm or refute 
outbreaks on a local or a national scale. This would be an invaluable resource as long as 
there is open access to anonymised (non-identifiable) data and to bioinformatics tools to 
analyse them rapidly and easily. The challenges will be to ensure standardised methods, 
development of strategies to avoid duplication of samples, and establishment of a large, 
comprehensive, open access, anonymised database where data could be deposited, curated, 
and accessible for public health benefit. As discussed previously, web-based, open-access 
software packages that are potentially suitable for this purpose are already being 
developed.135,136 Apart from the ability to detect emerging or potentially high-risk MRSA 
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clones retrospectively, on-going sampling and analysis will enable detection in real-time.  
In this study it was found that that the high-risk USA300 lineage, an epidemic cause of 
SSTI in the USA, has spread to the UK and is causing bloodstream infections across 
England. The genomic data suggest multiple introductions of USA300, supporting the 
regional findings of Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance for high-risk MRSA lineages). 
However, the use of bacteraemia rather than clinical isolate-based surveillance limits ability 
to analyse this further. However, using the PHE bacteraemia collection it was possible to 
identify a local expansion of CC5 causing bacteraemia in the South West region of England, 
where local investigations suggest this clone has been problematic.178 Thus timely, routine 
WGS of PHE bacteraemia isolates combined with local epidemiological data could 
potentially identify novel and/or pathogenic lineages in real time, and could be used to 
trigger local/regional investigations and interventions. 
 
This study had several limitations. The systems for collecting epidemiological data and 
bacterial isolates were separate and different, leading to high rates of sample exclusion. 
This challenge of capturing and integrating both types of data could be overcome in practice 
by submitting epidemiological and laboratory data to a single data collection system. 
Submission of bloodstream isolates was voluntary, with many reported cases having no 
corresponding isolate referred for characterisation; this may have introduced bias into the 
analysis. This could be addressed by having mandatory submission of isolates for all 
reported cases. Finally, a cost/benefit analysis of this approach was not conducted. Despite 
these limitations, it has been demonstrated that prospective epidemiological and genomic 
surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infections is feasible, has numerous potential benefits, 
and could provide a valuable public health resource in England and beyond.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
7.1 Conclusions and Future Directions 
MRSA is classified as ‘high priority’ in the WHO’s global priority list for antibiotic 
resistant bacteria.179 Furthermore, as the threat from other antibiotic resistant bacteria 
increases, MRSA has long been considered the prototype of antimicrobial resistant 
pathogens,180 and experience in this field can be applied to other antibiotic resistant species.  
Surveillance plays a major part in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, and the 
development of technologies in the last 20 years has provided opportunities to optimise 
this. In her 2011 annual report, the UK Chief Medical Officer discussed the significant 
opportunity offered by novel technologies such as whole-genome sequencing to undertake, 
‘more rapid and more discriminating surveillance’. It highlighted the importance of any 
national strategy to implement genomics within diagnostic services in including, ‘the 
delivery of real surveillance data as an integral part’.130 
 
One of the primary aims of surveillance within a healthcare facility is to detect disease 
transmission and outbreaks, a key role of an infection control team. Despite being been 
shown as highly effective in providing the additional resolution required for effective 
investigation of MRSA outbreaks, WGS is not yet routinely used in day-to-day MRSA 
infection control practice in England.  Instead, because they are routinely available, ASPs 
and epidemiology are typically used to define potential outbreaks and to direct where 
further typing should be utilised. Chapter 3 (Evaluation of ASPs to detect MRSA 
transmission) described the first study to systematically analyse the utility of ASP and 
epidemiology in determining putative MRSA transmission events. This demonstrated that 
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the performance of ASP and epidemiology was poor, but improved slightly when isolates 
with the dominant ASP in the collections were excluded. It also performed better when 
individuals shared a residential post code rather than a stay in the same ward at the same 
time, but there was little variation when spa-typing was included.  
 
The persistence of ASPs as surrogates for determining transmission events is largely due 
to their widespread availability, as the processing of each organism to guide antibiotic 
therapy for clinicians produces the ASP as a (potentially) helpful by-product. WGS offers 
the potential to both identify organisms and determine the presence/absence of drug 
resistance mutations and genes. Because of variation in gene expression, genotypic 
resistance does not always cause phenotypic resistance. Therefore, a high level of 
concordance between phenotypic (current practice) and genotypic susceptibility results is 
required for this to be accepted into routine practice. S. aureus has been studied extensively 
in this regard,139,140 and Gordon et al., 2014, have shown that WGS is as sensitive and 
specific as routine antimicrobial susceptibility testing methods.138 If WGS was transitioned 
into routine susceptibility testing, then the use of WGS data instead of ASPs for detecting 
transmission as part of infection control practice would be inevitable. In the meantime, 
future work should combine large scale, systematic, real-time WGS of MRSA alongside 
ASPs and epidemiology to determine how WGS can be best targeted to improve outbreak 
detection, prior to the potential future integration of WGS into routine practice. 
 
Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance for high-risk MRSA lineages) explored the use of 
systematic surveillance to investigate potentially high-risk MRSA lineages. It determined 
the prevalence of USA300 MRSA in Cambridgeshire, providing the first insights into the 
burden of USA300 in an area of the UK, with phylogenetic analysis revealing multiple 
   
Conclusions 
 
118 
introductions and household transmission. This supports the findings from other studies 
elsewhere in Europe, such as France and Switzerland.72,181 In contrast to these studies from 
elsewhere in continental Europe, no isolates of USA300-LV from Latin America were 
identified in the sampled Cambridgeshire population. Whilst USA300 is considered a high-
risk lineage globally because of its history of rapid spread in the US,171 ST2371 MRSA is 
an example of a lineage which has primarily proven problematic in the Cambridgeshire 
region in England. Despite an outbreak of this lineage being declared closed, this work 
uncovered ten isolates which were closely related to the original outbreak isolates both 
from a genomic and epidemiological perspective. Although the ward outbreak had indeed 
been brought to a close, with no systematic surveillance programme monitoring the 
incidence of non-invasive MRSA infections, this lineage continued to cause disease in a 
group of linked individuals in the community, highlighting limitations in the current 
strategies to monitor cases.  
 
Chapter 4 (Regional surveillance for high-risk MRSA lineages) therefore shows how WGS 
could assist in the surveillance and monitoring of such high-risk lineages, and more 
broadly, it indicates that systematic WGS within a sentinel laboratory could be utilised as 
an MRSA surveillance mechanism. Future work should explore the practicalities and 
costings of different strategies for applying genomic surveillance to potentially high-risk 
lineages, including sentinel surveillance within specific laboratories as part of national 
surveillance. Through modelling different surveillance strategies, the optimal strategy can 
be determined and importantly, costed.   
 
Chapter 5 (Detection of cryptic local MRSA transmission) used systematic surveillance 
and WGS to identify transmission of the typically nosocomial lineage, ST22, within a 
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Cambridgeshire community. Based on the higher overall prevalence of MRSA in hospitals 
versus the community in the last few decades it has been assumed that the predominant 
directionality of spread of ST22, the most common MRSA lineage in England, is from 
hospitals into the community. The work in Chapter 5 (Detection of cryptic local MRSA 
transmission) challenges this view and demonstrates the need to consider GP surgeries as 
transmission hotspots. Previous studies conducted in the UK have isolated ST22 from the 
community,168,169,182 but bacterial typing lacked sufficient resolution to infer transmission. 
As one of the cases carried the same MRSA lineage for nearly three years and the diversity 
within the isolates from this case encompassed that of isolates from all other cases, this 
study also highlighted the important role of persistent MRSA carriers in the transmission 
of MRSA. Since writing, the important role of persistent carries in MRSA transmission has 
been confirmed in a comprehensive genomic study by Gordon et al., 2017.116  
 
Further work would aim to determine those factors which contributed to the success of this 
particular ST22 MRSA lineage in transmitting within the community. This would require 
a comprehensive analysis of patient, bacterial and environmental factors. However, the 
historical nature of the outbreak would be a limitation to the analysis. From a wider 
perspective, the role of infection prevention and control in the community will become 
increasingly relevant as initiatives are rolled out that increase delivery of care outside of 
hospitals,108 meaning altered demands on infection services.168 The implementation of 
surveillance WGS to control procedures may be a necessary tool if MRSA transmission is 
to be targeted by rapid interventions.   
 
Through exploring the integration of epidemiological and genomic surveillance at a 
national level, the investigation described in Chapter 6 (National surveillance of MRSA 
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bacteraemia) demonstrated that it is feasible to undertake combined epidemiological and 
genomic surveillance of MRSA bacteraemia in England.  Logistical challenges were 
encountered which could help inform practice for the integration of these services in PHE 
in future. Challenges included obtaining bloodstream isolates from all participating 
hospitals (as submission was voluntary), and integrating two datasets collected through 
different methods (epidemiological data collected through an online database submission 
and isolates sent via post/courier). 
 
A major advantage of sequencing MRSA isolates is the ability to share and collate genome 
sequence data to build up national and international databases. A number of bacteraemia 
surveillance systems already exist e.g. the English mandatory enhanced surveillance 
system, the voluntary British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy bacteraemia 
Surveillance Programme, and the voluntary European Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance Network. Whilst each system has different aims and objectives, sampling 
criteria and data collection methods, the digital interchangeability of sequence data creates 
an opportunity to collaborate and share genome sequence data whilst producing a 
sustainable, on-going resource if the isolates were sequenced.  
  
7.2. Closing Remarks 
This thesis has used phenotypic, epidemiological and genomic data to investigate MRSA 
surveillance at the regional and national level. It has quantified the sensitivity and 
specificity of ASPs and epidemiology versus the gold standard of WGS and epidemiology 
in determining MRSA transmission.  It has also revealed how WGS can be used alongside 
systematic surveillance to investigate potentially high-risk lineages of MRSA. It has shown 
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that WGS can feasibly be integrated into an existing national surveillance programme and 
can provide information to enhance surveillance at a national and regional level. 
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Longitudinal genomic surveillance of MRSA in the
UK reveals transmission patterns in hospitals
and the community
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Genome sequencing has provided snapshots of the transmission of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) during suspected outbreaks in isolated hospital wards. Scale-up to populations is now required to establish
the full potential of this technology for surveillance. We prospectively identified all individuals over a 12-month
period who had at least one MRSA-positive sample processed by a routine diagnostic microbiology laboratory in
the East of England, which received samples from three hospitals and 75 general practitioner (GP) practices. We
sequenced at least 1 MRSA isolate from 1465 individuals (2282 MRSA isolates) and recorded epidemiological data.
An integrated epidemiological and phylogenetic analysis revealed 173 transmission clusters containing between 2
and 44 cases and involving 598 people (40.8%). Of these, 118 clusters (371 people) involved hospital contacts alone,
27 clusters (72 people) involved community contacts alone, and 28 clusters (157 people) had both types of contact.
Community- and hospital-associated MRSA lineages were equally capable of transmission in the community, with
instances of spread in households, long-term care facilities, and GP practices. Our study provides a comprehensive
picture of MRSA transmission in a sampled population of 1465 people and suggests the need to review existing
infection control policy and practice.
INTRODUCTION
Staphylococcus aureus is responsible for a high proportionof community-
associated invasive and soft tissue infections and is a leading cause of
health care–associated infections (1). This burden is compounded by
infection with methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA), which results
in increasedmortality andhospitalization costs and longer hospital stays
compared to methicillin-susceptible S. aureus infections (2). Successful
reduction ofMRSA infection rates depends on preventingMRSA trans-
mission and detecting and containing outbreaks (3). Understanding
the settings and circumstances under whichMRSA evades current in-
fection control measures is central to designing new strategies to reduce
transmission.
MRSA carriage and infection have historically been associated with
health care settings. Recent studies have demonstrated the value of ap-
plying whole-genome sequencing to define the spread of MRSA (4–10)
and a range of other pathogens in hospitals.Whole-genome sequencing
provides the ultimate resolution to discriminate between bacterial iso-
lates and, when combined with epidemiological data, enables the recon-
struction of transmissionnetworks. Previous studies have largely focused
on suspected outbreaks (4–6) or transmission in high-risk settings such
as intensive care units (7–10). These snapshots have confirmed the
potential of whole-genome sequencing to confirm or refute outbreaks,
but the value that could be derived from applying this to entire popula-
tions, including those that bridge the divide between hospitals and the
community, is unknown. Here, we report the findings of a 12-month
prospective study of all MRSA-positive individuals detected by a large
diagnostic microbiology laboratory in the East of England in which an
integrated analysis of epidemiological and sequence data provided a full
picture of MRSA transmission.
RESULTS
Study participants and MRSA isolates
We identified 1465 MRSA-positive individuals in the East of England
over a 12-month period (April 2012 to April 2013) by screening all
samples submitted to a diagnostic microbiology laboratory by three
hospitals and 75 general practitioner (GP) practices (see Fig. 1 for
geographical distribution). Cases had a median age of 68 years
[range, newborns to 101 years; interquartile range (IQR), 46 to
82 years]. We sequenced 2282 isolates cultured from their multisite
screens (n = 1619) or diagnostic specimens (n = 663), which equated
to 1 isolate from 1006 cases and a median of 2 isolates (range, 2 to
15; IQR, 2 to 3) from 459 cases (see Supplementary Materials and
Methods for rationale for selecting isolates for sequencing and fig. S1
for number of isolates sequenced per case). About 80% of sequenced
MRSA isolates were from samples submitted by the three study hos-
pitals (1453 multisite screens and 372 diagnostic specimens), with the
remainder submitted by GP practices (166 multisite screens and 291
diagnostic specimens). Multilocus sequence types (STs) were derived
from sequence data, which revealed that most of the isolates be-
longed to clonal complex (CC) 22 (1667 of 2282, 73%), the predom-
inant health care–associated lineage in the UK (11). This was followed
in frequency by CC30 (n = 129, 5.6%), CC5 (n = 108, 4.7%), CC1 (n =
105, 4.6%), and CC8 (n = 87, 3.8%) (see table S1 for CC designation
of the entire collection). Supplementary Materials and Methods
provides a detailed description of the patient data collected, micro-
biology, sequencing methodology, and sequence data analyses, and
fig. S2 shows a flowchart summarizing the data types used and
analyses.
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Integration of genomic and epidemiological data
We initially divided the 2282 MRSA isolates into clusters containing
isolates that were no more than 50 single-nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs) different based on core genome comparisons (Supplemen-
tary Materials and Methods describes the rationale for the cutoff
used). This led to the identification of 173 separate phylogenetic
clusters. MRSA isolated from more than half of cases (785 of 1465,
53.6%) was genetically linked to MRSA from at least one other case
based on isolates belonging to the same cluster. The next step was to
apply epidemiological data (hospital admission and ward movement
data, GP registration, and residential postcode) to this clustering
framework to determine links between cases within each cluster,
which ignored the traditional categorization of lineages as community-
or hospital-associated. Figure S3 provides an overview of how the
bacterial phylogeny and patient epidemiological data were integrated
to define and classify transmission clusters. This revealed that 598 of
785 (76.2%) cases had an identifiable MRSA-positive contact with at
least one other study case in a hospital setting and/or in the commu-
nity (Table 1).
It is possible for epidemiological links between MRSA-positive in-
dividuals to arise by chance whenMRSA carriers are admitted to hos-
pital wards or other health care facilities
with a high patient turnover or a propor-
tionately higher prevalence ofMRSAcases
than the hospital- or community-averaged
baseline. To assess the potential impact of
this, we determined the strength of epide-
miological links between people with ge-
netically unrelated isolates (separated by
more than 50 SNPs). This was achieved
by a systematic pairwise comparison of
1040 cases with MRSA CC22. A total
of 540,280 unique pairwise case compar-
isons were made, of which 534,417 had
more than 50 SNPs (table S2). The in-
stances of shared wards, GP practices,
and postcodes were uncommon (wards/
GP practices) or very rare (postcodes) for
case pairs positive for unrelated CC22
MRSA (table S2). This analysis led us to
classify shared postcodes (present in
0.04% of genetically unrelated cases), GP
practice, andward contacts (<1% of genet-
ically unrelated cases) other than the Acci-
dent and Emergency Department (6.91%)
as strong epidemiological links. Admission
to the same hospital (particularly hospital
A) was common in unrelated cases and
considered a weak epidemiological link.
Each casewas pairedwith the individ-
ual whose MRSA isolate was the closest
genetic match, after which the genetic
distance between each MRSA pair was
plotted against six different categories
of epidemiological contact (Fig. 2). This
demonstrated a direct relationship be-
tween bacterial relatedness and strength
of epidemiological contact.
Evidence of MRSA transmission in the community
Twelve percent of cases (72 of 598) with both bacterial and epidemio-
logical links could be resolved into 27 distinct community transmission
clusters. MRSA lineages regarded as community-associated (CA-
MRSA)—which in the UK included CC1, CC5, CC8, CC45, and
CC80—were associated with nine separate community transmission
clusters (Table 1).However,most community clusters involvedhospital-
associated lineages [17 separate CC22 clusters involving 50 of 72 cases
(69%) and 1CC30 cluster involving 3 of 72 cases (4%)]. To contextualize
theMRSA CC22 isolates associated with transmission in the communi-
ty, we constructed a phylogenetic tree containing all CC22 study isolates.
This showed that CC22 associated with community clusters was
scattered throughout the phylogenetic tree, interspersedwith clusters as-
sociated with cases with hospital contacts alone (Fig. 3). This indicates
that CC22 isolates that were transmitted in the community belonged to
thewiderCC22population, with no evidence for specific genetic subsets.
We also identified transmission clusters relating to three independent
GP practices, the largest of which contained 13 cases. All cases with
shared postcodes were further investigated to determine whether they
shared a residential address. This confirmed that MRSA transmis-
sion had occurred in at least 11 separate households (25 cases) and in
Fig. 1. Map showing the study catchment area in the East of England. The locations of hospitals (n = 3), GP
practices (n = 75), and postcode districts are shown for the 1465 study cases. Postcode districts are color-coded to show
the number of MRSA-positive cases sampled in each district. A total of 5,012,137 residents lived in the highlighted
districts (16,240 km2) according to the 2011 UK Census.
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8 long-term care facilities (22 cases) (Table 1). A pictorial representation
of exemplars of transmission at a GP practice, long-term care facility,
and household is shown in fig. S4 (A to C).
Evidence of MRSA transmission in hospitals
More than half of cases with epidemiological and bacterial genomic
links (371 of 598, 62%) resided in transmission clusters with hospital
contacts, of which 255 cases had ward contacts. The 371 cases were
resolved into 118 different clusters each involving between 2 and 44
individuals (Table 1). We narrowed down further investigation to
those clusters that contained five or more patients (nine clusters; see
table S3 for details) and evaluated these for instances of direct ward
contact (same ward, overlapping admission dates) or indirect ward
contact (same ward, no overlap in admission dates). Where available,
Table 1. Epidemiological classification of transmission clusters. Columns are ordered based on decreasing proportion of isolates in each CC. Each cell shows
the number of cases and (in parentheses) the number of transmission clusters to which these cases were assigned. The number of transmission clusters in
each category is the sum of those of its subcategories. The same applies to the number of cases except for columns “CC22” and “Overall.” A total of seven cases
had two different CC22 strains suggestive of mixed colonization or strain replacement that linked them to two different transmission clusters. This explains
why the total number of genetically clustered cases (n = 578) is lower than the sum of cases in its subcategories. CCs with genetically unrelated isolates
or identified in a single individual from the study population are not shown. “Multiple hospitals” refers to epidemiological contacts from more than one of the
three study hospitals (A, B, and C).
Epidemiological classification Overall CC22 CC30 CC5 CC1 CC8 CC45 CC59 CC80 CC15 CC361
Genetically unrelated cases 680 462 36 49 35 42 17 15 6 1 2
Genetically clustered with other cases 785 578 46 30 45 9 34 26 9 8 3
Genetically clustered and epidemiological contacts 598 (173) 449 (127) 36 (8) 20 (9) 33 (13) 4 (2) 24 (8) 21 (3) 2 (1) 8 (1) 3 (1)
Only community contacts 72 (27) 50 (17) 3 (1) 3 (1) 6 (3) 4 (2) 4 (2) — 2 (1) — —
Different postcode Shared GP practice 14 (3) 10 (1) — — 2 (1) — 2 (1) — — — —
Same postcode Shared household 25 (11) 16 (7) 3 (1) — — 4 (2) — — 2 (1) — —
Same postcode Shared long-term care facility 22 (8) 20 (7) — — — — 2 (1) — — — —
Same postcode Different addresses 2 (1) — — — 2 (1) — — — — — —
Same postcode Unresolved 9 (4) 4 (2) — 3 (1) 2 (1) — — — — — —
Only hospital contacts 371 (118) 296 (91) 10 (3) 15 (7) 20 (8) — 16 (5) 5 (2) — 8 (1) 3 (1)
Ward contact 255 (64) 212 (52) 6 (1) 5 (2) 10 (4) — 9 (2) 3 (1) — 8 (1) 3 (1)
Hospital A 125 (41) 101 (35) 6 (1) — 6 (2) — 9 (2) — — — 3 (1)
Hospital B 48 (14) 32 (10) — 3 (1) 2 (1) — — 3 (1) — 8 (1) —
Hospital C 8 (4) 4 (2) — 2 (1) 2 (1) — — — — — —
Multiple hospitals 75 (5) 75 (5) — — — — — — — — —
Hospital-wide contact 118 (54) 85 (39) 4 (2) 10 (5) 10 (4) — 7 (3) 2 (1) — — —
Hospital A 97 (45) 70 (33) 2 (1) 8 (4) 8 (3) — 7 (3) 2 (1) — — —
Hospital B 6 (3) 2 (1) 2 (1) — 2 (1) — — — — — —
Hospital C 8 (4) 6 (3) — 2 (1) — — — — — — —
Multiple hospitals 8 (2) 8 (2) — — — — — — — —
Both hospital and community contacts 156 (28) 104 (19) 23 (4) 2 (1) 7 (2) — 4 (1) 16 (1) — — —
Different postcode Shared GP practice 13 (2) 13 (2) — — — — — — — —
Same postcode Shared household 37 (9) 17 (3) 11 (3) 2 (1) 3 (1) — 4 (1) — — — —
Same postcode Shared long-term care facility 56 (9) 36 (7) — — 4 (1) — — 16 (1) — — —
Same postcode Different addresses 17 (3) 5 (2) 12 (1) — — — — — — — —
Same postcode Unresolved 33 (5) 33 (5) — — — — — — — — —
Neither hospital nor community contacts 193 134 10 10 12 5 10 5 7 — —
Total number of cases 1465 1040 82 79 80 51 51 41 15 9 5
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the presence of a negativeMRSA culture followed by a positiveMRSA
culture was interpreted as additional evidence of hospital acquisition.
The specific ward whereMRSA had been putatively acquired could be
determined in three of the nine clusters, one of which is depicted in
Fig. 4A. This ward-centric pattern occurred in two different hospitals
and across different CCs (CC22, CC30, and CC15). Notably, we ob-
served that there was a time delay between presumptive acquisition
date and first clinical detection of MRSA positivity in most cases
(six of eight, three of four, and three of five patients). For the remain-
ing six hospital clusters, multiple wards in the same hospital were
plausible places of acquisition.We also observed a pattern of transmis-
sion that centered around specific individuals in which the movement
of a single, persistentlyMRSA-positive index patient throughmultiple
wards resulted inMRSA acquisition by numerous other patients. This
patient-centric pattern of transmission was identified in three trans-
mission clusters (Fig. 4B and fig. S2, E and F) and was observed in two
different hospitals and for two CCs (CC22 and CC30). Acquisition by
other cases was associatedwith a high rate of indirect ward acquisition.
MRSA transmission at the hospital-community interface
We identified 28 clusters (157 cases) that contained amixture of people
with community and hospital epidemiological links (Table 1). Further
analysis of 15 clusters that contained five ormore cases (detailed in table
S3) revealed instances of community-onset transmission followed by
onward nosocomial dissemination, and hospital-onset transmission
followed by nosocomial and community spread in CC30 and CC22
clusters. A pictorial representation of exemplars of these transmission
patterns is shown in fig. S4 (D to F).
Fig. 2. Pairwise comparison between MRSA relatedness and type of patient contact. For each case, the most closely related MRSA isolate from another case was
identified, and the epidemiological contact of each case pair was defined. The number of cases in each epidemiological category is shown as a function of the genetic
distance (difference in the number of SNPs in the core genome). (A to D) Genetic distance distribution for cases with hospital contacts alone. Direct contact refers to a
link in the same time and place (ward or hospital). Indirect contact refers to a link in the same place but different time. (E) Community contacts (shared residential
postcodes or GP practice). (F) Cases with neither hospital nor community contacts. Only cases with MRSA isolates from CCs found in at least one other patient in the
population are shown (n = 1459).
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DISCUSSION
Our findings have important implications for infection control policy
and practice. MRSA transmission in our study population was not
attributable to large nosocomial outbreaks but resulted from the cumu-
lative effect of numerous clinically unrecognized episodes. We detected
173 separate genetic clusters that mapped to numerous different lo-
cations over the course of 12 months, which is indicative of repeated
lapses in infection control. There are several explanations for exten-
sive unrecognized transmission, including lack of hospital discharge
swabbing and the fact that place of acquisition is often different to the
place of detection and separated by a period of days, weeks, or months.
This indicates the need for outbreak investigations to widen their scope
in time and place when considering potential MRSA contacts.
Standard infection control practice centered on a ward-based ap-
proach may also fail to detect the impact of longitudinal patient-centric
transmission.We identified a critical role for some persistent carriers
who spreadMRSA inmultiple wards during complex health care path-
ways. This frequently involved indirect transmission, in which apparent
acquisition by a new case occurred after the index case had left theward,
which is suggestive of environmental contamination or colonizedhealth
care workers. Further studies are needed to identify host factors respon-
sible for persistent carriage associated with a high risk ofMRSA trans-
mission to facilitate risk stratification and targeted allocation of isolation
facilities where these are a limited resource.
It is generally accepted that most of the MRSA lineages either have
become adapted to persist and spread in hospitals or are sufficiently fit
to compete with other S. aureus lineages associated with community-
associated carriage (12). CC22 is the predominant health care–associated
MRSA lineage in the UK (~70%) followed in frequency by CC30, and
most ongoingMRSA transmission is assumed to occur in health care
settings. We expected that most clusters caused by CC22 and CC30
MRSA would map to hospitals but instead found considerable CC22
transmission in the community. Furthermore, clusters associated with
community transmission ofMRSACC22 were distributed across the
CC22 phylogeny and were interspersed with hospital-related clusters.
This provides definitive evidence for the spread of so-called hospital-
associated lineages such as CC22 through transmission networks that
include the community. The repeated introduction ofMRSA from the
community into hospitals and vice versa signals the need formore robust
action to detect and tackle community-associated carriage.
By including patient epidemiological information, we found that
residential postcodes and GP registration information were strong
epidemiological markers of MRSA transmission. Sharing the same
postcode or GP practice by two or more MRSA-positive patients often
Fig. 3. Transmission clusters color-coded on the CC22 phylogeny. Maximum likelihood tree generated from 34,600 SNP sites in the core genome is shown for 1667
CC22 isolates. Colors refer to the type of epidemiological links in clusters of genetically related isolates (maximum 50 SNPs) from multiple cases.
S C I ENCE TRANS LAT IONAL MED I C I N E | R E PORT
Coll et al., Sci. Transl. Med. 9, eaak9745 (2017) 25 October 2017 5 of 9
 by guest on M
ay 26, 2019
http://stm
.sciencem
ag.org/
Downloaded from
 
  Appendices 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Exemplars of two patterns of nosocomial MRSA spread. (A) Ward-centric pattern. Eight patients in this transmission cluster had ward contacts in wards B2 and B21,
including admission overlaps. Notably, the putative epicenter of transmission was in ward B2 or B21, but the outbreak strain was isolated on later admissions in six of the eight
patients, three of which (1090, 727, and 762) were first detected at a different hospital (hospital A) fromwhere they had putatively acquired this strain (that is, in hospital B).
(B) Patient-centric pattern. Six patients had stayed inwards visited by patient 388 (that is, A49, A80, andA59) before theirMRSA isolation date. NegativeMRSA screens before entry
to thesewards for somepatients (1288, 1057, 1488, 1377, and 942) further support hospital acquisition. Isolates frompatient 388were themost basal in the phylogenetic tree, and
their diversity enclosed that of isolates from the other patients, providing further indicators for this patient being the potential source for the transmission cluster. Colored blocks
other than gray represent ward contacts, which are labeled by a letter to denote the hospital (A or B) and a number that denotes the anonymized ward.
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indicated an outbreak, some of which spanned several months. Our
findings support the routine collection of postcodes and GP registra-
tion as an integral part of routine surveillance to capture putative
MRSA outbreaks in the community. This could guide a targeted ap-
proach to the use of whole-genome sequencing to confirm or refute
transmission and direct infection control interventions that would cur-
tail further dissemination.
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. The study design
did not include longitudinal or dischargeMRSA screening in hospitals
or screening of environmental reservoirs and health care workers.
Furthermore, sampling of the community was opportunistic and relied
on samples submitted to the diagnostic microbiology laboratory.We
acknowledge that this wouldmean failure to detect someMRSAcarriers
involved in our transmission clusters and that undetected carriers result
in incomplete transmission routes being reconstructed. Nonsampled
carriers explain why the MRSA isolate from 680 cases was not linked
to the MRSA from any other case and why 193 cases whose isolate
resided in a genetic cluster had no identifiable epidemiological contact.
Despite detecting multiple transmission clusters, we are also likely to
have underestimated the full extent of MRSA transmission attributable
to nosocomial and community sources because of undersampling of the
entire population served by the diagnostic laboratory at Cambridge
University Hospitals.
In conclusion, we provide evidence for the value of integrated
epidemiological and genomic surveillance of a population that accesses
the same health care referral network in the East of England. The large
number of patients screened here allowed us to sampleMRSA lineages
that are not dominant in the UK but are endemic in other areas of the
world including USA300 (prevalent in the United States) (13), the
European CA-MRSACC80 (14), and the Taiwanese CC59 clone (prev-
alent in Asia) (15). The identification of transmission clusters involving
these lineages in hospitals, in the community, and at the hospital-
community interface suggests that our findings may be applicable to
other UK regions and other countries.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study design
We conducted a 12-month prospective observational cohort study
between April 2012 and April 2013 to identify consecutive individuals
with MRSA-positive samples processed by the Clinical Microbiology
and Public Health Laboratory at the Cambridge University Hospitals
NHS Foundation Trust. This facility received samples from three
hospitals (referred to as A, B, and C) and 75 GP practices in the East
of England. All hospital inpatients were routinely screened for MRSA
on admission to hospital, and screeningwas repeatedweekly in critical
care units. Compliance with mandatory admission screening at the
three study hospitals was 85 to 90%. Additional clinical specimens were
taken as part of routine clinical care. In the community, there was no
formal MRSA screening, and specimens were taken by GPs or com-
munity nursing teams for clinical purposes, meaning that coverage was
not complete. Epidemiological data (including hospital ward stays and
residential postcodes) were recorded for all MRSA-positive cases.
Detailed methodology is provided in Supplementary Materials and
Methods, and a flowchart summarizing the data types and analyses
undertaken is shown in fig. S2. The study protocol was approved by the
National Research Ethics Service (reference 11/EE/0499), the National
Information Governance Board Ethics and Confidentiality Committee
(reference ECC8-05(h)/2011), and the CambridgeUniversityHospitals
NHS Foundation Trust Research and Development Department
(reference A092428).
DNA sequencing and genomic analyses
A total of 3053MRSA isolates were collected during the study, of which
2320 were selected for whole-genome sequencing. A detailed descrip-
tion of the rationale for selecting isolates for sequencing and genomic
methodologies is provided in Supplementary Materials and Methods.
In brief, DNAwas extracted, libraries were prepared, and 100–base pair
paired end sequences were determined for 2320 isolates on an Illumina
HiSeq2000, as previously described (11). Of these, 2282 were further
analyzed after passing quality control (see Supplementary Materials
andMethods). Genomes were de novo assembled using Velvet (16). STs
were derived from assemblies, and CCs were assigned. All isolates
assigned to the same CC were mapped using SMALT (www.sanger.ac.
uk/science/tools/smalt-0) to the most closely related reference genome.
SNPs were identified from BAM files using SAMtools (17). SNPs at re-
gions annotated as mobile genetic elements were removed from whole-
genome alignments, and maximum likelihood trees were created using
RAxML (18) for each CC. Pairwise genetic distances between isolates of
the same CC were calculated on the basis of the number of SNPs in the
core genome. Sequence data were submitted to the European Nucleo-
tide Archive (www.ebi.ac.uk/ena) under the accession numbers listed in
data file S1.
Epidemiological analysis
We established epidemiological links between each pair of MRSA-
positive individuals (termed case pairs) through a systematic compari-
son. Hospital contacts were categorized as follows: direct ward contact,
if a case pair was admitted to the same ward with overlapping dates of
admission; indirect ward contact, if admitted to the same ward with no
overlapping dates; direct hospital-wide contact, if admitted to the same
hospital in differentwardswith overlapping dates; and indirect hospital-
wide contact, if admitted to the same hospital in different wards with no
overlapping dates.We identified episodes of hospital admission for each
case in the 12-month period before their first MRSA-positive sample.
Information on outpatient clinic appointments was not available. Com-
munity contact was classified if cases shared a postcode or had their
MRSA-positive sample submitted by the same GP practice. Commu-
nity contacts were further categorized as follows: household contact,
if people shared a residential address; long-term care facility contact, if
they lived in the same long-term care facility; or GP contact, if they were
registered with the same GP practice. Information on GP visits was not
available other than that recorded for cases withMRSA swabs collected
at GP practices. In a few instances, cases shared the same postcode
but lived at a different residential address. In aminority of cases, patient
addresses could not be retrieved from clinical records and were clas-
sified as “unresolved.” We studied cases positive for MRSA CC22 to
determine the frequency of different types of epidemiological contact
among genetically unrelated cases, using a pairwise SNP distance
greater than 50 SNPs. This analysis led us to consider epidemiological
links as strong if they were ward contacts (other than Accident and
Emergency visits), GP contacts, or shared postcodes, and weak if they
were hospital-wide contacts and Accident and Emergency visits (see
Supplementary Materials and Methods for details).
Identification of putative MRSA transmission
Selecting a SNP cutoff to define MRSA transmission clusters was
informed by two independent lines of evidence. First, we established
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the genetic diversity of the same MRSA clone in a single individual
(pool of diversity) in 26 cases with more than one isolate (range, 2 to 3;
median, 2) from independent samples cultured on the same day. The
maximumgenetic distance ofMRSA in each case ranged from 0 to 41
SNPs (median, 2; IQR, 1 to 3), which is comparable to the maximum
within-host diversity reported elsewhere (19–21). In parallel, we selected
the single largest phylogenetic cluster containing isolates from cases
with strong epidemiological links (13 cases, a putative outbreak) and
established that the pairwise genetic distance between cases ranged
from 0 to 48 SNPs. We constructed CC-based phylogenetic trees and
then subdivided each tree into clusters based on a SNP distance of no
more than 50 and looked for hospital and community contacts between
cases residing in the same genetic cluster. Clusters were categorized as
containing community contacts alone, hospital contacts alone, commu-
nity and hospital contacts, or no knownhospital/community contacts.
For clusters with hospital and/or community contacts involving five or
more cases, we incorporated individual patient movement data (for in-
patients), sampling dates,MRSA screen results, and bacterial phylogeny
to identify the most plausible MRSA source. Supplementary Materials
and Methods and figs. S2 and S3 describe in more detail how genomic
and epidemiological data were integrated to identify and classify trans-
mission clusters.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
www.sciencetranslationalmedicine.org/cgi/content/full/9/413/eaak9745/DC1
Materials and Methods
Fig. S1. Number of isolates sequenced per patient.
Fig. S2. Flowchart summarizing data types and analyses.
Fig. S3. Integration of genomic and epidemiological data to identify transmission clusters.
Fig. S4. Six examples of transmission clusters in different settings.
Fig. S5. Number of heterozygous sites in the core genome per isolate.
Fig. S6. Within-host diversity over time and at a single time point.
Table S1. Proportion of isolates in different CCs.
Table S2. Frequency of epidemiological contacts among genetically unrelated cases.
Table S3. Epidemiological classification of transmission clusters containing five or more cases.
Data file S1. Accession numbers.
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Chapter 3.  
Appendix 3.1. Antibiotic susceptibility testing undertaken. 
Antibiotic String Position 
Number 
Antibiotic Agent 
1 Benzylpenicillin 
2 Cefoxitin 
3 Oxacillin 
4 Ciprofloxacin 
5 Erythromycin 
6 Chloramphenicol 
7 Daptomycin 
8 Fusidic acid 
9 Gentamicin 
10 Linezolid 
11 Mupirocin 
12 Nitrofurantoin 
13 Rifampicin 
14 Teicoplanin 
15 Tetracycline 
16 Tigecycline 
17 Trimethoprim 
18 Vancomycin 
19 Clindamycin 
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Appendix 3.2. Codes for Antibiotic susceptibility profiles with >10 isolates determined in 
analysis. 
Antibiotic Susceptibility 
Profile Code n 
Frequency 
(%) 
RRRRSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS ASP1 383 26.14 
RRRRRSSSSSSSSSSSSSS ASP2 315 21.50 
RRRSSSSRSSSSSSSSSSS ASP3 83 5.67 
RRRSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS ASP4  80 5.46 
RRRRSSSRSSSSSSSSSSS ASP5 45 3.07 
RRRSRSSSSSSSSSSSSSS ASP6 42 2.87 
RRRRRSSRRSSSSSSSSSS ASP7 40 2.73 
RRRRRSSRSSSSSSSSSSS ASP8 34 2.32 
RRRSRSSRSSSSSSSSSSS ASP9 28 1.91 
RRRRRSSSSSSSSSSSRSS ASP10 26 1.77 
RRRRSSSSSSSSSSSSRSS ASP11 24 1.64 
RRRRRSSSSSSSSSRSSSS ASP12 24 1.64 
RRRRRSSSSSSSSSSSSSR ASP13 21 1.43 
RRRRSSSRRSSSSSSSSSS ASP14 14 0.96 
RRSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS ASP15 12 0.82 
RRRSRSSSSSSSSSRSSSS ASP16 12 0.82 
RRRRRSSSSSSSSSISSSS ASP17 12 0.82 
RRRSSSSSSSSSSSSSRSS ASP18 11 0.75 
RRRRSSSSSSSSSSISSSS ASP19 11 0.75 
RRRRRSSSSSSISSSSSSS ASP20 10 0.68 
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Appendix 3.3. Phenotypic ASPs identified within in silico spa-types (For those spa-types 
with 10 or more isolates). 
spa-type Number of Isolates Number of unique ASPs 
Untypable  67 21 
t002 40 16 
t008 30 13 
t018 19 9 
t020 32 9 
t022 55 11 
t032 631 53 
t127 56 14 
t012 10 5 
t019 33 5 
t025 11 4 
t1041 14 5 
t1302 10 5 
t316 35 8 
t3505 10 4 
t852 10 6 
t3505 10 4 
t379 17 5 
t4545 36 5 
t554 12 3 
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Appendix 4.1. Accession numbers and temporal data for isolates. 
*Day 1: The first day of this study. 
 
Study ID 
Accession 
Number Day Collected* 
1 ERR204148 33 
2 ERR737219 290 
2 ERR715303 295 
3 ERR736964 155 
3 ERR714975 155 
4 ERR701945 132 
4 ERR730959 133 
5 ERR737332 327 
6 ERR213001 83 
7 ERR715353 253 
7 ERR737176 253 
7 ERR715295 281 
8 ERR714843 231 
8 ERR702215 280 
9 ERR212793 10 
9 ERR702170 238 
9 ERR702210 238 
9 ERR702208 280 
10 ERR736945 115 
10 ERR730953 130 
10 ERR774759 167 
11 ERR737164 239 
12 ERR737468 335 
13 ERR736985 134 
13 ERR702055 134 
13 ERR715270 138 
14 ERR737324 321 
14 ERR715384 334 
15 ERR737105 274 
16 ERR737359 135 
17 ERR715072 196 
18 ERR715053 183 
18 ERR737021 184 
18 ERR736975 186 
18 ERR736978 187 
18 ERR715314 189 
19 ERR737537 298 
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20 ERR715099 352 
21 ERR714960 152 
22 ERR212784 8 
22 ERR742877 11 
22 ERR737644 12 
22 ERR715403 12 
22 ERR715191 27 
22 ERR715264 27 
22 ERR715260 88 
22 ERR715227 95 
22 ERR715193 95 
22 ERR715192 95 
22 ERR715262 111 
22 ERR742912 155 
22 ERR715341 232 
22 ERR702200 232 
22 ERR737503 344 
23 ERR702050 134 
24 ERR701919 124 
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Appendix 5.1. Patient information letter. 
   
   
   
   
 
                          
DAY/MONTH/YEAR 
Dear 
 
We are writing to you as a patient registered at XXX who has received a positive result for meticillin 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in the last 3-4 years. 
 
The practice is currently working with the NHS, Public Health England (PHE) and the University 
of Cambridge to understand better how MRSA spreads in the community.   
 
 As part of this, we will be looking in more detail at the medical records of a small number of our 
patients who are known to have had a positive result for a type of MRSA called ST22. Apart from 
basic data (such as age, sex, address), the key information that will be collected includes details of 
any contact you may have had with healthcare services and details of your MRSA. 
 
The information collected will help us to determine whether our current systems are satisfactory or 
if anything more can be done to reduce the risk of people getting infections due to MRSA.  
 
We would like your permission to share, with the review team, the relevant information from your 
medical records for the period of your MRSA infection and the 6 months before it was first detected. 
Any personal identifiable information will not be shared beyond the review team. 
 
If you do not want us to share your information or would like further information, please get 
in touch with XXX by 11th August 2015. If we do not hear from you by this date, we will 
assume that you are happy for your information to be shared. Your decision will not influence 
your future care in any way. 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Appendix 5.2. Case epidemiological data collection form.  
Topic Specific Instructions 
Patient information      
Identifiers NHS number   
  Sample ID   
  First Name   
  Surname   
  Address   
  Postcode   
Demographics Sex   
  DoB   
  Ethnicity   
MRSA information      
Sample information  MRSA DETECTION DATE   
  Sample location   
  Who took sample   
  Is this the first sample (during this 
episode) where MRSA was 
isolated from this patient 
Yes or No 
  If NO, please provide date of the 
first MRSA isolate and correct 6 
month period below 
  
Characteristics of MRSA 
infection  
Clinical information on MRSA 
infection Free text 
Outcome of MRSA infection   Free text 
Patient health information     
Key conditions List key health conditions Free text 
For the 6 month period 
PRE MRSA DETECTION 
DATE 
    
DATA COLLECTION 
PERIOD To be corrected to 6 month prior to first sample if necessary 
Patient location in Pre Index 
period House Yes or No 
  Nursing home/residential care Yes or No 
  Sheltered accommodation Yes or No 
  Other group living Yes or No 
  Address   
  Postcode   
  Dates moved if in period   
Skin integrity, did the 
patient have any breach in 
skin integrity 
Pressure sore Yes or No 
  Leg ulcer Yes or No 
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  Foot ulcer Yes or No 
  Eczema Yes or No 
  Surgical wound Yes or No 
  Chronic wound Yes or No 
  Other wound Yes or No 
  Other wound, describe   
  Other Yes or No 
  Other, describe   
Contact with, did the 
patient have contact with Any hospital inpatient stays? Yes or No 
  Hospital    
  Date of admission   
  Date of Discharge   
  Dates   
  Reason   
  Any hospital outpatient appt?  Yes or No 
  Hospital   
  Outpatient Clinic   
  Date   
  Reason   
  Any Hospital A&E appointment Yes or No 
  Hospital    
  Date   
  Reason   
  Dialysis  Yes or No 
  Regularity   
  Date From   
  Date to    
  Community Podiatry Yes or No 
  Place   
  Date   
  GP Leg ulcer clinic Yes or No 
  Date   
  Other relevant GP clinics Yes or No 
  Name   
  Date   
  Any other GP visits Yes or No 
  GP   
  Date   
  Reason   
  Home visit by district nurse or 
other Yes or No 
  Nurse/team   
  Date   
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  Reason   
  Continence Care Yes or No 
  Date   
  Other respite care Yes or No 
  Name   
  Dates   
Devices used Type List 
  Dates   
  Duration   
  Purpose   
Presence of MRSA negative 
sample 
Date of known negative MRSA  
Sample 
e.g. previous clear 
screening sample 
  Sample location   
  Who took sample   
Prior infections Prior MRSA infection   
  Date of first sample   
  Date of decolonisation   
  Prior MSSA infection   
  Date of first sample   
  Date of decolonisation   
Connections Known medical connection with another case e.g. same clinic Free text 
  Known family connection with another case Free text 
  Any other known connection with another case Free text 
Other information Any other information relevant to the individual acquiring MRSA Free text 
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Appendix 5.3. Staff screening information letter and consent form. 
DAY/MONTH/YEAR 
 
Dear colleague, 
 
We are writing to you further to the meeting that was held with staff at XXXX on the 23rd of 
November. A research study by the University of Cambridge looked at the relatedness of routine 
MRSA samples in Cambridgeshire from April 2012 to April 2013 using whole-genome sequencing. 
This novel technology showed many groups of related MRSA samples, which would not have been 
identified previously. One of these groups included patients registered with XXXX.  
 
Public Health England (PHE) and the University of Cambridge are working with the GP practice 
to use this information to advance our understanding of how MRSA spreads and how we can 
improve infection prevention and control beyond current practice. One approach is to undertake 
staff MRSA screening which involves taking swabs from the nose, throat (and optionally groin) 
and any areas of broken skin.  
 
Further to the discussion at the practice meeting and on the advice of PHE, we are asking for staff 
who work on the XXXX premises to be screened. The screening will be undertaken confidentially. 
The clinical manager, XXXX, will organise for your swabs to be taken and samples will be 
forwarded to Addenbrooke’s microbiology laboratory for processing. Where possible, swabs 
should be taken at the start of a shift to avoid detecting transient carriage of MRSA.  
 
To preserve confidentiality, the letter with your results (positive or negative) will be sent to an 
address of your choice within two weeks of sampling. The results will not be sent directly to the 
XXXX or your GP. The results will also be shared with the CCG Infection Prevention and 
Control (IPC) team to enable them to advise you further. If you are found to be MRSA 
positive you will be contacted by the CCG IPC team to provide you with further advice and 
details of decolonisation treatment. Given the nature of work in primary care, it is highly unlikely 
that any work restrictions will be required.  
 
We request that you provide a preferred contact telephone number for the team to use to contact 
you if you are identified as being MRSA positive (see form overleaf). It is also important to identify 
if an answer phone message can be left on a home or mobile telephone number if there is no answer, 
to avoid delay in contacting you.  
 
Many thanks for your assistance with this screening. If you have any questions or queries about this 
process please feel free to contact me, or XXXX  at the practice, for further advice.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dr Nicholas Brown, Consultant Microbiologist and Interim Lead Public Health Microbiologist, 
Public Health England, East of England.  
 
Email: nicholas.brown@addenbrookes.nhs.uk 
Telephone: 01223 257057 
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Staff MRSA Informed Consent, Screening Record and Contact Details 
 
Informed consent 
I agree to undergo MRSA screening and am aware that I will be contacted with the results.   
 
Print name: 
 
Signed:      Date: 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Screening record 
 
Individual taking swab 
 
Print name: 
 
Signed:      Date of Swab:  
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Details 
 
Name  
 
Date of Birth  
 
Job Title  
 
Date Screened  
 
 
Preferred address for results letter: 
 
 
 
 
Preferred telephone number (if MRSA positive):  
 
This is a  
Home number /Mobile /Work number (please circle)  
 
Can leave answer phone message if no answer Yes/ No (please circle) 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Please return this form to: 
XXXXX  
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MRSA screening of staff: frequently asked questions 
The information below is designed to answer staff questions about MRSA screening.  
 
Why are we carrying out MRSA screening of staff? A research study by the University of 
Cambridge looked at the relatedness of routine MRSA samples in Cambridgeshire from April 2012 
to April 2013 using whole-genome sequencing. This novel technology showed many groups of 
related MRSA samples, which would not have been identified previously. One of these groups 
included patients registered with XXXX. The GP surgery is working proactively with Public Health 
England (PHE) and University of Cambridge to understand how these findings from novel 
technologies can be best used to improve infection prevention and control beyond current practice. 
 
Who will be screened? All staff using the premises of XXXX, including non-clinical staff, will be 
asked to have screening performed. There will also be environmental screening of the practice. 
 
What does it involve? Screening involves a healthcare worker swabbing your nostrils, throat and 
groin at the beginning of a shift. The groin can be self-swabbed if you prefer. In addition, any open 
skin wounds should be swabbed.  
 
How will I receive the results? When you undergo screening you will be asked to provide preferred 
contact details to receive the results. You will be contacted by a member of the team by phone if 
the result is positive to advise further. If the result is negative you will receive notification by letter 
within two weeks.  
 
What does it mean if my MRSA test result is positive? If the test is positive MRSA 
decolonisation therapy will be required. MRSA treatment will only be required if you have signs 
of infection.  
 
Will my employer be informed of this result? No, individual results are confidential between you 
and the PHE/CCG ICT team. 
 
How will this affect my work? Given the nature of work in primary care it is highly unlikely that 
any work restrictions will be required. If decolonisation fails to eradicate the MRSA after several 
treatment courses, we may need to discuss the implications of this with you, occupational health 
and your employer. You will be informed in advance if this is necessary. 
 
Will I pay for my treatments? No. Any treatment will be organised by the CCG Infection 
Prevention and Control team and you will not be charged for this. 
 
How will this information be used? Summary data and feedback will be provided to the practice 
and staff. In addition summary data may be used in academic research settings to improve future 
practice. However no personal identifiable information or individual data will be disclosed. 
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Appendix 5.4. Environmental Sampling Sites. 
SwabID Location Site 
S01 Clinic Room 1 Lightswitch 
S02 Clinic Room 1 Lamp handle 
S03 Clinic Room 1 Skirting trim 
S04 Clinic Room 1 Privacy Screen 
S05 Clinic Room 1 Sink rim 
S06 Clinic Room 1 Blind pulls 
S07 Clinic Room 1 Lower couch 
S08 Clinic Room 1 Footrest 
S09 Clinic Room 1 Blood pressure (BP) cuff 
S10 Clinic Room 1 Fan 
S11 Clinic Room 1 Keyboard 
S12 Clinic Room 1 Reusable scissors 
S13 Clinic Room 1 Floor under couch 
S14 Main waiting area Carpet 
S15 Main waiting area Armrest of chair 
S16 Main waiting area Patient use BP monitor 
S17 Main waiting area Stored wheelchair frame 
S18 Main waiting area Check in monitor 
S19 Main waiting area Privacy screen 
S20 Sub waiting area Chair surface 
S21 Clinic Room 2 Blind blade 
S22 Clinic Room 2 Sink rim 
S23 Clinic Room 2 Pillow 
S24 Clinic Room 2 Specimen box 
S25 Clinic Room 2 Notice board 
S26 Clinic Room 2 Internal door handle 
S27 Clinic Room 2 Soap dispenser surround 
S28 Clinic Room 2 Horizontal shelving 
S29 Clinic Room 3 Couch 
S30 Clinic Room 3 Desktop 
S31 Clinic Room 3 Horizontal shelving 
S32 Clinic Room 3 BP cuff 
S33 Clinic Room 3 Telephone 
S34 Clinic Room 3 Communal KY jelly  
S35 Treatment Room Liquid Paraffin  
S36 Treatment Room Tongue depressor 
S37 Clinic Room 4 Chair 
S38 Clinic Room 4 Floor under couch 
S39 Clinic Room 4 Glove box 
S40 Clinic Room 4 Privacy curtain 
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Appendix 5.5. Accession numbers and assembly statistics for isolates. 
StudyID 
Accession 
Number 
Total 
Length 
No 
Contigs 
Avg Contig 
Length 
Largest 
Contig N50 
Contigs 
in N50 
P01_1 ERS161495 2787852 28 99566.14 406415 310765 4 
P02_1 ERS161347 2785773 31 89863.65 406345 176268 5 
P02_2 ERS512442 2786952 26 107190.46 577341 235468 4 
P03_1 ERS198012 2743760 28 97991.43 577983 174029 4 
P03_2 ERS512836 2743767 23 119294.22 585540 210359 4 
P04_1 ERS197550 2740977 26 105422.19 577179 210333 4 
P04_2 ERS808624 2797195 26 107584.42 861382 275185 3 
P04_3 ERS808620 2794537 27 103501.37 644342 325238 4 
P04_4 ERS808623 2794805 25 111792.2 734450 337770 3 
P05_1 ERS163223 2790656 24 116277.33 645061 210307 4 
P06_1 ERS161486 2787317 31 89913.45 406600 176889 5 
P06_2 ERS513104 2786014 22 126637 451170 210446 5 
P07_1 ERS161496 2790396 29 96220.55 406413 235468 5 
P07_2 ERS198039 2787148 27 103227.7 520222 252652 4 
P07_3 ERS512702 2785763 26 107144.73 406772 235517 5 
P08_1 ERS198000 2785894 27 103181.26 581078 235485 4 
P09_1 ERS197548 2785559 25 111422.36 580944 235468 4 
P10_1 ERS197832 2786945 30 92898.17 577273 310752 4 
P11_1 ERS512443 2791175 31 90037.9 406499 174571 5 
P11_2 ERS512963 2791562 27 103391.19 406422 310911 4 
P12_1 ERS163210 2785842 29 96063.52 406739 210241 5 
P12_2 ERS197734 2786143 33 84428.58 581210 235410 4 
P13_1 ERS161475 2785024 28 99465.14 406601 173959 5 
P13_2 ERS513007 2786489 26 107172.65 581322 235468 4 
P13_3 ERS512501 2784896 26 107111.38 513426 252406 4 
P14_1 ERS808627 2795284 23 121534.09 586873 253641 4 
P15_1 ERS808626 2838387 30 94612.9 587033 235381 4 
P16_1 ERS808619 2836067 29 97795.41 604554 384267 3 
P17_1 ERS808621 2770001 23 120434.83 
102999
2 468119 2 
P18_1 ERS808622 2747709 23 119465.61 508573 328798 4 
P19_1 ERS808625 2774009 25 110960.36 
104369
9 659264 2 
P20_1 
ERS106683
3 2755454 25 110218.16 
122318
5 
104387
5 2 
P21_1 
ERS106683
4 2830409 39 72574.59 444283 178132 5 
P22_1 
ERS106683
5 2814198 28 100507.07 628568 350510 3 
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Chapter 6.  
 
Appendix 6.1. Accession numbers and assembly statistics for isolates. 
 
Lane 
Accession 
Number 
Total 
Length 
No 
Contigs 
Avg Contig 
Length 
Largest 
Contig N50 
Contigs 
in N50 
12483_8_74 ERR527291 2805786 29 96751.24 578294 406874 3 
12483_8_17 ERR527235 2785153 23 121093.61 710580 353665 3 
12625_1_22 ERR541004 2789012 21 132810.1 680362 351019 3 
12483_8_71 ERR527288 2827284 35 80779.54 336875 158444 7 
12625_1_23 ERR541005 2786258 25 111450.32 410246 215664 5 
12625_1_20 ERR541002 2892874 39 74176.26 310563 156340 7 
12625_1_17 ERR540999 2898342 35 82809.77 331780 174046 7 
12483_8_73 ERR527290 2783743 27 103101.59 430856 243617 5 
12483_8_69 ERR527286 2904264 22 132012 712694 239538 4 
12483_8_61 ERR527278 2800478 33 84862.97 406382 162908 6 
12625_1_24 ERR541006 2791957 39 71588.64 328884 129459 7 
12625_1_25 ERR541007 2954957 44 67158.11 355694 150949 7 
12625_1_13 ERR540995 2748820 26 105723.85 578300 215897 4 
12483_8_45 ERR527262 2814642 23 122375.74 442336 233965 4 
12483_8_31 ERR527249 2849775 35 81422.14 334674 150786 6 
12483_8_68 ERR527285 2808044 40 70201.1 307929 155404 7 
12483_8_47 ERR527264 2951415 52 56757.98 252105 150360 8 
12483_8_21 ERR527239 2782501 26 107019.27 526565 176875 5 
12483_8_30 ERR527248 2827457 29 97498.52 654368 258448 4 
12483_8_78 ERR527295 2825890 28 100924.64 340344 176999 6 
12483_8_20 ERR527238 2827598 29 97503.38 499812 167026 6 
12483_8_19 ERR527237 2743133 25 109725.32 493748 156373 5 
12673_8_85 ERR555084 2822513 26 108558.19 360569 245050 5 
12625_1_26 ERR541008 2946331 41 71861.73 354825 199458 6 
12625_1_18 ERR541000 2805752 24 116906.33 536809 215896 4 
12625_1_29 ERR541011 2810808 29 96924.41 540606 167877 5 
12483_8_77 ERR527294 2831213 28 101114.75 406522 211865 5 
12625_1_11 ERR540993 2777822 24 115742.58 517112 304025 4 
12625_1_8 ERR540990 2806852 24 116952.17 857011 236909 3 
12625_1_19 ERR541001 2827698 29 97506.83 426625 216095 5 
12483_8_49 ERR527266 2845038 28 101608.5 637106 339932 3 
12483_8_58 ERR527275 2795526 42 66560.14 363382 170598 6 
12483_8_35 ERR527253 2841639 59 48163.37 395482 133886 7 
12483_8_75 ERR527292 2826913 26 108727.42 449011 213417 5 
12673_8_86 ERR555085 2834147 39 72670.44 548373 226039 4 
12483_8_25 ERR527243 2813209 31 90748.68 406445 222865 5 
12483_8_24 ERR527242 2840856 35 81167.31 289623 173973 6 
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12625_1_9 ERR540991 2808869 25 112354.76 597681 364517 3 
12625_1_10 ERR540992 2811947 8 351493.38 1296603 1041310 2 
12673_8_87 ERR555086 2915873 31 94060.42 410368 247491 5 
12483_8_65 ERR527282 2799433 33 84831.3 439284 149389 5 
12625_1_5 ERR540987 2796225 31 90200.81 339248 167285 6 
12483_8_76 ERR527293 2830889 39 72586.9 340455 176721 6 
12483_8_87 ERR527304 2891127 44 65707.43 310892 146370 7 
12483_8_88 ERR527305 2792389 18 155132.72 1164948 381609 2 
12483_8_93 ERR527310 2914920 30 97164 449946 343074 4 
12483_8_2 ERR527220 2757398 25 110295.92 490637 253102 4 
12483_8_52 ERR527269 2885056 36 80140.44 334661 174026 6 
12483_8_83 ERR527300 2865262 42 68220.52 448536 211065 5 
12673_8_88 ERR555087 2790152 29 96212.14 1043673 527546 2 
12483_8_28 ERR527246 2854727 28 101954.54 406361 178507 6 
12625_1_14 ERR540996 2832768 32 88524 348864 173980 6 
12625_1_3 ERR540985 2825318 14 201808.43 548283 481656 3 
12483_8_16 ERR527234 2799500 27 103685.19 538456 170552 6 
12483_8_55 ERR527272 2803664 33 84959.52 404559 176944 5 
12483_8_81 ERR527298 2936789 45 65261.98 253394 130847 8 
12625_1_27 ERR541009 2833560 25 113342.4 572935 183521 5 
12483_8_51 ERR527268 2861902 45 63597.82 371523 170377 6 
12483_8_4 ERR527222 2798288 30 93276.27 312701 146422 7 
12483_8_56 ERR527273 2866158 35 81890.23 334632 156330 6 
12483_8_32 ERR527250 2827021 27 104704.48 532247 252836 4 
12483_8_92 ERR527309 2826453 30 94215.1 335183 156386 6 
12483_8_54 ERR527271 2787691 28 99560.39 400339 254900 5 
12483_8_95 ERR527312 2857819 33 86600.58 318899 173966 6 
12483_8_59 ERR527276 2844079 31 91744.48 406643 187194 5 
12483_8_1 ERR527219 2800708 34 82373.76 530265 173960 5 
12483_8_11 ERR527229 2823612 48 58825.25 404637 148370 6 
12625_1_2 ERR540984 2857227 39 73262.23 312292 150786 7 
12625_1_15 ERR540997 2805203 26 107892.42 531589 174151 4 
12483_8_41 ERR527258 2802200 27 103785.19 539518 246114 4 
12483_8_60 ERR527277 2794613 27 103504.19 579949 386206 3 
12483_8_62 ERR527279 2800725 27 103730.56 406345 173968 5 
12625_1_7 ERR540989 2870348 29 98977.52 335085 174567 6 
12483_8_15 ERR527233 2808856 14 200632.57 1240701 544212 2 
12483_8_7 ERR527225 2761492 29 95223.86 333533 176831 6 
12625_1_4 ERR540986 2757384 27 102125.33 585437 407252 3 
12483_8_80 ERR527297 2780864 16 173804 1012881 318029 3 
12483_8_66 ERR527283 2782358 24 115931.58 625639 224810 4 
12483_8_90 ERR527307 2731764 17 160692 826301 771413 2 
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12483_8_53 ERR527270 2829556 30 94318.53 417747 190560 5 
12483_8_34 ERR527252 2823203 33 85551.61 410658 173968 5 
12625_1_1 ERR540983 2831886 31 91351.16 406961 212595 5 
12483_8_86 ERR527303 2945102 48 61356.29 355132 170904 6 
12483_8_79 ERR527296 2746042 24 114418.42 662946 283591 4 
12483_8_9 ERR527227 2841545 30 94718.17 432115 219258 5 
12483_8_14 ERR527232 2784489 33 84378.45 360278 169827 5 
12483_8_63 ERR527280 2745413 16 171588.31 957389 324483 3 
12483_8_29 ERR527247 2904003 47 61787.3 253154 145784 8 
12483_8_82 ERR527299 2859712 40 71492.8 406750 172821 6 
12483_8_3 ERR527221 2852804 31 92025.94 339070 172516 6 
12483_8_57 ERR527274 2784827 27 103141.74 445853 211703 5 
12483_8_38 ERR527256 2787729 24 116155.38 443567 236587 4 
12483_8_42 ERR527259 2769530 33 83925.15 528506 166712 6 
12483_8_36 ERR527254 2726814 25 109072.56 333191 176658 6 
12483_8_67 ERR527284 2782288 25 111291.52 406563 213079 5 
12625_1_28 ERR541010 2874153 33 87095.55 443505 216245 5 
12483_8_50 ERR527267 2803347 30 93444.9 406537 173991 5 
12483_8_89 ERR527306 2741502 15 182766.8 607240 440589 3 
12625_1_6 ERR540988 2795756 30 93191.87 625574 174882 5 
12755_8_68 ERR564224 2821412 26 108515.85 511707 244583 5 
12483_8_94 ERR527311 2884841 41 70361.98 334668 178065 6 
12483_8_84 ERR527301 2803537 36 77876.03 348764 165123 6 
12483_8_26 ERR527244 2768320 22 125832.73 1171791 349496 2 
12625_1_30 ERR541012 2952602 41 72014.68 354364 170808 7 
12625_1_32 ERR541014 2766459 16 172903.69 969638 766243 2 
12589_1_6 ERR540707 2828482 24 117853.42 449190 211516 5 
12625_1_33 ERR541015 2853499 33 86469.67 581872 210562 5 
12625_1_34 ERR541016 2847832 19 149885.89 665585 222391 4 
12625_1_35 ERR541017 2789449 39 71524.33 252887 122483 9 
12625_1_36 ERR541018 2789751 28 99633.96 520827 176076 5 
12625_1_37 ERR541019 2764775 27 102399.07 403134 187674 5 
12625_1_38 ERR541020 2795876 15 186391.73 1259426 868969 2 
12625_1_42 ERR541023 2816327 24 117346.96 641784 253084 4 
12625_1_43 ERR541024 2817700 11 256154.55 1396697 607955 2 
12625_1_45 ERR541026 2815609 30 93853.63 561845 236672 4 
12625_1_46 ERR541027 2826754 29 97474.28 406603 215892 5 
12625_1_47 ERR541028 2757611 26 106061.96 502337 176883 4 
12625_1_48 ERR541029 2880371 31 92915.19 334637 176580 6 
12625_1_49 ERR541030 2817986 38 74157.53 312907 169524 7 
12625_1_53 ERR541034 2788288 27 103269.93 539951 406586 3 
12625_1_54 ERR541035 2818505 24 117437.71 406733 168653 6 
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12625_1_50 ERR541031 2841089 33 86093.61 335264 190443 6 
12625_1_51 ERR541032 2837131 23 123353.52 406750 211884 5 
12625_1_52 ERR541033 2869983 40 71749.57 334427 174163 6 
12625_1_55 ERR541036 2876246 19 151381.37 609282 421538 3 
12625_1_56 ERR541037 2833519 33 85864.21 299986 159979 7 
12625_1_57 ERR541038 2847960 26 109536.92 433732 336060 4 
12625_1_59 ERR541040 2833232 28 101186.86 325018 190898 6 
12625_1_60 ERR541041 2799996 22 127272.55 485656 236281 4 
12625_1_61 ERR541042 2784951 27 103146.33 401456 211829 5 
12625_1_62 ERR541043 2758550 21 131359.52 601319 254816 3 
12625_1_63 ERR541044 2838019 26 109154.58 623662 190859 4 
12625_1_64 ERR541045 2802106 29 96624.34 296088 183393 6 
12625_1_65 ERR541046 2768537 15 184569.13 1004355 574665 2 
12589_1_7 ERR540708 2863180 47 60918.72 326481 174569 6 
12625_1_66 ERR541047 2829811 23 123035.26 521506 211546 5 
12625_1_67 ERR541048 2929073 42 69739.83 323473 150304 8 
12625_1_69 ERR541050 2889124 48 60190.08 307193 148843 7 
12625_1_70 ERR541051 2795704 21 133128.76 532752 229302 5 
12625_1_71 ERR541052 2812244 28 100437.29 495521 237888 4 
12625_1_72 ERR541053 2728718 15 181914.53 1290868 485615 2 
12625_1_73 ERR541054 2804579 28 100163.54 409160 183369 5 
12625_1_74 ERR541055 2821148 31 91004.77 534430 185704 5 
12625_1_75 ERR541056 2894237 19 152328.26 902815 616181 2 
12625_1_76 ERR541057 2794704 24 116446 808154 398675 3 
12625_1_78 ERR541059 2801895 14 200135.36 822244 644700 2 
12625_1_79 ERR541060 2892772 31 93315.23 480959 170894 6 
12625_1_80 ERR541061 2781800 18 154544.44 426918 305539 4 
12625_1_81 ERR541062 2793711 14 199550.79 1043060 775249 2 
12625_1_82 ERR541063 2932105 45 65157.89 354686 150369 8 
12625_1_83 ERR541064 2765934 38 72787.74 300044 156345 7 
12625_1_84 ERR541065 2808924 22 127678.36 426029 211888 5 
12625_1_85 ERR541066 2809808 24 117075.33 406234 211846 5 
12625_1_86 ERR541067 2774045 19 146002.37 622592 459067 3 
12625_1_87 ERR541068 2792216 16 174513.5 1042516 398918 2 
12625_1_89 ERR541070 2886035 34 84883.38 335172 146433 7 
12625_1_90 ERR541071 2776797 48 57849.94 311566 156412 7 
12625_1_91 ERR541072 2830918 27 104848.81 447811 325298 4 
12625_1_92 ERR541073 2831198 28 101114.21 340338 174168 6 
12625_1_93 ERR541074 2795747 30 93191.57 450586 179094 4 
12625_1_95 ERR541076 2870876 30 95695.87 601992 252299 4 
12593_1_1 ERR540795 2795381 17 164434.18 1028541 326924 3 
12593_1_2 ERR540796 2801344 33 84889.21 354667 170582 6 
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12593_1_4 ERR540798 2818109 34 82885.56 406515 156349 6 
12593_1_64 ERR540857 2729381 15 181958.73 764747 727015 2 
12593_1_5 ERR540799 2802676 28 100095.57 406730 211567 5 
12593_1_6 ERR540800 2946472 54 54564.3 252177 150846 8 
12593_1_7 ERR540801 2843007 33 86151.73 334848 173924 7 
12593_1_9 ERR540803 2802821 26 107800.81 407003 211279 5 
12593_1_10 ERR540804 2817739 16 176108.69 1340092 326153 2 
12593_1_11 ERR540805 2775205 35 79291.57 406736 156331 6 
12593_1_13 ERR540807 2821445 29 97291.21 406652 311237 4 
12593_1_65 ERR540858 2993887 43 69625.28 322311 169300 7 
12593_1_15 ERR540809 2919161 21 139007.67 1229100 471733 2 
12593_1_16 ERR540810 2722167 16 170135.44 1058188 598629 2 
12593_1_17 ERR540811 2750792 35 78594.06 347780 224199 5 
12593_1_18 ERR540812 2835115 32 88597.34 406288 213528 5 
12593_1_19 ERR540813 2786940 33 84452.73 406171 160077 6 
12593_1_20 ERR540814 2812598 13 216353.69 1393898 326231 2 
12593_1_21 ERR540815 2791141 28 99683.61 422355 190485 5 
12593_1_22 ERR540816 2854985 30 95166.17 406835 186271 5 
12593_1_23 ERR540817 2883320 40 72083 310898 167257 7 
12593_1_24 ERR540818 2802547 32 87579.59 339999 190453 6 
12593_1_66 ERR540859 2927752 50 58555.04 326631 176815 6 
12593_1_26 ERR540820 2875193 28 102685.46 335369 211429 6 
12593_1_27 ERR540821 2874023 35 82114.94 337092 173974 6 
12593_1_28 ERR540822 2881571 38 75830.82 338141 211446 5 
12589_1_8 ERR540709 2834628 27 104986.22 406502 215472 5 
12593_1_29 ERR540823 2749113 10 274911.3 1291662 544089 2 
12593_1_30 ERR540824 2802886 38 73760.16 444231 211664 5 
12593_1_68 ERR540861 2743349 34 80686.74 406910 174028 6 
12593_1_69 ERR540862 2794465 28 99802.32 406743 211400 5 
12589_1_9 ERR540710 2875276 43 66866.88 739265 387692 3 
12589_1_10 ERR540711 2770288 17 162958.12 1047276 767560 2 
12589_1_11 ERR540712 2818356 14 201311.14 1418352 1418352 1 
12589_1_12 ERR540713 2861235 30 95374.5 495723 236603 4 
12593_1_31 ERR540825 2802526 18 155695.89 1024385 386162 2 
12589_1_13 ERR540714 2866277 36 79618.81 331774 156372 7 
12593_1_32 ERR540826 2822711 15 188180.73 1396871 594472 2 
12593_1_33 ERR540827 2829824 36 78606.22 390629 214664 5 
12589_1_17 ERR540718 2808564 33 85108 582327 187028 5 
12593_1_72 ERR540865 2820532 28 100733.29 540157 264183 4 
12593_1_73 ERR540866 2817927 32 88060.22 406775 183667 5 
12589_1_19 ERR540720 2830610 31 91310 449024 187597 5 
12593_1_35 ERR540829 2852499 34 83897.03 354272 162431 6 
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12593_1_75 ERR540868 2758718 30 91957.27 314529 173974 6 
12593_1_76 ERR540869 2845261 46 61853.5 356358 156399 7 
12589_1_20 ERR540721 2797283 12 233106.92 981412 611731 2 
12589_1_21 ERR540722 2798522 27 103648.96 414782 173970 5 
12589_1_22 ERR540723 2829945 31 91288.55 334701 176674 6 
12589_1_50 ERR540751 2869407 50 57388.14 406663 174046 6 
12593_1_37 ERR540831 2832872 31 91382.97 306085 269181 5 
12593_1_38 ERR540832 2803655 27 103839.07 406672 194148 5 
12589_1_23 ERR540724 2785469 28 99481.04 406826 173959 6 
12589_1_24 ERR540725 2791320 26 107358.46 383036 251837 5 
12593_1_77 ERR540870 2836038 31 91485.1 580810 257862 4 
12593_1_78 ERR540871 2906255 45 64583.44 275676 150854 7 
12593_1_79 ERR540872 2907021 45 64600.47 385288 150867 7 
12593_1_80 ERR540873 2799453 23 121715.35 428986 258032 4 
12589_1_51 ERR540752 2823033 31 91065.58 368196 174562 6 
12589_1_62 ERR540763 2858563 41 69721.05 272241 150354 7 
12755_8_70 ERR564226 2806489 35 80185.4 411683 173986 5 
12593_1_40 ERR540833 2952223 30 98407.43 745217 256581 4 
12593_1_41 ERR540834 2773134 35 79232.4 349109 124766 7 
12593_1_42 ERR540835 2849098 55 51801.78 328287 156449 7 
12589_1_28 ERR540729 2734718 28 97668.5 525880 211643 4 
12593_1_44 ERR540837 2808775 24 117032.29 409850 312987 4 
12593_1_45 ERR540838 2803545 31 90436.94 355325 187753 5 
12593_1_46 ERR540839 2900348 41 70740.2 252177 150367 8 
12589_1_63 ERR540764 2744198 27 101636.96 356471 156386 6 
12589_1_29 ERR540730 2791032 28 99679.71 581195 156333 5 
12593_1_81 ERR540874 2826266 33 85644.42 327706 173972 6 
12589_1_54 ERR540755 2918359 46 63442.59 300498 150835 7 
12593_1_82 ERR540875 2795891 22 127085.95 495758 175610 5 
12589_1_52 ERR540753 2758279 26 106087.65 731755 279248 3 
12589_1_31 ERR540732 2790508 35 79728.8 325175 156338 6 
12589_1_32 ERR540733 2851671 30 95055.7 335438 170729 6 
12593_1_83 ERR540876 2739427 16 171214.19 642083 541567 3 
12589_1_35 ERR540736 2846771 30 94892.37 425231 211425 5 
12593_1_84 ERR540877 2772936 24 115539 680912 311055 3 
12593_1_47 ERR540840 2810386 41 68546 406668 152545 6 
12593_1_48 ERR540841 2785658 27 103172.52 375104 211785 5 
12593_1_49 ERR540842 2813055 46 61153.37 254743 148162 8 
12593_1_50 ERR540843 2815899 53 53130.17 365105 134203 7 
12593_1_51 ERR540844 2790352 28 99655.43 605640 364398 3 
12593_1_52 ERR540845 2787931 30 92931.03 348858 173985 6 
12593_1_53 ERR540846 2803380 14 200241.43 988098 603253 2 
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12593_1_86 ERR540879 2795672 15 186378.13 1024696 437005 2 
12593_1_87 ERR540880 2816771 16 176048.19 1339411 326299 2 
12589_1_55 ERR540756 2834425 28 101229.46 409607 211681 5 
12593_1_88 ERR540881 2791718 33 84597.52 333718 147001 6 
12589_1_36 ERR540737 2859564 31 92244 448289 187790 5 
12593_1_89 ERR540882 2799764 27 103694.96 297335 196766 6 
12593_1_90 ERR540883 2887116 49 58920.73 298267 190165 6 
12593_1_91 ERR540884 2753909 14 196707.79 1230710 1004294 2 
12589_1_53 ERR540754 2784925 15 185661.67 776653 325728 3 
12589_1_37 ERR540738 2841058 31 91647.03 409336 174028 5 
12593_1_92 ERR540885 2766694 17 162746.71 1009743 718526 2 
12589_1_38 ERR540739 2829756 36 78604.33 450656 187587 5 
12589_1_39 ERR540740 2827983 36 78555.08 297474 146751 7 
12593_1_93 ERR540886 2907459 32 90858.09 433624 203342 5 
12589_1_40 ERR540741 2806788 28 100242.43 445379 214708 5 
12593_1_95 ERR540888 2879278 36 79979.94 340240 131082 6 
12589_1_1 ERR540702 2778244 28 99223 626119 375215 3 
12589_1_2 ERR540703 2858688 51 56052.71 498406 126598 6 
12589_1_42 ERR540743 2742514 17 161324.35 732743 327301 3 
12589_1_43 ERR540744 2755754 21 131226.38 403326 236146 5 
12589_1_44 ERR540745 2798775 30 93292.5 403038 215882 5 
12589_1_3 ERR540704 2769245 11 251749.55 1295238 705716 2 
12593_1_57 ERR540850 2754654 15 183643.6 601319 318708 4 
12589_1_45 ERR540746 2841530 33 86106.97 296737 173971 6 
12593_1_58 ERR540851 2814888 32 87965.25 534391 185703 4 
12589_1_48 ERR540749 2943212 51 57710.04 252162 150923 8 
12589_1_47 ERR540748 2787172 29 96109.38 406980 190408 5 
12589_1_46 ERR540747 2796815 29 96441.9 402787 235908 5 
12589_1_4 ERR540705 2834862 26 109033.15 623869 158607 4 
12589_1_5 ERR540706 2827121 30 94237.37 531558 214877 4 
12589_1_61 ERR540762 2786043 33 84425.55 317646 169740 6 
12593_1_59 ERR540852 2747569 27 101761.81 579132 187334 4 
12589_1_58 ERR540759 2847527 21 135596.52 858997 306322 3 
12589_1_59 ERR540760 2747354 12 228946.17 1292715 1000816 2 
12593_1_61 ERR540854 2850051 45 63334.47 296316 148376 7 
12593_1_62 ERR540855 2766351 19 145597.42 931891 654638 2 
12593_1_63 ERR540856 2919428 46 63465.83 300521 155132 7 
12589_1_60 ERR540761 2737663 16 171103.94 775754 726968 2 
12589_1_65 ERR540766 2840257 18 157792.06 1048269 561329 2 
12589_1_66 ERR540767 2813103 17 165476.65 856984 811292 2 
12589_1_67 ERR540768 2937977 54 54406.98 298545 142108 8 
12589_1_68 ERR540769 2833910 32 88559.69 406835 215942 5 
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12589_1_69 ERR540770 2788662 30 92955.4 581087 158445 5 
12589_1_70 ERR540771 2892904 35 82654.4 426153 173965 6 
12589_1_71 ERR540772 2877622 36 79933.94 340067 177250 6 
12589_1_72 ERR540773 2882132 44 65503 449078 174158 5 
12589_1_73 ERR540774 2735694 14 195406.71 775721 723880 2 
12589_1_74 ERR540775 2814049 14 201003.5 1339739 601644 2 
12755_8_71 ERR564227 2865761 34 84287.09 319522 162406 6 
12755_8_72 ERR564228 2818206 50 56364.12 253105 149712 7 
12589_1_77 ERR540776 2828003 30 94266.77 354301 245290 5 
12589_1_78 ERR540777 2805390 30 93513 562598 252894 4 
12589_1_80 ERR540779 2864831 38 75390.29 388148 174028 6 
12589_1_81 ERR540780 2798011 32 87437.84 554442 254705 4 
12589_1_82 ERR540781 2810589 22 127754.05 406675 210561 5 
12589_1_83 ERR540782 2859821 35 81709.17 424942 174158 5 
12589_1_84 ERR540783 2866437 35 81898.2 407023 173965 6 
12589_1_85 ERR540784 2860923 37 77322.24 433657 171480 5 
12589_1_86 ERR540785 2818143 30 93938.1 578294 185011 5 
12589_1_87 ERR540786 2865549 33 86834.82 331730 204066 6 
12589_1_88 ERR540787 2755369 21 131208.05 866011 211058 3 
12593_2_77 ERR540964 2817766 27 104361.7 532248 215969 4 
12589_1_89 ERR540788 2858637 39 73298.38 310875 173809 6 
12755_8_73 ERR564229 2845498 32 88921.81 406501 174013 5 
12589_1_90 ERR540789 2874947 24 119789.46 506689 298007 4 
12589_1_91 ERR540790 2842482 27 105277.11 310544 181666 6 
12589_1_92 ERR540791 2864377 39 73445.56 335288 146496 6 
12589_1_94 ERR540793 2810815 41 68556.46 311002 146329 7 
12593_2_78 ERR540965 2757664 24 114902.67 578259 183012 4 
12589_1_95 ERR540794 2746902 30 91563.4 586489 187386 4 
12593_2_1 ERR540889 2784280 23 121055.65 435719 210501 5 
12593_2_2 ERR540890 2884506 37 77959.62 336366 159531 6 
12593_2_3 ERR540891 2869644 29 98953.24 342907 211791 5 
12593_2_7 ERR540895 2736057 14 195432.64 674073 394939 3 
12593_2_8 ERR540896 2822279 28 100795.68 923034 592632 2 
12593_2_9 ERR540897 2783486 29 95982.28 403337 156332 5 
12593_2_10 ERR540898 2796401 27 103570.41 432312 209690 5 
12593_2_11 ERR540899 2734852 26 105186.62 601579 209205 4 
12593_2_12 ERR540900 2850371 31 91947.45 447811 236605 4 
12593_2_13 ERR540901 2873404 33 87072.85 308426 167280 7 
12593_2_14 ERR540902 2875063 33 87123.12 391787 167183 6 
12593_2_15 ERR540903 2796480 14 199748.57 1276109 393426 2 
12593_2_16 ERR540904 2806264 24 116927.67 584728 190438 5 
12593_2_17 ERR540905 2826252 47 60133.02 432174 125425 7 
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12593_2_18 ERR540906 2832323 34 83303.62 402665 173975 6 
12593_2_20 ERR540908 2913436 41 71059.41 384115 224535 6 
12593_2_21 ERR540909 2841399 33 86103 311221 155433 6 
12593_2_22 ERR540910 2793063 15 186204.2 783665 327586 3 
12593_2_25 ERR540913 2808505 31 90596.94 449202 252896 5 
12593_2_79 ERR540966 2859996 34 84117.53 311794 156383 7 
12593_2_26 ERR540914 2844388 35 81268.23 335264 180716 6 
12593_2_27 ERR540915 2798768 31 90282.84 339954 145480 7 
12593_2_80 ERR540967 2776565 15 185104.33 936644 405202 3 
12593_2_28 ERR540916 2877882 43 66927.49 493057 222073 4 
12593_2_74 ERR540961 2755223 26 105970.12 537138 270494 4 
12593_2_29 ERR540917 2754003 24 114750.12 578231 198486 4 
12593_2_30 ERR540918 2773695 33 84051.36 380518 172455 6 
12593_2_31 ERR540919 2809265 26 108048.65 449758 198563 5 
12593_2_34 ERR540922 2853024 38 75079.58 359249 156334 6 
12593_2_40 ERR540927 2735446 16 170965.38 775746 721678 2 
12593_2_42 ERR540929 2810521 33 85167.3 532086 253199 4 
12593_2_43 ERR540930 2866408 33 86860.85 452294 198397 5 
12593_2_37 ERR540925 2787135 34 81974.56 313355 156269 7 
12593_2_38 ERR540926 2781323 23 120927.09 424252 288853 4 
12593_2_45 ERR540932 2858091 24 119087.12 889981 347903 3 
12593_2_46 ERR540933 2854137 39 73183 408720 174028 6 
12593_2_47 ERR540934 2747192 25 109887.68 531601 429664 3 
12593_2_48 ERR540935 2840984 44 64567.82 325722 173981 7 
12593_2_49 ERR540936 2782682 25 111307.28 389949 180469 6 
12593_2_50 ERR540937 2827626 29 97504.34 449052 161765 6 
12593_2_51 ERR540938 2760287 9 306698.56 1170217 1018563 2 
12593_2_52 ERR540939 2783598 30 92786.6 371722 209323 5 
12593_2_53 ERR540940 2856170 38 75162.37 332380 146487 6 
12593_2_54 ERR540941 2907721 52 55917.71 325147 172474 6 
12593_2_55 ERR540942 2793753 23 121467.52 891425 227118 3 
12593_2_56 ERR540943 2852512 35 81500.34 506997 170975 5 
12593_2_81 ERR540968 2694936 24 112289 399842 169681 5 
12593_2_61 ERR540948 2807408 33 85072.97 340311 174029 6 
12593_2_62 ERR540949 2928689 32 91521.53 611252 311090 4 
12593_2_82 ERR540969 2819094 27 104410.89 428301 185704 5 
12593_2_64 ERR540951 2800241 17 164720.06 711581 355018 3 
12593_2_57 ERR540944 2731988 12 227665.67 1091846 771520 2 
12593_2_58 ERR540945 2797301 30 93243.37 571361 210567 4 
12593_2_59 ERR540946 2828444 23 122975.83 1237435 426260 2 
12593_2_60 ERR540947 2791233 39 71570.08 289393 172432 7 
12593_2_69 ERR540956 2774566 31 89502.13 357087 238007 5 
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12593_2_70 ERR540957 2798601 30 93286.7 339941 176880 6 
12593_2_71 ERR540958 2886555 37 78015 338798 209770 5 
12593_2_83 ERR540970 2734638 18 151924.33 766419 726482 2 
12593_2_72 ERR540959 2823402 33 85557.64 455215 167361 5 
12593_2_65 ERR540952 2785432 27 103164.15 446139 212973 5 
12593_2_84 ERR540971 2734798 13 210369.08 889306 721618 2 
12593_2_66 ERR540953 2779769 31 89669.97 693654 331984 3 
12593_2_67 ERR540954 2778851 13 213757.77 1287747 458670 2 
12593_2_68 ERR540955 2950686 28 105381.64 714737 263489 4 
12593_2_91 ERR540978 2902287 44 65961.07 252201 150384 8 
12593_2_92 ERR540979 2784102 31 89809.74 404303 210634 5 
12593_2_93 ERR540980 2762776 35 78936.46 581322 147926 6 
12593_2_95 ERR540982 2861195 16 178824.69 1418386 542339 2 
12673_8_44 ERR555043 2878255 18 159903.06 864716 366118 3 
12673_8_78 ERR555077 2847565 36 79099.03 310572 158375 7 
12673_8_60 ERR555059 2882444 22 131020.18 1010231 336319 3 
12673_8_61 ERR555060 2786185 23 121138.48 670162 352485 3 
12673_8_70 ERR555069 2952480 37 79796.76 714882 256733 4 
12673_8_71 ERR555070 2876933 33 87179.79 450850 173973 5 
12673_8_77 ERR555076 2898647 29 99953.34 611081 367375 4 
12673_8_62 ERR555061 2915191 33 88339.12 464350 314988 4 
12673_8_63 ERR555062 2772052 12 231004.33 1291631 543624 2 
12673_8_66 ERR555065 2776146 17 163302.71 1090666 775789 2 
12673_8_55 ERR555054 2769117 19 145743 387472 240923 5 
12673_8_56 ERR555055 2827916 44 64270.82 338338 158318 7 
12673_8_68 ERR555067 2882836 29 99408.14 505603 211932 4 
12673_8_69 ERR555068 2798393 25 111935.72 409004 190333 5 
12673_8_76 ERR555075 2813559 60 46892.65 277173 156412 7 
12673_8_51 ERR555050 2816484 9 312942.67 1335735 544265 2 
12673_8_52 ERR555051 2778989 35 79399.69 400703 174169 6 
12673_8_79 ERR555078 2798664 42 66634.86 338698 125425 7 
12673_8_80 ERR555079 2746006 14 196143.29 971061 584611 2 
12673_8_81 ERR555080 2825296 25 113011.84 893943 255709 3 
12673_8_54 ERR555053 2772753 13 213288.69 1291764 428796 2 
12673_8_57 ERR555056 2833486 27 104943.93 406858 211675 5 
12673_8_58 ERR555057 2737122 16 171070.12 766047 385595 3 
12673_8_59 ERR555058 2710636 16 169414.75 1299005 625334 2 
12593_2_85 ERR540972 2759201 28 98542.89 654828 174012 4 
12673_8_45 ERR555044 2844311 35 81266.03 330651 166819 6 
12673_8_46 ERR555045 2990078 66 45304.21 291353 111034 10 
12673_8_48 ERR555047 2786913 26 107188.96 446091 245293 4 
12673_8_47 ERR555046 2927433 34 86100.97 782091 298630 4 
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12673_8_50 ERR555049 2912386 46 63312.74 304400 150843 7 
12673_8_53 ERR555052 2810797 54 52051.8 254996 120153 9 
12673_8_72 ERR555071 2830164 43 65817.77 311105 146329 7 
12673_8_73 ERR555072 2786692 31 89893.29 444390 209377 5 
12673_8_74 ERR555073 2770516 36 76958.78 399519 134226 7 
12593_2_87 ERR540974 2748159 26 105698.42 591719 174014 4 
12593_2_88 ERR540975 2863268 36 79535.22 386184 190191 5 
12593_2_89 ERR540976 2890755 42 68827.5 335252 255227 5 
12593_2_90 ERR540977 2867185 39 73517.56 300290 170885 7 
12593_2_86 ERR540973 2830337 36 78620.47 406473 168691 6 
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Appendix 6.2. Combined genomic and epidemiologic data. 
Sample 
Details     Laboratory Data   
Strain ID Year of Isolation 
CC 
(genomic) 
ST 
(genomic) 
spa 
(geno
mic) 
m
e
c
A 
P
V
L 
spa Region 
Community 
(CO)/ 
Hospital 
Onset(HO) 
12483_8_74 2012 22 22 t608 1 0 t608 EAST HO 
12483_8_17 2012 5 5 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_22 2012 5 5 t548 1 0 t548 YORK&HUM CO 
12483_8_71 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS HO 
12625_1_23 2012 22 3742 t906 1 0 t906 LONDON HO 
12625_1_20 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12625_1_17 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12483_8_73 2012 5 125 t067 1 0 t067 LONDON NK 
12483_8_69 2012 8 8 t121 1 1 t121 EAST CO 
12483_8_61 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12625_1_24 2012 22 22 t005 1 1 t005 N WEST HO 
12625_1_25 2012 30 36 t1820 1 0 t1820 N WEST HO 
12625_1_13 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 YORK&HUM HO 
12483_8_45 2012 22 22 t10125 1 0 t10125 N WEST HO 
12483_8_31 2012 22 22 t2892 1 0 t2892 S EAST NK 
12483_8_68 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST NK 
12483_8_47 2012 30 36 t268 1 0 t268 NK NK 
12483_8_21 2012 22 22 t432 1 0 t432 LONDON CO 
12483_8_30 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST NK 
12483_8_78 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST NK 
12483_8_20 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12483_8_19 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON HO 
12673_8_85 2012 22 22 t790 1 0 t790 LONDON HO 
12625_1_26 2012 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 S EAST HO 
12625_1_18 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12625_1_29 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST CO 
12483_8_77 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12625_1_11 2012 59 59 t316 1 0 t316 W MIDS HO 
12625_1_8 2012 22 22 t379 1 0 t379 S EAST HO 
12625_1_19 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST CO 
12483_8_49 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST CO 
12483_8_58 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST CO 
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12483_8_35 2012 22 22 t005 1 1 t005 LONDON CO 
12483_8_75 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST HO 
12673_8_86 2012 8 94 t008 1 0 t008 LONDON CO 
12483_8_25 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST CO 
12483_8_24 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_9 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST CO 
12625_1_10 2012 12 12 t160 1 0 t160 S WEST NK 
12673_8_87 2012 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 LONDON HO 
12483_8_65 2012 59 59 t316 1 0 t316 YORK&HUM HO 
12625_1_5 2012 22 22 t1218 1 0 t1218 N WEST CO 
12483_8_76 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12483_8_87 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12483_8_88 2012 5 5 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12483_8_93 2012 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 LONDON HO 
12483_8_2 2012 22 22 t785 1 0 t785 YORK&HUM CO 
12483_8_52 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12483_8_83 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12673_8_88 2012 45 45 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST HO 
12483_8_28 2012 22 22 t906 1 0 t906 N WEST HO 
12625_1_14 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_3 2012 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 N WEST CO 
12483_8_16 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12483_8_55 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12483_8_81 2012 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON HO 
12625_1_27 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST HO 
12483_8_51 2012 30 30 t1749 1 1 t1749 YORK&HUM HO 
12483_8_4 2012 22 22 t513 1 0 t513 S WEST NK 
12483_8_56 2012 22 22 
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12483_8_32 2012 22 22 t2818 1 0 t2818 S WEST CO 
12483_8_92 2012 22 22 t578 1 0 t578 W MIDS CO 
12483_8_54 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12483_8_95 2012 22 22 t10172 1 0 t10172 S WEST CO 
12483_8_59 2012 22 22 t148 1 0 t148 W MIDS CO 
12483_8_1 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST CO 
12483_8_11 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 N WEST HO 
12625_1_2 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12625_1_15 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12483_8_41 2012 22 22 t1370 1 0 t1370 LONDON HO 
12483_8_60 2012 unknown_CC 72 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12483_8_62 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12625_1_7 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12483_8_15 2012 5 105 t045 1 0 t045 S WEST HO 
12483_8_7 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 S WEST NK 
12625_1_4 2012 22 22 t4929 1 0 t4929 S WEST NK 
12483_8_80 2012 5 5 t6445 1 0 t6445 W MIDS NK 
12483_8_66 2012 30 30 t019 1 1 t019 LONDON CO 
12483_8_90 2012 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST NK 
12483_8_53 2012 22 22 t4218 1 0 t4218 S WEST NK 
12483_8_34 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12625_1_1 2012 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 W MIDS HO 
12483_8_86 2012 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON HO 
12483_8_79 2012 59 3669 t529 1 0 t529 S WEST NK 
12483_8_9 2012 22 22 t2857 1 0 t2857 W MIDS NK 
12483_8_14 2012 59 59 t316 1 0 t316 YORK&HUM HO 
12483_8_63 2012 5 5 t311 1 0 t311 EAST CO 
12483_8_29 2012 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 S WEST HO 
12483_8_82 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON HO 
12483_8_3 2012 30 36 t253 1 0 t253 E MIDS CO 
12483_8_57 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12483_8_38 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM HO 
12483_8_42 2012 22 22 t005 1 1 t005 LONDON NK 
12483_8_36 2012 22 22 t005 1 0 t005 YORK&HUM HO 
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12483_8_67 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12625_1_28 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12483_8_50 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 YORK&HUM HO 
12483_8_89 2012 5 5 t010 1 0 t010 E MIDS CO 
12625_1_6 2012 30 30 t019 1 1 t019 S EAST CO 
12755_8_68 2012 1 1 t127 1 1 t127 N WEST CO 
12483_8_94 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12483_8_84 2012 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 N WEST NK 
12483_8_26 2012 8 3727 t334 1 0 t334 S WEST NK 
12625_1_30 2012 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON HO 
12625_1_32 2012 5 3743 t1781 1 0 t1781 N WEST CO 
12589_1_6 2012 22 22 t3612 1 0 t3612 S WEST CO 
12625_1_33 2012 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S WEST CO 
12625_1_34 2012 5 526 
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1 1 t002 N WEST CO 
12625_1_35 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST HO 
12625_1_36 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST NK 
12625_1_37 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST NK 
12625_1_38 2012 88 88 t1816 1 1 t1816 S EAST NK 
12625_1_42 2012 22 22 t8530 1 0 t8530 S WEST CO 
12625_1_43 2012 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 LONDON HO 
12625_1_45 2012 22 22 t11666 1 0 t11666 S WEST CO 
12625_1_46 2012 22 22 t3612 1 0 t3612 S WEST CO 
12625_1_47 2012 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 S WEST CO 
12625_1_48 2012 22 22 t432 1 0 t432 W MIDS CO 
12625_1_49 2012 22 22 t4573 1 1 t4573 W MIDS CO 
12625_1_53 2013 22 3122 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_54 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_50 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST HO 
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12625_1_51 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12625_1_52 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12625_1_55 2013 8 8 t104 1 1 t104 S EAST NK 
12625_1_56 2012 22 22 t1041 1 0 t1041 EAST CO 
12625_1_57 2013 22 22 t8473 1 0 t8473 LONDON HO 
12625_1_59 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_60 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12625_1_61 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12625_1_62 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12625_1_63 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST NK 
12625_1_64 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON HO 
12625_1_65 2013 unknown_CC 80 t044 1 1 t044 NK NK 
12589_1_7 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12625_1_66 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12625_1_67 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 N WEST HO 
12625_1_69 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12625_1_70 2013 22 22 t906 1 0 t906 N WEST CO 
12625_1_71 2013 22 22 t1499 1 0 t1499 N WEST NK 
12625_1_72 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 EAST CO 
12625_1_73 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12625_1_74 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12625_1_75 2013 8 8 t008 1 1 t008 YORK&HUM CO 
12625_1_76 2013 45 46 t040 1 0 t040 EAST CO 
12625_1_78 2013 unknown_CC 93 t202 1 1 t202 S EAST CO 
12625_1_79 2013 30 3674 t253 1 0 t253 E MIDS HO 
12625_1_80 2013 1 772 t657 1 1 t657 S WEST NK 
12625_1_81 2013 5 5 t002 1 1 t002 LONDON HO 
12625_1_82 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 N WEST CO 
12625_1_83 2013 22 22 t1612 1 0 t1612 S WEST NK 
12625_1_84 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12625_1_85 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12625_1_86 2013 45 45 t077 1 0 t077 LONDON CO 
12625_1_87 2013 5 5 t002 1 1 t002 LONDON HO 
12625_1_89 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST CO 
12625_1_90 2013 22 22 t852 1 1 t852 N WEST HO 
12625_1_91 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST CO 
12625_1_92 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
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12625_1_93 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S EAST CO 
12625_1_95 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST CO 
12593_1_1 2013 5 5 t2724 1 0 t2724 N WEST CO 
12593_1_2 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12593_1_4 2013 22 22 t11885 1 0 t11885 LONDON HO 
12593_1_64 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON CO 
12593_1_5 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12593_1_6 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON HO 
12593_1_7 2013 22 22 t11279 1 0 t11279 S EAST NK 
12593_1_9 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 EAST HO 
12593_1_10 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 N WEST CO 
12593_1_11 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12593_1_13 2013 22 22 t8964 1 0 t8964 EAST CO 
12593_1_65 2013 8 239 t037 1 0 t037 EAST HO 
12593_1_15 2013 8 8 t008 1 1 t008 LONDON CO 
12593_1_16 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 N WEST HO 
12593_1_17 2013 59 59 t316 1 0 t316 W MIDS CO 
12593_1_18 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 W MIDS CO 
12593_1_19 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST HO 
12593_1_20 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 LONDON CO 
12593_1_21 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12593_1_22 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_1_23 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_1_24 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 EAST NK 
12593_1_66 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 EAST CO 
12593_1_26 2013 22 22 t1467 1 0 t1467 N EAST NK 
12593_1_27 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST HO 
12593_1_28 2013 22 22 t3861 1 0 t3861 LONDON CO 
12589_1_8 2013 22 22 t9502 1 0 t9502 S WEST HO 
12593_1_29 2013 1 1 t2279 1 0 t2279 W MIDS HO 
12593_1_30 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12593_1_68 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12593_1_69 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 LONDON HO 
12589_1_9 2013 5 5 t1341 1 0 t1341 S WEST HO 
12589_1_10 2013 5 1340 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON CO 
12589_1_11 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 N WEST HO 
12589_1_12 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON HO 
12593_1_31 2013 unknown_CC 78 t186 1 0 t186 
YORK&
HUM CO 
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12589_1_13 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_1_32 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON HO 
12593_1_33 2013 22 22 t223 1 0 t223 W MIDS CO 
12589_1_17 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST NK 
12593_1_72 2013 22 22 t2818 1 0 t2818 S WEST NK 
12593_1_73 2013 22 22 t5892 1 0 t5892 S EAST HO 
12589_1_19 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST NK 
12593_1_35 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12593_1_75 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12593_1_76 2013 22 22 t852 1 1 t852 LONDON HO 
12589_1_20 2013 5 5 t010 1 0 t010 EAST CO 
12589_1_21 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12589_1_22 2013 22 22 
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1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12589_1_50 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12593_1_37 2013 59 59 t316 1 0 t316 YORK&HUM HO 
12593_1_38 2013 22 22 t025 1 0 t025 N WEST HO 
12589_1_23 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_24 2013 unknown_CC 152 t1828 1 1 t1828 LONDON CO 
12593_1_77 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 W MIDS HO 
12593_1_78 2013 30 36 t253 1 0 t253 S WEST NK 
12593_1_79 2013 30 36 t253 1 0 t253 S WEST NK 
12593_1_80 2013 22 2916 t578 1 0 t578 YORK&HUM HO 
12589_1_51 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12589_1_62 2013 30 36 t012 1 0 t012 LONDON CO 
12755_8_70 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12593_1_40 2013 8 241 t037 1 0 t037 LONDON CO 
12593_1_41 2013 22 22 t4559 1 0 t4559 E MIDS HO 
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12593_1_42 2013 22 22 t852 1 1 t852 LONDON HO 
12589_1_28 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST CO 
12593_1_44 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 N EAST NK 
12593_1_45 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 N EAST NK 
12593_1_46 2013 30 2938 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON CO 
12589_1_63 2013 22 22 t1214 1 0 t1214 W MIDS CO 
12589_1_29 2013 22 3734 t12520 1 0 t12520 EAST HO 
12593_1_81 2013 22 3824 t022 1 0 t022 E MIDS CO 
12589_1_54 2013 30 3672 t018 1 0 t018 S EAST HO 
12593_1_82 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12589_1_52 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12589_1_31 2013 22 22 
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1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12589_1_32 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S EAST HO 
12593_1_83 2013 45 45 t630 1 0 t630 W MIDS CO 
12589_1_35 2013 22 22 t8473 1 0 t8473 LONDON HO 
12593_1_84 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 S EAST HO 
12593_1_47 2013 22 22 t2818 1 0 t2818 S WEST HO 
12593_1_48 2013 22 22 t12254 1 0 t12254 W MIDS NK 
12593_1_49 2013 22 22 t557 1 0 t557 N EAST HO 
12593_1_50 2013 22 22 t852 1 1 t852 S WEST CO 
12593_1_51 2013 30 30 t019 1 1 t019 LONDON CO 
12593_1_52 2013 22 22 
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12593_1_53 2013 45 45 t026 1 0 t026 LONDON CO 
12593_1_86 2013 unknown_CC 78 t3202 1 0 t3202 
YORK&
HUM HO 
12593_1_87 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 LONDON HO 
12589_1_55 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST HO 
12593_1_88 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM NK 
12589_1_36 2013 22 22 t6859 1 0 t6859 LONDON NK 
12593_1_89 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON CO 
12593_1_90 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12593_1_91 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 N WEST HO 
12589_1_53 2013 5 5 t002 1 1 t002 LONDON HO 
12589_1_37 2013 22 22 
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1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12593_1_92 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 N WEST HO 
12589_1_38 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST HO 
12589_1_39 2013 22 3735 t12287 1 0 t12287 LONDON HO 
12593_1_93 2013 22 22 t12293 1 0 t12293 N EAST NK 
12589_1_40 2013 22 22 t379 1 0 t379 N EAST NK 
12593_1_95 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12589_1_1 2013 30 1456 t019 1 1 t019 LONDON CO 
12589_1_2 2013 45 45 t1081 1 0 t1081 LONDON CO 
12589_1_42 2013 5 3074 t002 1 0 t002 N WEST CO 
12589_1_43 2013 22 3734 t025 1 0 t025 EAST HO 
12589_1_44 2013 22 22 t557 1 0 t557 LONDON HO 
12589_1_3 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 S EAST CO 
12593_1_57 2013 5 149 t002 1 0 t002 E MIDS CO 
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12589_1_45 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS HO 
12593_1_58 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12589_1_48 2013 30 3671 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON NK 
12589_1_47 2013 22 22 t1214 1 0 t1214 LONDON CO 
12589_1_46 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_4 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12589_1_5 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12589_1_61 2013 59 59 t7344 1 0 t7344 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_1_59 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM HO 
12589_1_58 2013 8 8 t1774 1 0 t1774 S WEST NK 
12589_1_59 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 N WEST HO 
12593_1_61 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST CO 
12593_1_62 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 N WEST HO 
12593_1_63 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON HO 
12589_1_60 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST CO 
12589_1_65 2013 unknown_CC 3673 t044 1 1 t044 E MIDS HO 
12589_1_66 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S EAST CO 
12589_1_67 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 S WEST HO 
12589_1_68 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST HO 
12589_1_69 2013 22 22 t10718 1 0 t10718 N WEST CO 
12589_1_70 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_71 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12589_1_72 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S EAST HO 
12589_1_73 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 NK NK 
12589_1_74 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 LONDON CO 
12755_8_71 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST CO 
12755_8_72 2013 22 22 t557 1 0 t557 N EAST NK 
12589_1_77 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST CO 
12589_1_78 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST CO 
12589_1_80 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 NK NK 
12589_1_81 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_82 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_83 2013 22 22 t12422 1 0 t12422 LONDON HO 
12589_1_84 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON NK 
12589_1_85 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_86 2013 22 3737 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12589_1_87 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
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12589_1_88 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST NK 
12593_2_77 2013 22 22 t2235 1 0 t2235 S EAST CO 
12589_1_89 2013 22 22 t2752 1 0 t2752 YORK&HUM CO 
12755_8_73 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 EAST CO 
12589_1_90 2013 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 LONDON CO 
12589_1_91 2013 22 1082 t1612 1 0 t1612 S EAST CO 
12589_1_92 2013 22 3738 t2818 1 0 t2818 S WEST NK 
12589_1_94 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS HO 
12593_2_78 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 EAST CO 
12589_1_95 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_1 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 W MIDS CO 
12593_2_2 2013 22 22 t8703 1 0 t8703 LONDON HO 
12593_2_3 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12593_2_7 2013 97 97 t6576 1 0 t6576 S EAST CO 
12593_2_8 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON CO 
12593_2_9 2013 22 22 t1302 1 0 t1302 N WEST HO 
12593_2_10 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON CO 
12593_2_11 2013 59 59 t7344 1 0 t7344 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_12 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12593_2_13 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST NK 
12593_2_14 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12593_2_15 2013 88 88 t5973 1 0 t5973 N WEST NK 
12593_2_16 2013 22 22 t12550 1 0 t12550 N WEST CO 
12593_2_17 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12593_2_18 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 EAST HO 
12593_2_20 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 S EAST CO 
12593_2_21 2013 22 22 t578 1 0 t578 N WEST HO 
12593_2_22 2013 5 526 
- 
(Deleti
ons/rea
rrange
ments 
within 
the spa 
gene. 
Loss of 
sequen
ce 
comple
mentar
y to 
forwar
1 0 t8084 S EAST CO 
 Appendices 
 
 179 
d 
primer) 
12593_2_25 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N EAST NK 
12593_2_79 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_26 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S WEST HO 
12593_2_27 2013 22 3739 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST HO 
12593_2_80 2013 7 7 t12607 1 0 t12607 S WEST CO 
12593_2_28 2013 5 105 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON CO 
12593_2_74 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12593_2_29 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_2_30 2013 30 30 t021 1 1 t021 LONDON CO 
12593_2_31 2013 22 22 t12651 1 0 t12651 S WEST HO 
12593_2_34 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 LONDON CO 
12593_2_40 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST CO 
12593_2_42 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 E MIDS CO 
12593_2_43 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12593_2_37 2013 22 22 t1500 1 0 t1500 S WEST HO 
12593_2_38 2013 1 772 t657 1 1 t657 YORK&HUM HO 
12593_2_45 2013 8 8 t1774 1 0 t1774 N WEST HO 
12593_2_46 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST NK 
12593_2_47 2013 22 22 t790 1 0 t790 EAST HO 
12593_2_48 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12593_2_49 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON NK 
12593_2_50 2013 22 22 t025 1 0 t025 S WEST NK 
12593_2_51 2013 5 5 t1154 1 1 t1154 S EAST CO 
12593_2_52 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S WEST HO 
12593_2_53 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_2_54 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12593_2_55 2013 30 30 t019 1 1 t019 S EAST NK 
12593_2_56 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 YORK&HUM HO 
12593_2_81 2013 59 3740 t7344 1 0 t7344 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_61 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12593_2_62 2013 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 S EAST HO 
12593_2_82 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 LONDON HO 
12593_2_64 2013 97 97 t12761 1 0 t12761 N WEST HO 
12593_2_57 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST NK 
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12593_2_58 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 LONDON CO 
12593_2_59 2013 unknown_CC 361 t315 1 0 t315 LONDON NK 
12593_2_60 2013 22 22 t025 1 0 t025 S WEST HO 
12593_2_69 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12593_2_70 2013 22 22 t2892 1 0 t2892 S EAST HO 
12593_2_71 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 W MIDS CO 
12593_2_83 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 YORK&HUM HO 
12593_2_72 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12593_2_65 2013 22 22 t379 1 0 t379 W MIDS HO 
12593_2_84 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST CO 
12593_2_66 2013 30 30 t122 1 1 t122 LONDON NK 
12593_2_67 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 W MIDS CO 
12593_2_68 2013 8 241 t037 1 0 t037 LONDON HO 
12593_2_91 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 LONDON NK 
12593_2_92 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON HO 
12593_2_93 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS CO 
12593_2_95 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 S EAST HO 
12673_8_44 2013 8 8 t008 1 1 t008 W MIDS NK 
12673_8_78 2013 22 3757 t032 1 0 t032 LONDON CO 
12673_8_60 2013 8 8 t008 1 1 t008 S EAST HO 
12673_8_61 2013 unknown_CC 361 t315 1 0 t315 LONDON CO 
12673_8_70 2013 8 241 t037 1 0 t037 LONDON NK 
12673_8_71 2013 22 22 t020 1 0 t020 S WEST HO 
12673_8_77 2013 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 S EAST CO 
12673_8_62 2013 8 8 t008 1 0 t008 YORK&HUM CO 
12673_8_63 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 S WEST CO 
12673_8_66 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S WEST NK 
12673_8_55 2013 5 149 t002 1 0 t002 LONDON NK 
12673_8_56 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST NK 
12673_8_68 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 E MIDS HO 
12673_8_69 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12673_8_76 2013 22 22 t005 1 1 t005 S EAST CO 
12673_8_51 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 S WEST HO 
12673_8_52 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12673_8_79 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST NK 
12673_8_80 2013 88 88 t729 1 0 t729 S EAST CO 
12673_8_81 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 S EAST NK 
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12673_8_54 2013 1 1 t127 1 0 t127 S WEST HO 
12673_8_57 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12673_8_58 2013 5 5 t002 1 0 t002 EAST HO 
12673_8_59 2013 45 3846 t015 1 0 t015 W MIDS HO 
12593_2_85 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 N EAST NK 
12673_8_45 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 E MIDS HO 
12673_8_46 2013 8 241 t030 1 0 t030 N WEST HO 
12673_8_48 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST NK 
12673_8_47 2013 8 8 t032 1 0 t032 S EAST HO 
12673_8_50 2013 30 36 t018 1 0 t018 S EAST CO 
12673_8_53 2013 22 22 t005 1 1 t005 S EAST HO 
12673_8_72 2013 22 22 t718 1 0 t718 YORK&HUM HO 
12673_8_73 2013 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 N WEST HO 
12673_8_74 2013 97 97 t267 1 0 t267 LONDON HO 
12593_2_87 2013 22 22 t492 1 0 t492 S EAST HO 
12593_2_88 2012 22 22 t032 1 0 t032 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_89 2013 22 22 t1802 1 0 t1802 YORK&HUM CO 
12593_2_90 2013 30 36 t012 1 0 t012 YORK&HUM HO 
12593_2_86 2013 22 22 t022 1 0 t022 YORK&HUM CO 
 
 
